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REFUGEE LAW IN ISLAM

**Dr. Muhammad Munir*

Abstract

This paper focuses on the role of Islamic tradition of *hijrah* and *aman* and the law and practice relating to forced migration and refugee protection in the Muslim world. It concludes that there is contradiction between the Islamic tradition of *hijrah* and *aman* and the law and practice relating to forced migration and the protection of refugees in the Muslim world. The rich heritage of Islam in the field of migration law and refugee protection has been abandoned throughout the Muslim world today. In the past, Islam made a great contribution to the humanization of internal and international relations in the Muslim world. It could play this role even today and could prompt a much-needed humanization of some branches of international law. Given the current importance of this issue, Muslim states must urgently need to revive the Islamic concepts of *hijrah*, *aman*, and asylum in order to contribute to the improvement of modern refugee law and to make it more protective for refugees and forced migrants in general.

Introduction

Regulation of relations between the Muslim state and non-Muslim states is one of the core areas of *Siyar* or the Islamic law of nations. The main sources of *Siyar*, i.e., the Qur'an and the *Sunna* have elaborate rules on the law of war, peace, the formation of treaties, and trade. *Siyar* also deals extensively with rebels and apostates and has a set of binding rules for guiding the Islamic state; how to deal with the non-Muslim citizens of a Muslim state; how to deal with foreigners, especially businessmen from the non-Muslim nations who visited the Muslim entity for business or individuals or communities who requested asylum or protection from Muslim individuals or State; immunity of envoys; territorial jurisdiction and a host of other issues. Classical Muslim jurists have given elaborate rules in their treatises about the relations of Muslim and non-Muslim states and communities. In classical Islamic law the area of Islamic law that regulates relations between the Muslim State with non-Muslim States is known as *siyar* (Islamic international law). Refugee law in Islam is not an area in which the Muslim state and the non-Muslim states have much to do. It is rather the citizens of the Muslim state and the citizens of non-Muslim states that are involved in this area of Islamic law. The most comprehensive classical treatise dealing with all the issues

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of Islamic International law (*siyar*) is *Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir* by Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d.189/804).¹

There are 57 Muslim member states in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)* located in Africa, Asia, and Europe.² Muslim communities are found all over the world as minorities. Currently, Muslims are more than 1.66 billion.³ The world is experiencing armed conflicts and persecution of persons at an alarming rate. This is more so in the Muslim world which seems at present to be a world of armed conflicts and forced displacements, or in other words, “*dar al-hrub wa al-muhajirun*” a (world of wars and refugees). Uprooted persons are refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Refugees and asylum-seekers move involuntarily from one country to another seeking protection from persecution or fleeing insecurity and violence whereas displaced persons move involuntarily within the national borders. Refugees are governed by refugee law in particular.

According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as of June 2009 there were 42 million uprooted people. They included 16 million refugees outside their countries and 26 million other displaced internally.⁴ The 57 Member states of the OIC were host to 9.4 million refugees and persons of concern to the UNHCR. This figure does not include the more than four million Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, who fall within the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the Kashmiri refugees who migrated to Pakistan and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Pakistan.

Islamic law relating to asylum-seeking and forced displacement or what is known in Islamic history as *hijrah* law are quite different from modern refugee law. Islamic law gives more protection to asylum-seekers and refugees (*mustaminun*), but it is rarely referred to or invoked today. If the Islamic laws of asylum and *hijrah* are taken into consideration, it could significantly solve the refugee problems all over the world and especially within the Muslim states. This would also help in understanding Islam differently. Unfortunately, today Muslim states do not apply Islamic law to deal with refugees and asylum-seekers. This

* Renamed as Organisation of Islamic Cooperation on June 28, 2011.

work analyses Islamic law regarding refugees and asylum-seeking.⁵ It also refers to international refugee law on forced migration.

The Concept of Hijrah and Asylum-seeking in Islam

The term *hijrah* (immigration) and its derivatives are mentioned 27 times in the Qur'an to mean "to abandon." The term *hijrah* comes from the Arabic word *hajara* which means to abandon, to migrate, to break ties with someone. In *Shari'ah* it means "migration in the path of Allah"⁶ and is very often used to designate the fact of fleeing from a state governed by the infidels in order to join the Muslim community. Asylum is very important in Islamic history and law and is linked with the obligation to search for security and protection. Immigration marked the Muslim community since its beginning. The Prophet (peace be upon him) sent some of his followers to Abyssinia to protect them from the persecutions of the infidels of Makka.⁷ However, the concept of *hijrah* is primarily discussed with reference to the Prophet's (peace be upon him) persecution and flight in September 622 from Makka to Yathrib, the city of his mother, later named Madina. That marks the beginning of the Islamic era which does not start with the Prophet's (peace be upon him) birth or the date when he received revelation, but with his *hijrah* to Madina. Those who migrated to Madina were called *muhajirin* (the immigrants) and those who gave them good support were called *ansar* (the supporter). Some Muslims, however, remained in Makka and practised their faith in secret. Others stayed back because they were sick, infirm or unable to migrate for other reasons. Referring to this episode, the following verses urged the Muslims in Makka to join the Community:

Verily, as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they are wronging themselves (as they stayed among the disbelievers even though emigration was obligatory for them), they (angels) say (to them): "We were weak and oppressed on the earth." They (angels) say: "Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to emigrate therein?" Such men will find their abode in Hell – What an evil destination! Except the weak ones among men, women and children who cannot devise a plan, nor are they able to direct their way. These are they whom Allah is likely to forgive them, and Allah is Ever Oft-Pardoning, Oft-Forgiving.⁸

Historically this migration was stopped after Makka was conquered in the 8th year after the Prophet's *hijrah* to Madina. According to Imam Abu Zahra, migration is not necessary for Muslims except when there is a genuine excuse.⁹ He argues that "all those Muslims who live in a country where a Muslim is humiliated or where he cannot practise his religion or where he is not treated according to Islamic laws then, it is obligatory for him to migrate to a land where he can strengthen the Muslims."¹⁰ He asserts that a Muslim is accountable if he preferred humiliation and luxurious life outside the land of Muslims and that it is better for him to live poor with dignity under Islam rather than to live a prosperous life with humiliation.¹¹ This is, however, the ambivalent characteristic of the pre-modern age. The reason is that today one-third of all Muslims live in non-Muslim countries.¹² In his treatment of the issue of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim states, Khaled Abu El Fadl argues that "The rulings and decisions of pre-modern Muslim jurists will not necessarily resolve the dilemmas facing Muslim minorities. They do, however, provide examples of ethical choices made in response to particular historical challenges."¹³

The Concept of Aman

Muslim jurists discuss the term "*Al-Aman*" while explaining verse 9:6 of the Holy Qur'an. According to Kamal ibn al-Humam, *al-Aman* is a type of *muwada'a*."¹⁴ "Because by virtue of it hostilities are suspended like *muwada'a*" says the author of '*Enayat 'ala al-Hidaya*."¹⁵ *Aman* is "safe conduct" or "assurance of protection" and may be given by a Muslim citizen or by an *Imam* or his deputy to a private citizen coming from a non-Muslim State/territory. According to *fuqha*, *aman* – whether given by a free man or slave, man or women¹⁶ – usually covers a small group of people which may be upto 10 people, or a small caravan, or a fort. So, if a Muslim says, to his adversary, "Lay down your weapon first and fear not," he has given him an assurance of protection, he must not be killed and must be returned to his place of security. Refuge or *aman* is of two types: general, which is for all people; and particular, which is for one or a few persons. The first one is also called *hudnah* (peace treaty). The majority of jurists agree that to give general *aman* is only the right of the *Imam* or his delegate. However, they disagree in relation to the particular *aman*. So, the majority agrees with particular *aman* but a few jurists, such as Ibn Majishun and Ibn Habib of the Maliki school, claim

that such an *aman* would be valid only if ratified by the *Imam* or his deputy. Other Maliki jurists disagree with them. According to Ibn Juzi, another leading Maliki jurist, “The *Imam* and Muslims must abide by the *aman* granted by a Muslim to a non-Muslim, or a group of them [non-Muslims], as long as there is no harm in it. It does not matter whether it is beneficial or not.”¹⁷ Refuge (asylum) is covered by the Qura’nic verse. God says:

And if anyone of the *Mushrikun* (polytheists, idolaters, pagans, disbelievers in the Oneness of Allah) seeks your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the Word of Allah (the Qur’an), and then escort him to where he can be secure, that is because they are men who know not.¹⁸

Imam Awza’i was once asked about this verse: “And where is his place of security; do you think if he says my place of security is in Constantinople, we should take him there?” Awza’i answered, “If he reaches one of their fortresses or one of their strongholds, this would be his place of security.” He was then asked, “What if the polytheists are met by a Muslim patrol in their country before they reach their place of security?” he answered, “The patrol should not stand in their way.” He was then asked about the enemy who enters Muslim land under a safe conduct which is valid until his return and, on the way back to his country, climbs a mountain within his own territory but is forced by strong winds to return to Muslim land. If the enemy then says, “I am here under safe conduct, what should be done?” Awza’i answered, “I am of the opinion that he is entitled to remain protected by the safe conduct.”¹⁹

The Prophet is reported to have said, “*Aman* given by Muslims is allowed. So, if anyone violated the protection granted by a Muslim, he [the violator] is cursed by God, angels and all the people.”²⁰ Ibn Hajr in his commentary on this *hadith* says, “It is prohibited (*haram*) for a Muslim to interfere in the *aman* given by his fellow Muslim.”²¹ The Prophet approved the protection given by Umm Hanni to two men on the day Makka was conquered. These men were the relatives of her husband but violated the terms of general amnesty granted to the Makkans.²²

Aman may be given by Muslims to non-Muslims and by non-Muslims to Muslims. At the time of ‘Umar, the Second Caliph, during a war, a Persian soldier took shelter at the top of a tree. A Muslim soldier

told him in Persian cum Arabic “*matrasi*” (don’t be afraid). His adversary thought that he was given a pledge and protection and came down. Sadly, he was killed by the Muslim soldier. The matter was reported to the Caliph, who warned the commander, saying “[A]s God is my witness, if I hear anyone has done this I shall cut his neck.”²³

According to Shaybani if the Muslim commander informed, or wrote, or sent a messenger to the enemy besieged in a fort telling them not to accept the *aman* if given to [them] by a Muslim individual because his *aman* is invalid, then, if they accepted the *aman* granted to them by an individual Muslim, they will become prisoners of war (POWs). He argues that it does not mean that *aman* cannot be granted by an individual Muslim but it is because they [the besieged non-Muslims] did not follow the notice given to them by the Muslim commander.²⁴ Shaybani further argues “If a person entered a Muslim state with *aman* and killed a Muslim intentionally or without intention, or committed robbery, or spied on the Muslims and sent it [the information] to the polytheists, or raped a Muslim or a non-Muslim women [non-Muslim citizen of the Muslim state], or committed theft, then none of these amount to breach of his *aman*.”²⁵ Similarly, he will be given the punishment of *hadd* if he [person given *aman*] accuses an innocent Muslim of illegal sex.”²⁶ Finally, no death penalty will be awarded to a Muslim or a non-Muslim [citizen of a Muslim state] for killing a *musta’min* [person given pledge] but the killer has to pay blood money to his relatives and will be imprisoned.²⁷ Shaybani has dealt with this topic in minute details in 25 chapters, i.e. chapters 42-50 of volume I and chapters 51-67 of volume II of his *Kitab al-siyar al-kabir* (magnum opus study of *siyar*).²⁸ Going into the details is beyond the scope of this work.

There have been many occasions when *aman* was granted by the Muslims to an individual who brought victory for them. Ibn Nuhas²⁹ mentions in his book that in the year 20 the battle of Tastur happened. Abu Musa al Ash’ari had laid siege to the fortified city for over a year. The Persian general al-Hurmuzan was fortified in there. A Persian man came to Abu Musa and told him if he promised him and his family protection he would guide him to a secret entrance into the city. Abu Musa gave him protection and sent with him Majza’ah bin Thawr. They entered through a hidden underground spring of water, swimming through it until they surfaced in the city. They entered the city and

Majza'ah travelled through it until he learned its map. The Persian man also pointed out to him the Persian general Hurmuzan. Majza'ah returned and was sent along with 35 men to conquer the city. The thirty five men swam through the spring and entered into the city at night. They fought courageously and the Persians surrendered. Al Hurmuzan became a Muslim and settled in Madina.

No *aman* (asylum) or covenant of security can be given to apostates (*murtadoon*) since they are regarded as rebels who defy the authority of Islamic state. Muslim jurists have discussed elaborate rules for what a *musta'min* (the secured) can bring, take back, buy or sell or for how long can he stay.

The jurists have formulated certain limitations concerning the property which a *harbi* may acquire. Abu Yusuf writes:

The *Imam* should forbid an enemy person who comes to us, whether with *aman*, or as messenger of a foreign prince, to take with him slaves, weapons and other commodities which could strengthen the enemy to attack Muslims. Concerning clothes, wares and similar things, their exportation is not forbidden.³⁰

Ibn Rushd (d. 1126), based the *aman* on the fact that the Prophet had purchased goats from a non-Muslim shepherd who came to him. He gave a list of commodities that the *harbi* could not buy weapons, iron, elegant clothes, copper and horses.³¹

The Islamic concept of *hijrah* is broader than the definition of refugees given in article 1 of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951. This article describes refugees only as persons forced to flee persecution for specific and limited reasons and who otherwise would not have found it necessary to migrate. This Convention, which now represents the universal charter of refugee law, defines a refugee as any person who,

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Islam considers asylum as a right of the asylum-seekers, a duty for those who are requested for it, and a general and comprehensive form of protection. It is religious, territorial and to some extent diplomatic. Modern international as well as national laws do not give individuals the right to grant or be granted asylum. Both set of modern laws reserve this right for the State, which is free to grant or refuse asylum to those who seek it. Nationals cannot choose their foreign hosts and expect them to grant protection, even if they are from the same origin but with different nationalities. Today, only the State has the right to decide to whom refugee status will be granted. In Islamic law and traditions, any person (even a non-Muslim) fleeing and seeking protection has the right to enter an Islamic community and ask for protection (*aman*). This person can seek asylum from State leaders or from common individuals (men or women, Muslims, or non-Muslims) living within the Islamic community or *dar al-Islam* (the world where Islamic law applies). These individuals have the right to protect asylum-seekers equally.

In a sense, seeking asylum is a duty. Muslims are not obliged to live in places where there is injustice and persecution and they are urged by Islam to leave these places and seek protection elsewhere.

Moreover, Muslims cannot close their doors to persons seeking protection. It is their duty to grant asylum. It is the duty of the political leaders of the Islamic communities, but is also the duty of any person living in *dar al-Islam*, regardless of race, sex, social, or political status.

All forced migrants who are in need of protection should be granted *aman* (refuge or asylum) if they seek it. They can seek asylum from within *dar al-Islam*. They may also come from *dar al-harb* (the world where Muslim law does not apply). Muslims are encouraged to protect non-Muslim asylum-seekers as a way of introducing them to Islam. Non-Muslim refugees, however, are not obliged to adopt Islam and, as is clear in verse 6 of *Surah Al-Tawbah* of the Qur'an, are granted the status of "protected persons" in *dar al-Islam*. Asylum-seekers are not even obliged to prove that they have been persecuted before fleeing and should be granted asylum only upon their own request. However, asylum-seekers should not have committed crimes before seeking asylum, as all crimes should be punished, and there is no distinction in Islam between political and non-political crimes.

Once asylum is granted to any person, protection or *aman* should be general, and refugees should benefit from all the rights guaranteed to nationals. These include the right to work, the right to education, the right to free movement, the right to do business, and the right to family reunification. Moreover, *aman* is not limited in time and the departure of the “protected” or *mustaman* from *dar al-Islam* or the place of his/her residence will depend on the individual’s decision. This is the equivalent of voluntary repatriation in modern international law. However, it may be presumed that the rules on *aman* as found in classical texts of Islamic law are only about the situations in which individuals or small groups seek protection among the Muslim community. The situations in which there is mass influx of population because of war between non-Muslim neighbouring state and another state (not the Muslim state) or in case of a civil war within the non-Muslim state itself, Muslim jurists may have to devise new rules or modify the old ones to cover these situations.

Islam reaffirms old Arab traditions and customs relating to granting asylum and refugee status (*al-himaya* in Arabic) and adopts principles relating to the granting of religious asylum or sanctuary. Some places kept their pre-Islamic sacred characteristics (such as the Ka‘abah in Makka), and others became sacred, such as the cities of Makka and Madina, the house of the Prophet and the houses of his successors and of religious leaders. Many verses of the Qur’an recommend respecting a sanctuary.³²

Islam reaffirms the tradition of granting territorial asylum by any individual or by Muslim leaders to asylum-seekers looking for protection. This kind of asylum was called *istijara* or *talab al-jiwar* (asking for assistance from a neighbourhood or assistance from a community). Islam also reaffirms the pre-Islamic Arab tradition of protecting non-Muslim messengers and merchants (and their collaborators), who come for a short period to *dar al-Islam*. In pre-Islamic times, this kind of protection was called the protection of the mission, a kind of diplomatic protection in modern terms. In Islamic theory, in short, asylum is a human right both for asylum-seekers and for their hosts. By comparison, the protection guaranteed to refugees and forced migrants under modern law is more limited and restrictive.

Limitations of Modern International Refugee Law

Modern international refugee law and law on forced migration comprise the international instruments relating to human rights, migrant workers, and refugees. These documents include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1945, the two international Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants and the Members of their Families of 18 December 1990. These instruments are universal, regional, and national. As stated earlier, modern refugee law does not consider asylum-granting as a right of individuals; it is the right of the state only. In addition it does not concern all forced migrants but only a few of them who are well defined in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention. Many persons are consequently excluded from its protection and therefore from asylum.

Modern refugee law does not protect IDPs as there are no binding international instruments relating to them in particular. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, prepared in 1998 by Special Representative of the Secretary General for IDPs, Francis Deng, apply to such persons, but these principles are not binding on states.

Modern international refugee law excludes some categories of persons who are not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention from international protection. For example, Article 1D declares that the 1951 Convention will not apply to persons “who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.” This is the case of over 3 million Palestinian refugees who receive assistance (and not protection) from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). On the other hand some refugees need special attention, such as women and children. Women, especially Muslim women have special needs as refugees, but these are rarely taken into account by modern refugee law or state practice.

Modern Law of Asylum is Mainly a Right of the State

Refugees lack protection from their countries of origin and are in need of international protection. They are usually fleeing persecution and insecurity and in need to find a safe place to live. That is why they seek asylum. Modern refugee law has no provision to the effect that to be

granted asylum is a right of asylum-seekers. The 1951 Convention does not mention asylum in its provisions. Only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights deals with asylum. Article 4 of UDHR states that, “everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” The term ‘enjoy’ does not mean in any case the automatic grant of asylum. The same article adds, however, that “this right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” Unfortunately no exact definition of a ‘political crime’ exists in international law. It is left to states to decide on the definition of political and non-political crimes and in state practice, a crime is rarely considered to be political.

The crux of the matter is that granting or refusing asylum is the exclusive right of the state. The only obligation for the state is that an asylum-seeker will not be forcibly returned to any country where his/her life could be in danger, according to article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Consequently, all forced migrants in the world are not really protected by modern refugee law. Only some of them are granted protection. In Muslim states, which since the 1990s, have become the centre of all types of migration, refugees in many cases are neither protected by the limited modern refugee law nor by Islamic law relating to *hijrah* and *aman*. It is very disappointing that in the 21st century era of globalization there are often gaps in the legal frameworks of both Muslim and non-Muslim states when it comes to the subject of asylum and the protection of refugees and IDPs.

Legal Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Legal Vacuum

Afghanistan produced massive refugee movements during the 1980s. The problem began in April 1978, when a group of urban intellectuals led by Nur Mohammad Taraki seized power and attempted to establish a communist state. They introduced wide-ranging social reforms which were resented by the deeply Islamic traditional rural population they were intended to benefit. The communist regime was backed by the then Soviet Union and it responded very harshly to Afghans who opposed the regime. Writing in 1987 Dupree and Dupree described this state of affairs in this way:

Religious, political, and intellectual elites were jailed or executed; ground attacks and aerial bombings destroyed

villages and killed countless numbers of the rural population. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people disappeared or were eliminated ... from April 1978 to December 1979.³³

Afghans began fleeing to neighbouring Pakistan and Iran and by August 1978, some 3,000 has sought refuge in Pakistan; by early 1979, this figure has risen to over 20,000.³⁴ In late December 1979, the then Soviet Union, fearing the loss of an important ally to its southern border, invaded Afghanistan, triggering a massive exodus of refugees. Within weeks, over 600,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran. Refugees continued to flee Afghanistan throughout the rest of the decade. By December 1990, UNHRC estimated that there were over 6.3 million Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries, including 3.3 million in Pakistan and three million in Iran. By this time, Afghans had come to constitute the largest refugee population in the world.

In Pakistan, the refugees were mostly ethnic Pashtuns, and they sought refuge mainly in Pashtun-dominated parts of Pakistan. More than 300 'refugee villages' were established by UNHCR, and the majority of the refugees lived in these villages. However, they were free to move anywhere in the country and find any type of job. By contrast, in Iran, most of the Afghan refugees were ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, with only a small number of Pashtuns. Most refugees in Iran spread out to towns and cities throughout the country.³⁵

The government of Pakistan has been tolerating refugees and asylum-seekers on its soil, though Pakistan has not ratified the refugee Convention and does not have domestic legislation on asylum. Since the beginning, refugees, whether Afghans or others, are living in a legal vacuum. On the one hand Pakistan has accepted the millions of Afghans who flooded in since 1979 as *prima facie* refugees – granted refugee status as a group without individual assessments; on the other hand they do not actually have any legal standing in Pakistan. According to the strict interpretation of Pakistan's domestic law refugees are viewed as illegal immigrants.³⁶ In the absence of ratification of the 1951 refugee Convention by the government of Pakistan, relevant domestic laws are not in accordance with international refugee law. The entry, stay and movement of all foreigners is regulated by the Foreigners Act No. XXXI of 1946. This law has been amended many times and the most recent

amendment of the Foreigners (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXV of 10 July 2000, which contains, inter alia, draconian provisions in respect of foreigners contravening its rules (imprisonment up to three years/fine) or knowingly entering into Pakistan illegally (imprisonment up to ten years and fine). However, Pakistan generally tolerates the pressures of recognized refugees pending the identification of a durable solution for them outside the country of asylum.³⁷ The economic and geopolitical considerations of the region are the main reasons of Pakistan's reluctance in ratifying the refugee Convention. It is high time for Pakistan to reconsider its stance on ratifying the 1951 refugee Convention to fill in the gaps in legal regime about the status of refugees on its soil.

Conclusion

The law and practice relating to forced migration and to refugees in the Muslim world are today far less protective of refugees than as conceived according to the Islamic *hijrah* and *aman* traditions. The rich heritage of Islam in the field of migration law and refugee protection is in some respects of great significance to the international community. This tradition has been abandoned, for no plausible reason, throughout the Muslim world today. In the past, Islam made a great contribution to the humanization of internal and international relations in the Muslim world. It could play this role even today and could prompt a much-needed humanization of some branches of international law. Given the current importance of this issue, Muslim states must urgently need to revive the Islamic concepts of *hijrah* and *aman* in order to contribute to the improvement of modern refugee law, and to make it more protective for refugees and forced migrants in general. Unfortunately, the Muslim world today is divided into many nation-states; is governed in the majority of cases by secular law; and very often, there is no or little respect for human rights.

Islam must be evaluated with reference to its tenets and humanitarian principles and not with reference to the conduct of some extremist groups or extremist ideology. Today the gap between theory and practice is very deep in the Muslim world, which leads to misconceptions and misunderstanding about Muslims, Islamic law and Islam in general. As a result, this issue is worthy of further research and assessment in both the Islamic and international contexts.

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2. See, <http://www.oic-un.org/about_oic.asp> (last accessed 21/03/2010).
3. See, <<http://www.islamicpopulation.com/>> (last accessed 21/03/2010).
4. See, Antonio Guterres, "World Refugee Day: 42 million uprooted people waiting to go home", available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/4a3b98706.html>> (accessed 21/03/2010). The data was collected at the end of 2008 and is a bit old. The total number of uprooted people must be slightly more than this.
5. Some literature regarding Islam and the refugee problem is available. For example, *Refugee Survey Quarterly* published by the University of Oxford has dedicated a special issue to this topic which has many articles as well as relevant documents. Of special importance in that issue are: Khadija Elmadmad, "Asylum in Islam and in Modern Refugee Law", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 27 (2008), 51-63; Muhammad Nur Manuty, "The Protection of Refugees in Islam: Pluralism and Inclusivity", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 27 (2008), 24-29; Volker Turk, "Reflections on Asylum and Islam", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 27 (2008), 7-14. Another notable work is Sami Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, "The Islamic Conception of Migration", *International Migration Review*, 30:1 (spring, 1996), 37-57. Ahmed Abou-El-Wafa, *The Right to Asylum between Islamic Shari'ah and International Refugee Law: A Comparative Study*, trans. Shahat Mansour (Riyadh: UNHCR, 2009). The last publication is a comprehensive treatment of refugee law and Islamic law.

6. See, Anwer Mahmoud Zanaty, *Glossary of Islamic Terms: Arabic – English* (Cairo: ‘Ain al-Shamsh University, 2006), 94.
7. It is mentioned that the Prophet (peace be upon him) sent a message with the Muslims inviting the king to embrace Islam which he accepted. See, Muhammad Hamidullah, 1985: 100.
8. 4:97-99.
9. Muhammad Abu Zahra, *Zahra al-Tafaseer* (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, n.d), 4:1821.
10. Ibid., 4:1818. However, according to Muhammad Asad, this *hijrah* (exodus or migration) has a moral connotation – namely, man’s “exodus” from “evil towards God – and does not necessarily imply the leaving of one’s homeland in the physical sense.” Asad, *The Message*, 124, n. 124.
11. Abu Zahrah, *Zahra al-Tafaseer*, 4:1819.
12. See, M. Ali Kettani, *Muslim Minorities in the World Today* (London: Mansell Publishing, 1986), 18.
13. Khaled Abu El Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries”, *Islamic Law and Society*, 1:2 (1994), 141-187 at 187. The issue needs systematic studies in terms of the realities of our times rather than in the realities of the past.
14. Kamal ibn al-Humam, *Fath al-Qadeer Sharh al-Hidayah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n. d.) 2nd edn., 5: 462.
15. Akmal ud Din M. b Mahmood al-Babarti, *Al-‘Enaya ‘ala al-Hidaya with Fath al-Qadeer*, (Beirut: Bolaq, 1316), 5:462.
16. According to Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali schools of thought *aman* can be granted by a slave man as well. See, Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Juzi, *Qawaneen al-Ahkam al-Shar’iyya wa mas’il al-furu’ al-fiqhiyyah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Elm lil malayeen, 1974), 173; Abu Ishaq Ibrahim Al-Shirazi, *al-Muhazzab*, (Cairo: Matba’ al-Halabi, n. d.), 2:235; ‘Abdullah b Ahmad Ibn Qudamah, *Al-Mughni*, (Beirut: Dar al-kitab al-Arabi, 1972), 10:432. The Hanafites stipulate that a free man or woman (among the individuals) can grant *aman* but not a slave. See, Burhanuddin al-Marghinani, *Al-Hidaya*, (Cairo: Dar al-Ehia al-Tourath al-Arabi, n.d.), 2:382.
17. Ibn Juzi, *Qawaneen*, 173.

18. Qur'an 9:6. The quotations from the Qur'an in this work are taken from Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din al-Hilali & Muhammad Mushsin Khan, *Translation of the Meaning of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language* (Madinah: King Fahd Complex, n.d.) unless otherwise indicated. Muhammad Asad comments on the literal use of the words "seeks to become thy neighbour" and says, that it is a metaphorical expression denoting a demand for protection, based on the ancient Arabian custom (strongly affirmed by Islam) of honouring and protecting a neighbour to the best of one's ability. Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Qur'an*, (Wiltshire: Dar Al-Andalus, 1984, repr. 1997), 256.
19. As quoted in Ahmed Zaki Yamani, "Humanitarian International Law in Islam: A General Outlook", *Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies*, 7 (1985), 204.
20. Muhammad ibn Isma'el al-Bukhari, *Sahih Bukhari*, ed., Muhammad Daib, (Beirut: Dar ibn Kathir, 1987), 3rd edn., 3:1160, hadith no. 3008; Ahmad ibn Ali ibn Hajr, *Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari*, ed., Ahmad ibn Hajr al-Asqalani, (Beirut: Dar Ma'rifah, 1379), 4: 81; Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Nisapuri, *Sahih Muslim*, ed., M. Fu'ad Abdul Baqi, (Beirut: Dar Ehya al-Torath al-Arabi, n. d.), 2: 999, hadith no. 1371.
21. Ibn Hajr, *Fath*, 4:86.
22. Bukhari, *Sahih*, hadith no. 357; Ibn Hajr, *Fath*, 1:469; Muslim, *Sahih*, 1: 498, hadith no. 336. These two men were fighting Khaled ibn al-Waleed, thereby losing the terms of general amnesty but were granted *aman* by Ummi Hanni.
23. Badruddin 'Ayni, *Umdah Al-Qari Sharh Saheeh al-Bukhari*, (Cairo: Idarat Al-Taba at Al-Muneeriya, n.d.), XV: 94. According to Shaybani, 'Umar wrote to his commander in Iraq that if anyone gave pledge to any enemy soldier by using, *inter alia*, the Persian words '*matrasi*', then these words are binding. See, Shaybani, *Siyar al-Kabir*, 1:199.
24. Shaybani, *ibid*.
25. Shaybani, *ibid.*, 1:214.
26. *Ibid.*, 215.
27. *Ibid.*, 216.

28. See, Shabani, *Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir*, along with commentary by Sarkhasi, 1:175-257 and 2:3-120.
29. Abi Zakariya al-Dimishqi ibn Nuhas, *Mashari' al-Ahswaq ila Masar'i al-'Ushaaq*, ed., Idrees M. Ali & M. Khalid Istanbuli, (Beirut: Dar al-Bash'ir, 1983), 981.
30. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Karaj*, ed. M. Ibrahim al-Banna (Peshawar: Maktaba Faruqiyya, n.d.), 232.
31. Abul Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd, *Bidaya al-Mujtahid* (Cairo: Mustafa al-Badi Press, n.d.), 2:613-614.
32. See, the Qur'an 14:35-36 and 2:125.
33. L. Dupree and N. Hatch Dupree, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan", 1987 *World Refugee Survey*, US Committee for Refugee, Washington DC, 1988, 17.
34. When the refugees first arrived in Pakistan, UNHCR did not have an office in the country. The refugees turned to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for help. UNDP in turn asked UNHCR for funds to provide temporary assistance to the needy cases. The Government of Pakistan formally requested the UNHCR for assistance. The UNHCR sent in two missions to Pakistan and raised US \$15 million to assist the refugees. Finally, in October 1979 the organization opened an office in Islamabad. See, UN Information Centre for Pakistan, News Release 22/79, 25 Oct. 1979, 100/PAK/AFG, F/HCR 11.2.
35. Many of them were conscripted to fight in the war against Iraq which began in September 1980. See, UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 116.
36. The UNHCR worked with a 55-member Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights, drawn from all parties in the then National Assembly and the Senate, to draft amendments to the current law that was proposed for debate in Parliament. The idea behind the proposed amendments was to incorporate a definition of refugee in Pakistani law and to exempt asylum seekers from the punitive provisions of the Foreigners Act 1946. See, UNHCR, "Boosting refugee protection in Pakistan" (Islamabad: UNHCR, 2006), 2 available at <[www.file:///H:\UNHCR Pakistan.htm](http://www.file:///H:\UNHCR%20Pakistan.htm)> (last accessed 20/5/2006). However, efforts of the UNHCR never materialized.

The UNHCR has tried the dissemination of Refugee law through the signing of MOUs with educational institutions. On 4th July 2004, it signed an agreement with International Islamic University, Islamabad for the dissemination of Refugee law. The present author played the main role on behalf of International Islamic University. Similarly, in the same year, the UNHCR signed an agreement with Allama Iqbal Open University for the launch of a three-month distance-learning certificate course on refugee law. Moreover, the UNHCR has been expanding its network of Assistance and Legal Aid Centers (ALACs) throughout Pakistan.

37. The official policy of Pakistan towards Afghan refugees at the height of their influx may be summarized in two principles, namely, 'humanity' and 'Islamic brotherhood'. Although, the government of Pakistan used the words 'Islamic brotherhood', these were never elaborated and the concepts of *hijrah* or *aman* were never officially mentioned. Another reason for welcoming the Afghans was to train them to fight against the Communists and Soviet forces in Afghanistan. See, Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn. 2003) and George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York: Groove Press. 2003), *Charlie Wilson's War* is also digitized.

PROVISIONAL NOTES ON LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Nigeria is very much a bellwether for the progress of democracy in Africa. The future of Nigeria's democracy has repercussions far beyond its shores. However, for nearly five decades, Nigeria's statehood and democratic practice has been vacillating between military and civil rule. Forty-nine years after independence, Nigeria is still grappling with the problem of democratic consolidation and how to produce the right kind of leadership that will move the country from its present state to one in which the virtues of justice, peace and equity will be firmly entrenched in the society. Moreover, hardly had Nigeria gained political independence and embarked on civil rule than democracy became imperilled by an excessively politicised and ineffective leadership. Successive democratic experiments have either collapsed or have not produced the desired results and many have questioned the workability of democracy in Nigeria as in other African democracies.

Democracy involves the delegation of powers to consenting individuals by the majority essentially through the process of an election. Ideally, the individual is meant to serve the interests of the electorate. The problem with representation is that the representatives often develop ideas and interests which are not necessarily coterminous with those of the electorate. The representatives also often have considerable latitude or freedom of choice.

History is determined by the decisions of political elites. Leaders and the type of leadership they exert shape the way in which policies are made and the subsequent behaviour of states. Leadership failure can be assumed to be responsible for the failure of democracy in Nigeria. Not only have successive leaderships undermined attempts at entrenching an enduring democratic culture, they have also demonstrated an almost uncanny incapacity for governance, resulting in malgovernance.

This article attempts to discuss the travails of democracy in Nigeria and what roles the leadership played or is playing in the struggle for the enthronement of a people-centred democracy. The rationale for this is not far-fetched. Nigeria has never really practiced democracy in the real sense of the word. Apart from symbols of democracy that are usually erected, virtually all the elements of democracy-free elections (equality), sovereignty of the people, respect for human life, the rule of law, and

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liberty of the individual – have all been absent from Nigeria’s version of democracy. The leadership of the country have always insisted on the forms or symbols of democracy while the substance is denied to the people.

Conceptualizing Democracy and Leadership

As a prelude to our discourse, we shall begin with a clarification of major concepts that will serve as the building blocks for the paper.

Democracy

Democracy enjoys universal appeal and is the dominant practice in contemporary politics. Its popularity stems from the fact that among all systems of rule, it is the only one that claims to be people centred. However, democracy has changed in its meaning several times and in more than one direction. As Gboyega argues, “the concept of democracy does have a meaning, a concrete manifestation that distinguishes democratic countries from non-democratic one in spite of the fact that there are many ways in which the fundamental nature of democracy may be conceptualised.”¹ For instance, Held identified three contending views on democracy which reflect deep rooted disputation about what democracy should mean and how it should be practised. These models are, first, ‘the direct or participatory democracy’ in which citizens are involved as in ancient Athens; second, the ‘liberal or representative democracy’ which sees democracy as a system of rule embracing elected officials who undertake to represent the interest and views of citizens within the framework of ‘rule of law’; and third, ‘the Marxist model’ otherwise known as ‘people’s democracy’ which seeks to extend equality of all citizens from the political to the social and economic spheres of life.²

An easier approach to understanding the real meaning of democracy is by looking at its origin. Etymologically, the term has its root in two Greek words, ***demos*** meaning ‘the people’ and ***kratien*** meaning ‘to rule.’ Thus in ancient Greece, democracy was understood as direct democracy, that is, rule by the people or the whole body of citizens.³ This means that in a democracy, political power is in the hands of the entire adult population, and no smaller group has the right to rule. Such was the practice of democracy in the ancient Greek city-states. It is in that light that Aristotle defines it as “the rule of many.”⁴ Plato, in his ***Republic*** equally describes democracy as “a charming form of government, full of

variety and disorder, and dispensing a kind of quality to equals and unequals alike.”⁵ It is in this light also that Abraham Lincoln gave what is regarded as the most popular definition of democracy as “government of the people, by the people and for the people.”⁶

However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent reversals or setback to the Marxian model of democracy, the western-style liberal/constitutional/neo-liberal democracy has come to dominate discussions on democracy. Indeed, political transition in the form of democratization became manifest in Africa in the 1990’s when transitions to democracy occurred in Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mauritania, Cameroon, Angola, Togo and Nigeria, to mention a few. The propelling move towards democratization in Africa had been associated with the argument that democratization is synonymous with development.

For democracy to thrive, it also needs state autonomy to ensure effective distribution of wealth to support meaningful participation by those enfranchised and mechanisms for holding elected leaders and bureaucrats accountable. As noted by Heater (1964: 117), “There are, it is suggested, five basic elements without which no community can call itself truly democratic. These elements are equality, sovereignty of the people, respect for human life, the rule of law, and liberty of the individual.”⁷ For him, democratic equality implies ‘one man one vote’, irrespective of differences in wealth, religion, intelligence, etc. it also connotes the equal right and opportunity of all citizens to hold political office.⁸

However, to Larry Diamond, democracy entails: “meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) either directly or indirectly, for the major positions of governmental power, in addition to popular participation in the electoral process and respect for the civil and political rights of the people.”⁹ In sum, Held tries to put together the varied definitions of liberal democracy and a listing of its major elements. According to him, liberal democracy in its contemporary form includes a “cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broader participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions.”¹⁰

This cluster includes elected government; free and fair elections in which every citizen's vote has an equal weight; a suffrage which embraces all citizens irrespective of distinctions of race, religion, class, sex and so on; freedom of conscience, information and expression on all public matters broadly defined; the right of all adults to oppose their government and stand for office; and associational autonomy-the right to form independent associations including social movements, interest groups and political parties.¹¹

The attraction of democracy is usually hinged on the fact that it is based on the will of the people and that is why it is regarded as the best form of government. It is the only system of government that makes rulers and representatives accountable to the people and also provides for a peaceful change of government or rulers without recourse to violence or revolution.

From the above, it is easy to deduce that democracy is people-centred and the way it could be concretely expressed is through regular, free and fair elections where the people have the opportunity to decide those who rule them. When elections are rigged and the people denied their fundamental rights to participate in governance as is the case in Nigeria, the government emanating from such fraudulent process lacks legitimacy and cannot therefore be expected to be answerable to the people or look out for their welfare. Here, Mayo's view that the "purpose of the whole electoral process is to produce a government invested with legitimacy"¹² is quite instructive. Thus, democracy without the people as the ultimate deciders of rulers, policies, and tenure of rulers is like theorising democracy without the *demos*, which is an exercise in fraud and futility and such country, strictly speaking, ceases to be a democracy until the illegitimacy is reversed.¹³

Leadership

Leadership is a concept with wide application. As Cronin contends, "it is one of the most widely talked about subjects and at the same time one of the most elusive and puzzling."¹⁴ The avalanche of definitions given by scholars has only increased the confusion on what the term actually means. This has led some scholars such as Lippit to argue that "leadership is the worst defined, least understood personal attribute sometimes possessed by human beings." He avers that "even the

conclusions of those who have done extensive research on leadership are contradictory, simplistic or ambiguous.”¹⁵ Similarly, Rost counselled against attempting to define leadership, because previous attempts to define it “have been confusing, varied, disorganised, idiosyncratic, muddled, and according to unconventional wisdom, quite unrewarding.”¹⁶

The difficulty of defining leadership has led to the suggestion that there should be a deviation from attempts at defining leadership to knowing what good leadership is all about. The import of the adjective ‘good’ is that while leadership is needed in every society for guidance and goal accomplishments, it can also misguide and bring about retardation in the society in question.¹⁷

A deeper investigation of the various definitions of leadership suggests some commonalities. For instance, Ciulla observes that these definitions perceive “leadership as some kind of process, act, or influence that in some way gets people to do something.”¹⁸ He notes the difference in their connotation i.e. how leaders get people to do things (impress, organise, influence, and inspire) and how what is to be done is decided (forced obedience or involuntary consent, determined by leaders and as a reflection of mutual purposes) have normative implications.¹⁹ Clearly, leadership is a process of motivating and influencing others, even though the means and ends may vary from one society to another.

In general therefore, the quality of leadership can be determined by the extent to which it possesses the following attributes-vision, foresight, knowledge/skill, stamina, integrity,²⁰ values, sensitivity, decisiveness, discipline, responsiveness, responsibility and its capacity to respond appropriately to challenges.²¹

Evidently, there are different types of leadership: the dictatorial leader, benevolent-autocratic, democratic and the laissez-fair leader.²² Another typology of leadership include visionary leadership, charismatic leadership, transformational leadership, invitational leadership, servant leadership, and distributed leadership.²³ However, benevolent/autocratic leaders or the so much revered charismatic leaders are at best not reliable and can turn out to be a burden on the people. The preferred form of leadership is the political democratic leadership which is democratically elected and is expected to be subject to the constitution of the state. Political/democratic leaders are therefore public servants who are supposed to serve the people they lead and all their actions are also

supposed to reflect the wishes of, and promote the welfare of the people. We now turn to analysing how the problem of bad leadership has hampered the entrenchment of a sound democratic polity in Nigeria.

Travail of Democracy Nigeria: The Leadership Conundrum

Until the Fourth Republic, Nigeria has been unable to experiment with enduring democracy or transit from one democratically elected government to another. Because of this, many analysts have expressed the view that democracy (at least, the liberal/western model) has failed in Nigeria and other systems of government should be tried.²⁴

One of the main reasons for the collapse of the two previous democratic experiments of the First and Second Republics were the inability to conduct peaceful, transparent, free and fair elections in Nigeria. Indeed, on all the occasions the military had sacked civilian governments, it has been on the heels of serious crises and chaos created as a result of failed elections.²⁵ The winner-take all attitude of Nigerian politicians turned periods of election to periods when Nigerians worry about the continued survival of the country as a result of the attendant violence and chaos that characterised elections. This is against the widely accepted norm that regular and credible elections is one of the concrete manifestations of democracy. Indeed for some, democracy exists in the “sovereignty of the vote.”²⁶ Consequently, the military cashed in on this situation and terminated the two previous democratic administrations, often to great applause and approval of the people.

However, the military administrations that replaced the civilians did not perform better and only added to the anguish of ordinary Nigerians by their penchants for tyranny, authoritarianism and abridgement of citizen’s rights. Nigerians again demonstrated their faith in democracy when they overwhelmingly participated in the elections organised under the watch of the military to usher in new democratic leaders in 1993. Unfortunately, the elections which were adjudged by both local and international observers to be relatively free, fair and transparent were annulled by the Ibrahim Babangida military regime.²⁷ The following eight years were one of the worst in Nigeria’s history. The General Abacha junta turned the country into a vast personal estate, converted most of the state’s resources to personal use and visited a reign of terror on the people and anyone who dared oppose his rule.²⁸ Needless to say that during that time, poverty deepened, social infrastructures and the

economy collapsed, the education sector sharply declined and, because of the government's brutish style of rule, was isolated and the country treated as a pariah state.

This experience ended all arguments and academic disputations on the desirability of military rule. Nigerians were fed up with military and loudly clamoured/waged struggles for a speedy return to democratic rule and the total banishment of the military to the barracks where they rightly belonged. Cashing in on the feelings at that time, the newly democratically elected president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo – a former military General and Head of State who is reputed to be the first Nigerian military ruler to voluntarily relinquish power to an elected civilian government – promised to heal the wounds of the nation and deliver the “dividends of democracy” to ordinary citizens thus raising expectations about democracy. But as observed; “even without his prompting, there would have been high expectations anyhow”²⁹ because of the harrowing experiences the citizens had to endure for the sixteen years that the third phase of military rule lasted.

However, as was the case during the First and Second Republics, by the end of the first tenure of the regime, the high hopes and enthusiasm had started to wane and was replaced by deep scepticism with many wondering aloud whether democracy was workable in Nigeria and whether the citizens would ever enjoy the “dividends of democracy.” Quite a number of commentators even compared the administration to that of General Sani Abacha with some scoring the later higher. More concretely, a series of surveys were conducted by Afrobarometer on public attitudes to democracy, market and civil society in Nigeria and the result showed, among others, the disillusionment with the workings of democracy. Satisfaction with the working of democracy plummeted from 81 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2005. Support for democracy also declined from 84 to 65 percent.³⁰

Despite wide dissatisfaction with the government and the Nigerian brand of democracy, the people, accepting the counsel that the only way to change a bad government or to correct a rigged elections is not through another coup, but through another election,³¹ waited patiently for the next round of elections to exercise their rights to choose those they wish to govern them. Assessment of the elections by both local and external observers rated the elections as far below democratic

standards³². Virtually all the parties were not prepared for the elections and selected their flag bearers through undemocratic means. As INEC later explained, the body had to contend with a very chaotic situation where political parties substituted, “*re-substituted* and *un-substituted*” their candidates even when the deadline for submission of parties’ list had elapsed.³³

The new government has carried on with a heavy legitimacy burden and, as a relief to the nation’s bruised psyche, have promised to reform the electoral process and ensure respect for the rule of law – which is also a hallmark of democracy.

Most politicians and stakeholders now see the tenuous “successful transition” from one civilian government to another as a major success for democracy in Nigeria. Some even argue that Nigeria has moved beyond democratic transition and the main task before it is that of democratic consolidation. This reasoning is defective. The fact that democracy or more appropriately, its form has survived for up to ten years is not the result of any positive change of behaviour on the part of the political elite or astuteness in governance or crisis management. Rather, it can be said to be the result of both external and internal circumstances and factors that have made it virtually impossible for the military to contemplate seizing power. For one, following from the post-Cold War triumph of liberal democracy as a global ideology, the international community, as against past practices, is no longer willing to accept military rule under any guise. Following the trend, the African Union (AU) also decided against recognising any unconstitutional change of government in Africa. Most importantly, however, is that the military in Nigeria has been so discredited that they would be extremely reluctant to contemplate a comeback at least for the main time.³⁴

The reasons for the failure of democracy or the inability of Nigeria to successfully percolate and internalise the nuances of democratic governance have engaged scholars for a long time now. In the periods immediately after independence to the late 1980s the arguments centred on the colonial heritage, unsuitability of the western style of democracy in Africa and Nigeria especially, and the debilitating influence and stranglehold of former colonial masters on former colonies.³⁵ These arguments have now run their full course and while they may have provided some reprieve, they cannot explain Nigeria’s political and

economic woes.³⁶ After observing the profligacy and wanton corruption that characterised Nigeria's post-oil boom era and the Second Republic, some analysts became convinced that while not discountenancing external factors, Africa, and indeed, Nigeria's problems are internal and can be traced to bad, weak or ineffective leadership.³⁷ Over the years, this assertion has become true and even the politicians themselves have accepted that leadership is the greatest obstacle to democratic sustenance and economic development. Indeed, Nigeria has always been under a "coalition of bad leadership," whether military or civilian.³⁸ Robert Rotberg captures the situation and maintained that "Africa has long been saddled with poor, even malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers. By far the most egregious examples come from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe, countries that have been run into the ground despite their abundant natural resources...." Rotberg further observes that "such leaders use power as an end in itself, rather than for the public good; they are indifferent to the progress of their citizens (although anxious to receive their adulation); they are unswayed by reason and employ poisonous social and racial ideologies; and they are hypocrites, always shifting blame for their countries' distress".³⁹

This position was confirmed by former President Obasanjo when he maintained that the abysmal economic development of Africa is a reflection of the "poor and sometimes outrightly irresponsible leadership".⁴⁰

The history of Nigeria's economic and social misfortunes especially with respect to political leadership has been well documented. But suffice it however to say that the main reasons for the collapse of Nigeria's democracies in the past have been dissatisfactions with the leadership.⁴¹ The ineffective leadership that characterised the First Republic is quite well known.⁴² The Government failed to offer the nation the much needed leadership and direction in the onerous task of economic development. Rather the Tafawa Balewa administration was content to leave the management of the economy to foreign concerns.⁴³ while it busied itself by consolidating its hold on power using every stratagem known to it including destabilising regional government (s) and allowing corruption among cabinet members to the consternation of the whole nation. The Balewa administration was engulfed in widespread

electoral fraud, frequent conflicts and contestations among the parties, violence and instability, political domination, and above all poor governance.⁴⁴ The administration lost support and legitimacy and became weak such that the military had to act to bring an end to the “insufferable government.”⁴⁵

The civilian administration of the Second Republic was not any better. It also demonstrated the irresponsibility, arrogance, and incapacity for leadership of the Nigerian political elite. The politicians squandered the nation’s resources, paid little or no attention to basic human needs for the majority and mortgaged the economy. This created a fertile opportunity for the military to hijack the struggles against the corrupt civilians in a military coup.⁴⁶

Whilst, the foregoing assertions are not contentious, those leaders were unable to provide the kind of quality leadership required to transform the country. They also exhibited poor leadership skills as they were unable to check the excesses of their subordinates who acted with impunity. If the common aphorism that the “buck stops at the table of the leader” is true, then they cannot be excused from blame and are therefore culpable and responsible for the failure of their government. From our discussion of leadership, it is apparent that the quality of a leader is not judged by the personal attributes he possessed but by the effectiveness of his/her subordinates. A leader is someone with a vision; who leads and influences those he leads and not the other way round.

Conclusion

Leadership failure has been responsible for, and is still the greatest challenge to Nigeria’s democracy and development. So far, it has been impossible to produce leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Julius Nyerere, and Festus Mogae, these were statesmen who could see beyond the short term gains and could see to the future and the needs of their respective states and the peoples. They considered the interests of the nation and the continent as paramount and not those of individuals or groups.

Considering the definitions of democracy examined previously, Nigeria cannot be said to be an embodiment of democracy. This is because virtually all the elements of democracy – equality, sovereignty of the people, respect for human life, the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of the individual – are absent in Nigeria. What we have are appearances of democracy. Nigerians had expected that the end of

military dictatorship will usher in an era of prosperity, equality, freedom and peace. But unfortunately, the leaders have hijacked the people's struggle and chosen to disregard their wishes and needs.

Significant progress cannot be achieved without the transformation of state-society relations in ways that generate generalised commitment to the state. This requires producing a fresh type of leadership that is committed to state building. The predominant leadership styles of the post-independence Nigerian elites as indeed, African elites generally, are perceived to be responsible for the dictatorship, spoils politics and economic failures that blotch the country's political and economical history. Nigeria continues to suffer a deficit in leadership by example reflected in the failure to enforce leadership code of conduct/ethics, wanton disregard for procedures and practices of accountability by public managers, rampant corruption and abuse of official power, weak oversight capacity of official accountability agencies such as the legislature, opposition parties, the ombudsman, and the national audit service. This has led to popular mistrust, alienation, and apathy.

Hoping and praying for a better tomorrow cannot and will not change the situation. The people must force the change on the leaders. The people must be determined to have real democracy which alone promises to solve the myriad of problems faced by the people, for as the African Charter for Popular Participation argues, "the absence of democracy is the main cause of the crisis of development in Africa."⁴⁷ The insistence on the enthronement of genuine democracy as the solution to Africa's leadership crisis stems from the fact that in a truly democratic society leaders are genuinely representative of and responsible to the people and where development is people-initiated and people-centred. This is the only recipe for solving Nigeria's hydra-headed and multi-dimensional problems. This is not to argue that development or progress is impossible without democracy. Indeed, as the newly industrialised countries of Asia (Asian Tigers) have shown, development is possible without democracy. This could be achieved with focused, visionary and good leadership that is authoritarian or dictatorial in nature. As the case of Asian Tigers have shown, these authoritarianism of these countries possessed certain redeeming features of democracy and good government namely accountability, predictability, the rule of law, and competition.⁴⁸

Democracy however, assures the conditions for and promotes good governance and sustainable development. As Sklar rightly argues, “in democratic systems of government, rulers are the stewards of the common weal, accountable to citizens for the conduct of their stewardship.”⁴⁹ The inherent logic in democratic rule is that if it is the people who are ruling themselves, they can only rule themselves well.

How can real democracy be established in Nigeria with the present predatory leadership in place? Leadership must engender in its mechanisms, institutions, and structures, and a system that fosters integrity, authenticity, credibility, visibility, honesty, loyalty and the ultimate ethical value, justice. And abhor the concealing of harmful information, bribes that are proffered, untruthfulness, abuse of authority, and the practice of nepotism. These virtues are only adequately expressed in actions and behaviour, not mere words. Recognition of the rule of law, human rights, and probity in government are also important.

Solutions to the existing problem should thus be within the existing framework. A more realistic approach would be a well co-ordinated campaign and advocacy for greater participation of the people in the political process. The people should demand and ensure that proper electoral reforms are carried out for the conduct of free, fair, and transparent elections that will reflect the true wishes of the people.

Participation in government also entails fulfilment of one's civic duties, especially payment of tax. There is also the need for a transparent and participative approach in decision making which suggests that leadership must be transparent, accountable and seen to be practicing probity whilst focusing equal attention to “means” as well as “ends”. It further suggests that there must be respect for ethical principles, and the need for a visionary and progressive approach to governance on the part of “transformative leaders”. Participatory democratic practise must therefore, translate into sensitivity to, and benefits for the common man. A “top-down” approach to governance should be replaced with grassroots participation at the local level, which respects the paradigms of transformative leadership and good governance. A transparent and participatory approach in decision making also suggests the need to address shortcomings in the democratic framework by establishing a sound and healthy party system, strengthening democracy within

political parties, inculcating a sense of accountability and transparency and civic and political morality among all sections of the people.

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ISSUES OF QUALITY ASSURANCE IN PHD IN ENGLISH IN PAKISTAN

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The study investigates the issues and problems of PhD degree in English in Pakistan. Although HEC has been allocating enough budget to ensure the quality of the indigenous PhD programs since its inception yet there are some serious issues regarding PhD degree and its quality assurance. It is hypothesized that the factors which may influence the quality of PhD degree are competent indigenous and overseas faculty to supervise the research scholars, adequate learning resources over all disciplines, research culture, indigenous journals of international standard; faculty and students exchange program and motivation to accomplish the tasks successfully. Total 1980 responses taken from 60 MS leading to PhD scholars in English were analyzed to address the research questions a) what are the current issues and problems in PhD degree, and b) how to enhance the quality of PhD degree in Pakistan. The data show that the less number of supervisors, lack of overseas faculty and collaboration with foreign universities, inadequate learning resources, non availability of HEC recognized journals in English, bureaucracy in the institutions and disharmony between the needs and wants are the obstacles of PhD degree in Pakistan. The data have shown some highly significant results at .05 p value. The study suggests that these discrepancies should be addressed to ensure quality PhD degree in English in Pakistan.

Introduction

The significance of PhD English degree cannot be denied in the present time. The Higher Education Commission (HEC) has given much emphasis on the production of more PhDs. New opportunities in the form of foreign and indigenous scholarships are becoming increasingly available. More funds for research projects have been specified and research grants have also been offered to present papers in the international conferences. As a result of these initiatives a large number of students are entering into the PhD programs. Many universities are endorsing PhD programs in Natural Sciences, Applied Science and Humanities. Although the objectives of the PhD programs are commendable yet in the absence of proper planning and resources, these prominent PhD programs risk losing their potential effectiveness. In order to ensure quality in the PhD degree, HEC has introduced many reform plans to up grade PhD to international level.

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HEC policy to ensure quality in PhD degree has led to number of problems, such as less number of qualified faculty members, less number of supervisors, lack of well equipped libraries and computer labs, lack of foreign subject specialists, inadequate collaboration with foreign universities, and unnecessary delay in research work. The present study aims to look into these problems to suggest remedial measures to enhance the quality of PhD programs with special reference to Pakistan.

Research Questions

- a) What are the current issues and problems in PhD degree?
- b) How to enhance the quality of PhD degree in Pakistan?

Literature Review

Universities around the globe have realized the need to restrict their PhD degrees so that they may prepare themselves to compete globally (Knight and De Wit, 1997; Scott, 1998; Marginson, 2001). All the routine activities of the universities including teaching, research, skill development, knowledge enhancement and management need a revamp to face the new challenges of the world. The PhD degree with all its claims of sophisticated study and mature research methodology to convert raw knowledge into value added product is on the apex of the academic achievements.

The high pedestal of PhD is in question due to various factors including dwindling number of candidates, limited economic benefits, insecure future of academic research in the market and the weak bond between material benefits for career building and the academic research (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2002). All these factors demand a review of the traditional role of PhD program as it has to meet the standards of training in research, authenticity in supervision and of quality learning.

The relevance of PhD degree has long been debated almost all over the world. The issues concerning PhD program have been surfacing in the advanced countries intermittently. Cude (1987) criticized many of the North American doctoral programs for their inflexibility, overburden and inefficiency. He further commented that, "Doctoral programs have become traps for the candidates and sinkholes for intellectual resources" (Cude, 2001). The present research aims to investigate the problems and issues in PhD degree with special reference to Pakistan.

Methodology

Finding and Data Analysis

Table-1: %age of Problems and Issues in PhD in English

Question	Problems and Issues	Positive Response		
1.	Less number of departments to run PhD in English program	90	85.5	94.5
2.	Lack of well-equipped libraries to support PhD program	64	60.8	67.2
3.	Lack of digital resources libraries to support PhD program	37.35	35	38.85
4.	Lack of research culture at PhD	87	82.65	91
5.	Lack of proper guidance to accomplish the research work	67	63	70.35
6.	Lack of learning opportunities through conferences	83	79	87.15
7.	Lack of HEC Approved Supervisors in PhD in English	78.85	74	81.90
8.	HEC Approved Supervisors are over-loaded with theses	67	63	70.35
9.	HEC Approved Supervisors feel reluctant to supervise Non-HEC scholars	84	80	88
10.	Restrictions for HEC scholars to work during their study	57.12	54	59.85
11.	Delay in research work demotivate the scholars to leave the PhD program	65	61.75	68


Analysis of Variance for C2

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Cl	10	7342.9	734.3	56.08	0.000
Error	22	288.1	13.1		
Total	32	7631.0			

Level	N	Mean	StDev
Less num	3	90.000	4.500
Lack of	3	64.000	3.200
Lack of	3	37.000	1.850
Lack of	3	87.000	4.350
Lack of	3	67.000	3.350
Lack of	3	83.000	4.150
lack of	3	78.000	3.900
HEC Appr	3	67.000	3.350
HEC Appr	3	84.000	4.200
Restrict	3	57.000	2.850

Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev		
Level	N	Mean
Less num	3	90.000
Lack of	3	64.000
Lack of	3	37.000
Lack of	3	87.000
Lack of	3	67.000
Lack of	3	83.000
lack of	3	78.000
HEC Appr	3	67.000
HEC Appr	3	84.000
Restrict	3	57.000

Delay in 3 65.000 3.250 (---*)
 Pooled StDev = 3.619 40 60 80 100

Table-2: %age of Problems and Issues in PhD in English**Key**

- A** Less number of departments to run PhD in English Program
- B** Lack of well-equipped libraries to support PhD program
- C** Lack of digital resources libraries to support PhD program
- D** Lack of research culture at PhD level
- E** Lack of proper guidance to accomplish the research work
- F** Lack of learning opportunities through conferences
- G** Lack of HEC Approved Supervisors in PhD in English
- H** HEC Approved Supervisors are over-loaded with theses
- I** HEC Approved Supervisors are reluctant to supervise Non-HEC scholars
- J** Restriction for HEC scholars to work during their study
- K** Delay in the research work causes demotivation among the scholars to abandon the PhD program

Note: Different small letters above the bars in graph represent significant difference among treatments.

Figure 2 showed the % of reasons of Problems and Issues in PhD in English. The significant differences among different reasons are shown by different letters above the bars. Less number of departments to run PhD in English program, lack of research culture at PhD, lack of learning opportunities through conferences and HEC approved supervisors feel reluctant to supervisor non-HEC scholars were the major reasons that

depicted significantly high % positive response. Statistical analysis showed that there was no significant difference among these questions/reasons. Whereas, lack of digital resources libraries to support PhD program showed the minimum % response that is significantly less ($P < 0.05$) than other reasons. Lack of well-equipped libraries to support PhD program, lack of proper guidance to accomplish the research work, HEC Approved Supervisor are over-loaded with theses and delay in research work demotivate the scholars to leave the PhD program were also other reasons that gave significantly higher responses. On the other hand, restriction for HEC scholars to work during their study is poor reason that is significantly ($P < 0.05$) lower than above mentioned reasons.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Looking at the results of this study, it is obvious that research scholars face a lot of problems in their PhD programs. The PhD in English program seems to be the most affected one in all of the disciplines of humanities due to certain reasons such as non-availability of approved supervisors, non-cooperation of supervisors because of their busy schedule, lack of research culture, books, research journals etc which addresses immediate remedial action. This remedial action must be taken not only to host the problems within the universities, but to outline a number of the issues and problems also which the present research has indicated within the PhD program in English in Pakistan. At present, some universities in Pakistan are producing a large number of MPhil degree holders with a very low caliber and profile which is spoiling the over all image of PhD degrees. The concept of the traditional PhD or foreign earned PhD is changing rapidly and losing its focus of quality. These changes are afoot to make it worse if not addressed seriously. Although, Higher Education Commission is taking every possible step to upgrade the indigenous PhD programs, it is time for all the universities and academia to bring a change in their vision to promote the culture of quality in these programs. There is a need that the Universities should adopt the standards set by HEC for a marked quality assurance in PhD program.

Delimitations

The study encompasses only on the PhD scholars' data about the problems and issues faced by them during their studies and research

work. The problems of universities and teachers are not included in the study, which may be considered for further research.

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IMPACT OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES ON STOCK RETURNS: A STUDY OF ISLAMABAD STOCK EXCHANGE

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Abstract

This study tries to explore short run association and long run relationships between ISE10 index and five macroeconomic variables i.e. Inflation, GDP, Exchange Rate, Money Supply, and Rate of Interest. In order to explore the long run and short run relationships Johansen cointegration technique and VECM was applied. The monthly data from July 2004 to June 2008 was used for analyzing ISE10 index. Three long run relationships were found between macroeconomic variables and stock prices. The results showed that ISE10 index was negatively related with Inflation, Exchange rate and Money Supply while positively related GDP and Rate of Interest bill rate in the long run. The VECM analysis and the results of vector error correction model (VECM) depicted that the adjustments in ISE10 were due to all three error correction terms i.e. ecm_1 , ecm_2 , and ecm_3 . The ISE10 index was relatively more exogenous in relation to other variables because 69 percent of its variance was explained by its own shock even after 24 months.

Key words: Stock prices, Cointegration, VECM, Macroeconomic variables, Variance decompositions.

Introduction

The managed and well structured stock markets encourage and mobilize the savings and activate the investment projects which lead to economic activities in a country. Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE) became fully operational in August, 1992. It is one of the three exchanges of Pakistani stock market. ISE10 index of Islamabad stock exchange was introduced in July, 2004. There were 248 listed companies and the market capitalization was Rs.1943.65 billions on December 16, 2008. ISE10 index which reflects overall performance of listed companies started with 2716.0 points in July, 2007 and reached all time heights of 3334.38 points on April 17, 2008 and declined to 2749.64 points (Annual Report, Islamabad stock exchange, 2008).

Mandelker and Tandon (1985), Groenewold et al. (1997), Chatrath et al. (1997), Alagidede (2008), Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007), and Humpe and Macmillan (2009) investigated the relationship between inflation and stock returns.

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Mandelker and Tandon (1985) explored relationship between stock prices and anticipated inflation, and unanticipated inflation and discovered that relationship between stock prices and anticipated inflation was negatively related. Chatrath et al. (1997), found negative impact of inflation stock prices on Indian economy. Groenewold et al. (1997) explored association between stock returns and expected inflation in Australian economy which was found negative in previous studies. The results demonstrated an indirect relationship between inflation and stock prices. Alagidede (2008) investigated whether stock market provided hedge against inflation for South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Kenya because this issue got great consideration in the economics and finance. The author tested Fisher's Hypothesis¹ for these countries. In Kenya only, the Fisherian hypothesis was not rejected. Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007) reported a positive impact of inflation on stock returns in US while Humpe and Macmillan (2009), explored negative relationship between stock prices and inflation.

Some studies explored impact of economic growth on stock prices and found that oscillation in stock prices usually imitate true economic activities (Fama, 1981; Nishat and Shaheen, 2004; Ratanapakorn and Sharma, 2007; Cook, 2007; Shabaz et al., 2008; Humpe and Macmillan, 2009 ;). Fama (1981) studied the connection between real output and stock returns and explored immense association between stock returns and gross national product, and stock returns and industrial production. Chen et al. (1986) found a powerful affiliation among the economic activity and the stock market.

Nishat and Shaheen (2004) found that there was a positive and strong impact of industrial production on stock prices in Pakistan. Granger causality test showed stock price affected industrial production. Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007) investigated the connections between industrial production and US stock returns in the long run. The authors found that stock prices were perhaps influenced by change in output level via impact of output on profitability. Shabaz et al. (2008) analyzed

¹ According to Fisher's Hypothesis, the market interest rate consists of anticipated real interest rate and anticipated inflation (Fisher, 1930). As nominal interest rate and inflation moved one-to-one, then, real rate of interest was not affected by a permanent change in inflation rate in long run. Thus, it was concluded that stock returns and rate of inflation moved in the same direction. Hence, real assets such as shares perhaps provide hedge against inflation.

whether there existed a relationship economic growth between and development of stock market in case of developing economy such as Pakistan. Humpe and Macmillan (2009) explored long run association between industrial production and stock returns by using cointegration technique and found in US stock returns were positively affected by the industrial production.

Several economists documented the relation between foreign exchange rate on stock returns during the last two decades. Mixed results were found. Aggarwal (1981) found positive association between the exchange rate and US stock prices. Soenen and Hennigan (1988) found negative relationship between these two variables.

Mookerjee (1987) analyzed money supply and stock returns in United States, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland; and Jeng, et al. (1990) explored relationship between money supply and stock returns in United States, Belgium, France, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Sweden, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, and. Nishat and Shaheen, (2004) found negative but insignificant association between money supply and stock returns and Ratanapakorn and Sharma, (2007) explored positive impact of money supply on stock prices in US. While; Humpe and Macmillan, (2009) found negative influence of money supply on NKY225 in Japan

Some studies reported positive impact of rate of interest on stock prices while; some studies explored negative relationship between these two variables e. g. Ratanapakorn and Sharma, (2007) reported positive relationship between S&P 500 and treasury bill rate in US and Humpe and Macmillan, (2009) found negative impact of treasury bill rate on SP55 in US.

The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide source of data and methodology to explore long run and short run relations between stock prices and macroeconomic variables and section 3 gives empirical results. In the last, conclusion is explained in section 4.

Data and Methodology

Monthly time series data was examined in exploring the relationship between the macroeconomic variables such as consumer price index as a proxy for inflation, real effective exchange rate, three month bills rate as a proxy for rate of interest, industrial production index as a proxy for GDP growth rate, money supply (M_2), and ISE10 (Index relating to

Islamabad stock exchange). The main data sources were monthly bulletins of State Bank of Pakistan, Annual reports of Islamabad stock exchange, *The Business Recorder* (Pakistani financial newspaper), Publications of the Federal Bureau of Statistics, and International Financial Statistics (IFS). The study used the data from July, 2004 to June, 2008 to explore the influence of macroeconomic variables on ISE10 index. The description of variables used in this research study was given as under:

LISE10 = Log of ISE10

LCPI = Log of Consumer price index

LIP = Log of Index of industrial production

LREER = Log of Real effective exchange rate

LM₂ = Log of money supply (Broader money)

LTTBR = Log of three months treasury bills rate

Stationary Checks

Many of variables studied in macroeconomics, monetary economics and financial economics were non-stationary time series (Hill *et al.*, 2001). If a time series was stationary, then shocks were considered transitory. On the other hand, mean or the variance or both the mean and the variance of a non-stationary time series depend on time. The variance depends on time and approach to infinity as time goes to infinity (Asteriou and Hall, 2006).

Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), Phillips – Perron test (Phillips and Perron, 1988), and KPSS (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt. and Shin, 1992) unit root tests were applied to test the stationarity of the above mentioned series.

Cointegration Test and Vector Error Correction Model

Cointegration test was used to identify equilibrium or a long-run association among the variables. If there was a long-run relationship between variables, then divergence from equilibrium path was bordered and the variables were co-integrated in the long-run. Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure undertook the most of the problems of Engle and Granger approach. The Johansen and Juselius (1990) approach was based on maximum likelihood estimates and gives maximum Eigen Value and Trace Value test statistics to find the number of cointegrating relations. This procedure provides framework for cointegration test in the

context of vector autoregressive approach. Johansen method was explained as follows:

$$x_t = A_0 + \sum_{j=1}^k A_j x_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

Where; A_0 is an $(n \times 1)$ vector of constants, x_t is an $(n \times 1)$ vector of non stationary $I(1)$ variables, k is the number of lags, A_j is a $(n \times n)$ matrix of coefficients and ε_t is $(n \times 1)$ vector of error terms. The above vector autoregressive process was reformulated and turned into a vector error correction model (VECM) in order to use Johansen and Juselius test as under:

$$\Delta x_t = A_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \Gamma_j \Delta x_{t-j} + \Pi x_{t-k} + \varepsilon_t \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

Where:

$$\Gamma_j = - \sum_{i=j+1}^k A_i \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi = -I + \sum_{i=j+1}^k A_i$$

“ I ” is an $(n \times n)$ identity matrix, and Δ is the difference operator. The Trace statistics and the Maximum Eigen Value test statistics was used to identify the characteristic roots that were insignificantly different from unity.

Variance Composition

The vector autoregressive (VAR) by Sims (1980) was estimated to find short run causality between macro economic variables and stock prices. To illustrate implication of relationships among macroeconomic variables and ISE10, variance decomposition was employed. In this study, Bayesian VAR model specified in first differences obtained in equation (3) and (4).

$$\Delta X_t = \alpha_1 + \sum_{i=1}^k \alpha_{11}(i) \Delta X_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^k \alpha_{12}(j) \Delta Y_{t-j} + \varepsilon_{xt} \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha_2 + \sum_{i=1}^k \alpha_{21}(i) X_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^k \alpha_{22}(j) Y_{t-j} + \varepsilon_{yt} \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

Where ε 's are the stochastic error terms, called innovations or shock.

Model

To explore long run association between macroeconomic variables and ISE10 index, following econometric models was specified in the study.

$$LISE10 = \beta_1 LCPI + \beta_2 LIP + \beta_3 LREER + \beta_4 LM2 + \beta_5 LTTBR + \varepsilon_t$$

To find both the short-run and long-run relations following models were estimated.

$$\Delta \text{LISE10}_t = \alpha_1 + \gamma_1 U_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \theta_{1i} \Delta \text{LCPI}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_{1i} \Delta \text{LIP}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \mu_{1i} \Delta \text{LREER}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \eta_{1i} \Delta \text{LM2}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \lambda_{1i} \Delta \text{LTTBR}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \dots\dots\dots (5)$$

Empirical Results

Stationarity Test

The study applied three different tests for checking the stationarity of the time series. All three tests were unanimously in the results and indicated that all the series were found non-stationary at level. But, at the first difference time series were found stationary as was shown in Table-1.

Table-1: Unit Root Analysis

Variables	ADF Test Statistic		PP Test Statistic		KPSS Test Statistic	
	Null Hypothesis: Time Series is Non-stationary		Null Hypothesis: Time Series is Non-stationary		Null Hypothesis: Time Series is Stationary	
	Level	First Difference	Level	First Difference	Level	First Difference
LISE 10	-2.43	-5.93*	-2.40	-6.80*	0.63	0.18*
LCPI	2.99	-1.08	2.44	-5.05*	0.90	0.41**
LIP	-2.51	-5.54*	-2.53	-8.14*	0.76	0.11*
LREER	-1.76	-6.81*	-1.73	-6.81*	0.35	0.14*
LM2	-0.14	-2.68**	-0.13	-10.08*	0.91	0.02*
LTTBR	-2.47	-3.81*	-6.24	-3.66*	0.67	0.53
Test Critical Values (MacKinnon, 1996)						
5% Level	-2.925169		-2.925169		0.463000	
10% Level	-2.600658		-2.600658		0.347000	

* implies that the coefficient is significant at 0.05 percent probability level and

** implies significant at 0.10 percent probability level

Cointegration Analysis

In this study, to find the long run association between the ISE10 and macroeconomic variables Johansen and Juselius (1988) cointegration technique was applied after confirming the stationarity of the series.

The results of stationarity analysis shown in the Table-1 illustrated that all the variables involved in the study were integrated of order one. Hence, the Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration technique was used to explore the long run relationship between the macroeconomic variables i.e. LCPI, LIP, LREER, LM₂, and LTTBR and ISE10 index. In the first step, appropriate lag length was determined by using Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) which showed that the appropriate lag length

was equal to one. In order to investigate the number of long run relations between the macroeconomic variables and ISE10 index, both Trace statistic and Maximal Eigen statistic were used. Using Pantula principle, the model with 'Unrestricted intercept and no trend' was selected. The results for both Trace statistic and Maximal Eigen statistic were shown in Table-2 and Table-3, respectively.

Table-2: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)

Hypothesized		Trace Statistics	0.05 Critical Value	Probability **
No. of CE(s)	Eigen Value			
None *	0.792	187.139	95.754	0.000
At most 1 *	0.682	118.128	69.819	0.000
At most 2 *	0.567	67.721	47.856	0.000
At most 3	0.369	28.908	29.797	0.037
At most 4	0.181	10.628	15.495	0.235
At most 5	0.041	1.844	3.841	0.175
Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 percent probability level				

* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 percent probability level

** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

Table-3: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigen Value)

Hypothesized		Max-Eigen Statistics	0.05 Critical Value	Probability **
No. of CE(s)	Eigen Value			
None *	0.792	69.010	40.078	0.000
At most 1 *	0.682	50.408	33.877	0.000
At most 2 *	0.567	36.813	27.584	0.003
At most 3	0.369	20.279	21.132	0.066
At most 4	0.181	8.784	14.265	0.305
At most 5	0.041	1.844	3.841	0.175
Max-eigen value test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 percent probability level				

* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 percent probability level

** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

Both tests i.e. the Trace statistic and the Maximal Eigen statistics recognized three cointegrating vectors, therefore, the study used three cointegrating vectors in order to explore the long-run association among the variables.

Long Run Relationship

After normalization the first cointegrating vector on LISE10, normalized cointegrating coefficients were estimated as reported in Table-4.

Table-4: Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients

LISE10	LCPI	LIP	LREER	LM2	LTTBR
1	4.999	-5.152	17.543	1.277	-2.562
S E	-6.548	-0.967	-3.789	-3.409	-0.616
t-value	-0.763	5.328	-4.630	-0.375	4.160

The first normalized equation was estimated as below:

$$\text{LISE25} = -4.999\text{LCPI} + 5.152\text{LIP} - 17.543\text{LREER} - 1.277\text{LM}_2 + 2.562\text{LTTBR} \dots (6)$$

According to the first normalized equation 6, stock prices (LISE10) showed insignificantly negative relationship with consumer price index (LCPI). The negative relationship between stock returns and consumer price index was steady with the results of Humpe and Macmillan (2009) for US data. However, findings were at variance Abdullah and Hayworth (1993) and Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2007). Normalized equation depicted that there was a significant positive association between stock prices and industrial production (LIP). The similar results were reported by many researchers (*Fama*, 1981; Chen et al., 1986; Abdullah and Hayworth, 1993; Eva and Stenius, 1997; Ibrahim and Yusoff, 2001; Nishat and Shaheen, 2004; Ratanapakorn and Sharma, 2007; Cook, 2007; Shabaz et al., 2008; Humpe and Macmillan, 2009). The LISE10 index was influenced by real effective exchange rate (LREER) negatively. This implied that along with the increase in exchange rate or depreciation in domestic money, there was a negative effect on production due to increase prices of imported raw material ultimately returns of the firms decreases and stock prices were depressed. Similar finding were reported by Soenen and Hennigan (1988). The relationship between stock returns and money supply was found negative but insignificant. The negative link between the two variables was consistent with the study of Humpe and Macmillan (2009) for Japan. The study found that stock prices and three month treasury bills (LTTBR) had a positive but insignificant relation with LISE10 in the long run. The result was consistent with the study of Ratanapakorn and Sharma, (2007) for US three months treasury bills rate but contrary to the study of Humpe and Macmillan (2009) for US who found negative relationship between US stock market (S&P500) and treasury bills rate.

Vector Error Correction Model

Error correction mechanism was applied to capture the short run dynamics of the model. The results of vector error correction model were reported in Table-5.

Table-5: Vector Error Correction Estimates

Variables	D(LISE10)	D(LCPI)	D(LIP)	D(LREER)	D(LM2)	D(LTTBR)
Vecm1(-1)	-0.642 (-4.45)	0.027 (0.075)	-0.042 (-0.34)	0.012 (0.43)	0.037 (1.11)	0.154 (2.20)
CointEq2	-1.595 (-3.70)	0.105 (2.65)	-0.392 (-1.07)	0.124 (1.97)	0.136 (1.37)	0.901 (4.32)
CointEq3	0.194 (3.10)	0.003 (0.60)	-0.086 (-1.61)	0.030 (3.23)	0.001 (0.045)	0.007 (0.23)
D(LISE10(-1))	0.243 (1.48)	0.011 (0.76)	0.287 (2.06)	-0.038 (-1.59)	-0.064 (-1.69)	-0.252 (-3.18)
D(LCPI(-1))	2.369 (1.096)	0.067 (0.34)	2.349 (1.27)	-0.972 (-3.07)	-0.402 (-0.81)	-1.235 (-1.18)
D(LIP(-1))	0.179 (0.85)	-0.013 (-0.66)	-0.116 (-0.65)	-0.047 (-1.51)	0.066 (1.36)	-0.023 (-0.22)
D(LREER(-1))	0.715 (0.60)	-0.084 (-0.78)	-1.117 (-1.11)	0.246 (1.428)	-0.024 (-0.08)	1.129 (1.98)
D(LM2(-1))	-0.304 (-0.45)	0.096 (1.55)	0.147 (0.25)	-0.007 (-0.07)	-0.464 (-2.99)	-0.116 (-0.35)
D(LTTBR(-1))	-0.105 (-0.39)	-0.014 (-0.55)	0.209 (0.92)	-0.054 (-1.37)	0.010 (0.17)	-0.101 (-0.78)
C	-0.004 (-0.15)	0.007 (2.81)	-0.022 (-0.94)	0.011 (2.73)	0.023 (3.54)	0.054 (4.05)
R-squared	0.42	0.42	0.23	0.36	0.32	0.74
F-statistic	3.02	2.92	1.21	2.26	1.89	11.52

() shows 't' values of "t" statistics

* show the coefficient significant at 0.01 percent probability level

** show the coefficient significant at 0.05 percent probability level

*** show the coefficient significant at 0.10 percent probability level

The coefficients of ecm1 (-1), ecm2 (-1), and ecm3 (-1) showed the correction speed of the ISE 10 to the long run equilibrium position in a period. As all three error correction terms were significant, hence the outcomes of vector error correction model (VECM) depicted that the adjustments in LISE10 were due to all three error correction terms i.e. ecm1, ecm2, and ecm3.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DLISE10} = & -0.004 + 0.243\text{DLISE10}(-1) + 2.369\text{DLCP1}(-1) + 0.1797\text{DLIP}(-1) + \\ & 0.715\text{DLREER}(-1) - 0.304\text{DLM}_2(-1) - 0.105\text{DLTTBR}(-1) - 0.642 \\ & \text{Vecm1}(-1) - 1.595 \text{Vecm2}(-1) + 0.194\text{Vecm3}(-1) \dots (7) \end{aligned}$$

Variance Decompositions

In order to examine the proportion of forecasting error variance in 24-months, the vector autoregressive (VAR) was estimated. The Variance decomposition confirms the relationships of the variables under study and degree of exogeneity among the variables. Table 3.6 showed that the LISE10 index was relatively more exogenous in relation to other variables i.e. LCPI, LREER, LM2, and LTTBR because 69 percent of its variance was explained by its own shock even after 24 months. LCPI explained 10.34 percent impact on stock prices. Innovations in other macroeconomic variables i.e. LIP, LEER LM₂, and LTTBR explained forecast variance 6.66 percent, 1.31 percent, 4.17 percent, and 8.44 percent respectively for LISE10. The value of variance forecast error explicated by all macroeconomic variables increased along with the passage of time. The degree of exogeneity of LCPI was greater than other variables including LISE10.

Table-6: Variance Decompositions

VDC of	Months	S.E.	LISE25	LCPI	LIP	LREER	LM2	LTTBR
LISE25	1	0.08	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	12	0.10	70.05	10.46	6.65	0.87	4.06	7.91
	24	0.10	69.08	10.34	6.66	1.31	4.17	8.44
LCPI	1	0.01	2.80	97.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	12	0.03	9.44	34.68	19.15	27.71	5.12	3.89
	24	0.07	8.70	26.07	22.61	26.48	9.12	7.02
LIP	1	0.06	0.00	6.85	93.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
	12	0.08	1.94	9.08	85.33	0.18	2.95	0.52
	24	0.08	2.49	10.15	80.74	2.64	3.24	0.73
LREER	1	0.01	0.14	3.35	11.87	84.64	0.00	0.00
	12	0.02	0.23	2.61	13.04	72.97	1.32	9.83
	24	0.02	0.84	4.56	13.46	65.89	3.57	11.68
LM2	1	0.02	2.21	8.03	2.81	6.64	80.31	0.00
	12	0.05	6.60	20.69	19.81	17.19	34.19	1.52
	24	0.10	8.16	22.73	23.12	24.81	15.56	5.63
LTTBR	1	0.05	5.31	0.00	11.03	0.64	0.44	82.57
	12	0.11	3.84	5.65	7.23	23.08	7.46	52.74
	24	0.13	5.44	10.67	13.01	28.12	6.75	36.00
Cholesky Ordering: LISE10 LCPI LIP LREER LM ₂ LTTBR								

Conclusion

This study investigated long run and short run relations between ISE10 Index and five macroeconomic variables in Islamabad Stock Exchange, Pakistan. All the time series used in this analysis was found

stationary at first difference but non stationary at levels. Three long run association was found between macroeconomic variables and ISE10 index. In the long run, Industrial production index, and three month treasury bill rate affected stock returns positively. While, inflation, real affective exchange rate, money supply showed negative impact on stock returns in the long run.

As all three error correction terms were significant, hence the outcome of vector error correction model (VECM) depicted that the adjustments in LISE10 were due to all three error correction terms i.e. ecm1, ecm2, and ecm3. The results of Variance Decomposition revealed that ISE10 index explained nearly 69 percent of its own forecast error variance while CPI, IP, REER, M2, and TTBR explained 10.34 percent, 6.66 percent, 1.31 percent, 4.17 percent, and 8.44 percent respectively for LISE10.

The study proposed that appropriate monetary measures should be adopted by monetary managers to control inflation so that the volatility of the stock markets can be minimized. Increase in Industrial production can play significant positive role in development of the capital markets of Pakistan. Thus, it was recommended that authorities should formulate such a policy which supports stock prices through the promotion of industrial production. The long run positive impact of exchange rate on ISE10 index suggested that for the development of stock market in Pakistan, exchange rate should be managed carefully keeping in view the elasticities of exports and imports which will lead to stability in stock market.

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THE HISTORICAL CONJUNCTURE OF NEO-COLONIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Neo-colonialism is widely viewed by many writers as the survival of the colonial system in an ex-colony. It is one of the issues that have blighted sustainable development in Nigeria. In Nigeria, it can be regarded as a specific phase of her development characterised by its social formation. This situation was carefully crafted during the decolonization process by the colonialists in collusion with Nigerian elites. Central to the understanding of neo-colonialism in Nigeria is the presence of a class dependent on foreign capital. This suggests that neo-colonialism can be seen as a method of control for the reproduction of dependency. This paper argues that the role played by the local bourgeoisie is crucial to the understanding of the synergy between neo-colonialism and underdevelopment in Nigeria. It further argues that the decolonization process was generally skewed in favour of a regime closely linked to foreign interests, desperate to perpetuate underdevelopment. The paper concludes that there had not been radical departure from orthodoxy since independence.

Introduction

Neither independence nor neo-colonialism 'fell from the sky'. They did not just happen by chance, nor as the fruit of some new insight. Rather, they were the outcome of profound historical pressures and struggles. These pressures and struggles themselves, paradoxically, were engendered by the very success of colonialism as a hegemonic organization of international production relations, which had permitted a vast accumulation of wealth and progress to occur in the nations of Western Europe. It is the very success of this pattern of global accumulation that brought forth its own contradictions, pressures for change and adaptation, which needed to be made if the continuity of global accumulation was to be safeguarded (Hoogvelt, 2001:29).

The term neo-colonialism came to fore when the limitation of formal independence began to be understood in Africa. It has been the central theme of books by writers, such as Leys (1974), Nkrumah (1965) and Woodis (1967). Most of these writers viewed neo-colonialism as the survival of the colonial system despite formal independence. Neo-colonialism can not only be seen as an imperialist policy in an ex-colony,

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but as political, social and economic characteristics in certain ex-colonies. Central to the concept of neo-colonialism is the presence of classes within an ex-colony, which are dependent on foreign capital. This suggests that neo-colonialism can be rightly regarded as a revision of forms and methods of control for the reproduction of old dependency relations (Woodis, 1967:56). However; it is within the ambit of an independent state to repudiate such manoeuvres. The role played by a section of the local bourgeoisie is necessary in the understanding of neo-colonialism where decolonization permits a relative efficient transfer of power to a regime closely linked to foreign interest, represented by the former colonial state.

No doubt, elements favourable to neo-colonialism exist in ex-colonies, but this was not the case in all the colonies, particularly in Algeria where the road to independence was not smooth (Alleg, 1970:77). In the case of Nigeria, where revolution did not precede the transfer of power, neo-colonialism can be regarded as a specific phase of its development as characterising its social formation. This is because the conditions for it existed – in fact, they were carefully prepared in the decolonization years (Osoba, 1987:223). Neo-colonialism in the sense of a development stage of an ex-colony must be recognised as transitional and temporal, however, in Nigeria, it has almost become a permanent tool that reproduces ‘underdevelopment’.

Although neo-colonialism is seen as a continuation of a former situation in an ex-colony, experience has shown that, a country that was never colonised, can also become a neo-colonialist state. An independent country without the experience of colonialism can be turned into a neo-colonial state by international finance capital, courtesy of its fragile economic structure. America through its capitalist economic power has created a number of colonies for itself including Liberia and Ethiopia that were never colonised in the classical sense of it (Emerson, 1960:25). Similarly, today, Iraq and Afghanistan have become American colonies through invasion and occupation by America without the classical colonization. What is therefore crucial in a neo-colonial state is not a colonial past, but a *dependency and social* formation, which transcend a colonial phase. This explains why independence does not imply the resolution of contradiction between surplus appropriation through

capitalist mode of production at the centre and the resultant mass poverty at the periphery.

Until recently, it used to be orthodoxy that the achievement of independence was premised on the diffusion of western liberal ideas and their impacts on western educated African nationalists. On this view, African nationalist is a creation of the West (Mafeje, 1977:412). The co-optation of important segments of both the traditional and western educated elites into the colonial system betrays the tradition of resistance of colonial domination. The capitulation of the elites was extended and manifested in the compromise with foreign capital in the post-colonial era.

Decolonization and Neo-Colonialism

Neo-colonialism is not just a radical slogan, but one of the most compelling realities of the Nigerian state. Decolonization and neo-colonialism can be loosely regarded as two sides of the same coin. It was within the vortex of decolonization that neo-colonialism was strategized by the departing colonial power in order to perpetuate British traditional economic influence and control in the emergent Nigerian state. In this regard, the statement credited to Ian Macleod, the Colonial Secretary in Harold Macmillan's Conservative government in March 1960 is very instructive here:

The Prime Minister has recently in a striking phrase spoken of turning an empire into a family. But what is happening is part of the pattern of our heritage. We did not go abroad to govern, we went abroad to trade ...So if we are wise we can stay in countries that we once ruled - as traders, farmers, planters, shippers, businessmen, engineers.

Available evidence seems to indicate that it was part of the imperial power's plan to perpetuate British interests in an independent Nigeria, and ensure Nigeria remains within its orbit as an economic and political satellite. Consequently, during the decolonization era, significantly between 1952 and 1960, concrete legislative and executive measures were put in place to ensure British dominant position in the economic and political space of an independent Nigeria (Osoba, 1987:240). Lamentably, these neo-colonialist measures were formulated with the

active collaboration of the majority of the Nigerian elite in the federal government.

There were several measures concocted during the decolonization period, ranging from tax laws, to bilateral agreements between Britain and Nigeria calculated to perpetuate Britain's domination of Nigeria beyond independence. These measures were designed to perpetuate in post-independent Nigeria the client pattern relationship, which characterised formal colonial relationship between Nigeria and Britain. "Bilateral" economic and financial agreements were arranged between Nigeria and the British government or British firms in such a way that guaranteed profitable conditions for the latter at the expense of the former. One of the implications of most of the arrangements was the reproduction of the colonial type dependency in a post independent Nigerian economy.

The Income Tax Ordinance was used by some foreign companies to evade taxes. For example, Elder Dempster Lines Agencies Ltd., a British enterprise in Nigeria could only be taxed on profits declared from agency fees and not on their actual operations, because the company had already paid taxes in the United Kingdom. The company could not be taxed appropriately despite the enormous profits of millions of pounds from their operations in Nigeria, because of the tax law that was carefully authored in favour of foreign companies during the decolonization process. In legitimatising this unequal arrangement, the Colonial Financial Secretary observed that:

There is provision in section 9 of the existing income tax Ordinance, which states that the gain or profits from the business of operating ships or aircraft carried on by persons not resident in Nigeria shall be exempted from tax provided that a reciprocal exemption from tax is granted by the country in which such person is resident. So that exemption is already granted in our law and also in the double taxation arrangement with the United Kingdom, there is already in the statute legal exemption for profits earned by overseas transport companies. Therefore, if one such company creates an agency in Nigeria, it does not alter the income tax position.

This law was made to undermine the taxes that would have accrued to Nigeria, while protecting foreign firms with their sharp practices. It

amounts to economic irrationality for taxes to be paid by firms outside the place of operations and transactions.

Apart from this Ordinance, there was a contractual arrangement, which permitted only British shipping companies to be carriers of Nigerian goods. This arrangement did not give Nigeria the option of patronising other shipping lines, besides, there were no indigenous Nigerian shipping companies operating on any appreciable scale in Britain. The implication is that the monopoly of shipping transactions between Britain and Nigeria is conceded to the former thereby depriving Nigeria part of the financial resources needed for development (Osoba, 2006:233). The exclusion of Nigeria from shipping business continued well after independence. For example, transnational oil cartels excluded Nigeria from the carriage of Nigerian crude oil. Efforts by Nigeria to participate in the carriage of the country's crude oil by procuring vessels in 1978 and 1986 were frustrated by foreign shipping lines and the vessels ended up as storage tankers (Attah, 2002:43-44).

In the course of decolonization, the departing colonial authority ensured the vast petroleum reserves in the Niger Delta area were under the control of two foreign monopoly concerns before independence. The foreign firms are the British Petroleum and the Royal Dutch Shell Company – the former a 100 per cent British-owned enterprise and the latter a joint Anglo-Dutch concern. These firms controlled the Nigerian oil industry from production through marketing, thereby ensuring they maximised profit at the expense of development in Nigeria (Attah, 2002:46). The situation did not change significantly even after 1961 when exploration right was granted to other multinational oil companies representing American, Japanese, Italian, German, French, Dutch and British interests. Despite Nigeria's ownership of the oil, the control, management and regulations were in the hands of these firms. Modern capitalism illustrates that the function of ownership can be separated from management. The role of the state is therefore reduced to that of tax collector, which is a product of neo-colonialism.

The departing colonialists ensured that a complex tax laws (including tax relief and tariffs), were put in place in a way that European interests would be protected in post-independent Nigeria. These laws were meant for foreign business concerns to operate continuously on advantageous terms in Nigeria. One of the laws was the income tax

Ordinance of 1952, further amended in 1957 and 1961, which gave foreign investors fiscal concessions capable of undermining Nigerian government's share of the profits from foreign companies. The ordinance permitted 'initial allowances' as well as 'annual allowances' for new firms willing to establish in Nigeria (Osoba, 2006:238). This allows companies; both public and private, to write off from their profits large amount of their capital investments in fixed assets during the early years of business for the purpose of computing taxable income. The Companies Income Tax Act (No.22 of 1961) further strengthened this arrangement, which was detrimental to development in Nigeria. The scope of these allowances was spelt out thus:

Initial allowances vary from 20 per cent in the case of building to 40 per cent in the case of machinery and plants. Annual allowances vary from 10 per cent to 33 per cent, depending upon the type of assets and the amount of wear and use involved in each case.

Another tax relief put in place to favour foreign companies operating in Nigeria was the aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952, which was modified by the Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act of 1958. It provided a 'tax holiday of up to five years to pioneer companies depending on the capital invested in fixed assets. The Act also permitted the tax holiday to be extended if there was reported losses. Similarly; the Industrial Development (Import Duty Relief) Act of 1957, amended by subsequent Acts gave exemption, wholly or partly to customs duties on components imported by foreign companies operating in Nigeria (Osoba, 2006:240). These were part of the laws carried over to post-colonial Nigeria thereby entrenching neo-colonialism.

In addition, foreign firms were given the concession under the import substitution industrialization in 1956 and reaffirmed in 1964 to the effect that their profits and dividends could be repatriated or freely transferred to their mother countries. In effect, therefore, the import substitution industries operating in Nigeria were free to repatriate up to 60 per cent of their gross profits back home (Osoba, 2006:242). The implication of this practice is that it leads to capital flight from Nigeria while the same capital is re-invested abroad for the development of the metropolises at the expense of development in Nigeria. The colonial-type of industrial and general economic clientage became so firmly rooted in

the post independence era, such that the authors of the Second National Development Plan had to admit that:

Most industrial activities in the country are still not manufacturing in the true sense of the term, but mere assembly industries. Very often, all the components used are imported and are merely put together behind the tariff wall. Whether one is considering the manufacturing of shoes or cosmetics, beer or soft drinks, the story is broadly the same. All that happens at most of the breweries is that all the imported inputs are mixed and sealed in imported bottles.

The Dialectics of the Political Class

It is true that the elite power in Nigeria and other African countries is small in numbers, but the role played by the elite since independence outweighs its number. The commanding position in government – local government level to federal was occupied by western educated elite. Those sectors of economy not under the direct control of foreign business concerns were dominated by the elite (Schatz, 1962:261). It played dominant role in decision-making position of the government. This class exerted strong influence on the value orientation of the people.

The development of the power elite was characterized by the increasing bourgeoisification of its members. They were obsessed with acquiring wealth and its attendant's power. In view of the general poverty in the country, it regarded good connection with governments and the political parties as indispensable for the realization of their ambitions (Osoba, 1977:378). This perception is crucial in the explanation of the class struggle within the political class. The pathology of the elite towards the nation was essentially how to extract surplus from the material resources in the country at the expense of the mass majority of the people. In a situation like this, the political elite were deficient of viable ideas, indispensable to development.

The behavioural factor of the power elite can be understood if seen as product of conjuncture of social realities. The profit orientation to public office and its manifestation in corruption and collusion with exploitative foreign firms were essentially symptomatic of a process of class formation among a group who found themselves in a position of economic advantage. The intensification of ethnic antagonism and differences were artificially generated by political leaders anxious to

carve exclusive sphere of political and economic influence for themselves (Ihonybere and Shaw, 1988:39). Since independence, leaders of political parties or military who controlled the regions or state governments and vied for power at the centre were primarily concerned with monopolising the access to power and wealth. They exploited the sentiment of their groups to promote private interests by equating personal interests with national objectives of their groups.

Most members of the early power elite were first generation educated and prosperous men who emerged from very humble peasant or working class background. They resolved to enrich themselves through graft; bribery and sharp practices in government and in business, instead of social engineering and economic planning that would have developed the country (Williams, 1977:285). They were not ready to return to the condition of squalor from which they had emerged; hence all means (fair and foul) were adopted to perpetuate their hold to power at the expense of development.

The tragedy of the power elite as mentioned earlier arose primarily with their obsessive concern with the illusion of personal wealth and power. It is such that the real power, which resides with those who control the high point of the economy elude the political class. Because the crucial control of Nigerian economy is acquiesced to foreign firms backed by their home governments, the Nigerian power elite relegated itself to the position of 'comprador'.

One major factor in the development of the business sector of the elite was the role of big foreign business concerns in accommodating influential businessmen in their organizations. The foreign business concerns identified the growing desire for wealth among many members of the power elite and pandered to this ambition by entering into business partnership with many influential members of the ruling class (Osoba, 1972:99). The active support and protection of the power elite was sought by these firms by giving them minor share of profits, which they hitherto monopolised.

The growing collaboration between foreign firms and Nigerian elite was manifested in various forms. It became fashionable to appoint members of the elite class as directors of foreign companies operating in Nigeria in order to make use of their positions in politics for the interest of the foreign firms (Williams, 1982:52). These directors, lacking

commitment to national development became intermediaries to foreign capital.

Until the decolonization era, British banks in Nigeria were reluctant in granting credit facilities to indigenous Nigerian businessmen. As independence was approaching, banks such as Barclays began to liberalise their terms of loans in a way that they could easily grant loans to highly placed Nigerian. For example, in 1962, S. O. Shonibare, a strong member of Action Group party obtained a loan of £250,000 from one of the British banks in Nigeria. He used the loan to establish a housing estate (Soni Investment Properties Limited) in Lagos (Uzoage, 1964:92-3). It should be noted that Nigerians were hardly given such loans during the colonial era. The nature of loans given to privileged Nigerians during the decolonization period and immediately after independence was part of the efforts by European firms to get the favour, support and protection of the political elite in post independent Nigerian economic space.

In view of the growing confidence between the big foreign firms and Nigerian business elite, the former became increasingly disposed to appointing elite with political contacts in government as sub-contractors in the execution of major government contracts. They were also co-opted as representatives and agents of metropolitan based firms. These partnerships ensured Nigerian businessmen as subordinates of their foreign principals. The role of the local businessmen therefore helped to legitimise and entrench foreign companies in the commanding positions of the Nigerian economy (Lubeck, 1986:64). This situation has not changed since independence, thereby compelling a dependent economy incapable of engendering autochthonous development.

Today, there emerged a narrow base elite who had acquired political and economic power in virtue of their inheritance of the state apparatus. The stranglehold of foreign capital on the economy had resulted in an emasculated bourgeoisie, incapable of acting as the engine of economic transformation (Akeredolu-Ale, 1976:73). The Nigeria situation therefore typically provides confirmation of Frantz Fanon's description of the role of the local bourgeoisie in the Third World thus:

The national middle class discovers its historical mission: that of intermediary. Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation:

it consists prosaically of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism (Fanon, 1963:152).

The access to the source of political power and the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie marks a partial modification of the Marxian identification of class with modes and relation of production. “The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of the businessman not that of captain of industry” who is engaged in production. Nigerian bourgeoisie failed to become producers of goods, instead they entrenched themselves in the economic space as “buyers and sellers” of goods. They could not reproduce the historical roles of the Bourgeoisie of the West.

The Tragedy of a Neo-Colonialist State

Neo-colonialism in its essential meaning of domination of mass of the population of a country by foreign capital other than direct colonial rule requires local class interests, which are allied to those of foreign capital for the purpose of ensuring their joint interests in economic policies. However, this system is unstable. It is dogmatic and highly misleading to regard the social and political system, which emerged in Nigeria at independence as successful. Though the post independence years witnessed some intense class struggles; those years were exceptionally favourable for the consolidation of neo-colonialism. The power of the state was used to give the various forms of protection it wanted. The result was a structure of social control based on clientelism and ideological domination, which has a resemblance of a mixed economy. The economic boom in the early 1970s frequently congratulated, was an appearance, which resulted from the assertion of state power, and did not reflect the underlying reality of sharp social and economic contradictions as demonstrated in the economic crisis that began from the 1980.

The post-colonial Nigeria inherited the institutions implanted by the colonial state without inheriting its location in the international division of labour; neither did it inherit its expertise, military power, finances or metropolitan support (Ihonnvbere and Shaw, 1988:39). The tenuous relation of the power elites at independence to productive activities translated into characteristic dependence on foreign capital as mentioned earlier. The inability of the “new” local bourgeoisie to constitute itself

into an effective hegemonic class and play its role reflects the contradictions, which characterise the post-colonial state. The dominance of oil in the political economy of the state has particularly far-reaching implication that constitutes challenges to the presumed independence. The state as the collector of huge oil rents became the focus of capital accumulation as fractions and factions of the dominant class compete for control of the state. Thus, competition was evidenced in the alignment and re-alignment of political forces, often rationalized through unbridled corruption aimed at climbing the intra-class conflicts over revenue allocation (Okpeh, 2006:20).

The rentier state has the ability to undertake gigantic state expenditure with spectacular growth in certain sectors of the economy. However, this did not translate into fundamental improvement in the living conditions of the majority of the people. Some dependent form of industrialisation took place; however, the nature and direction of the development are conditioned by the social origin and the dominant classes operating either at the political or economic levels.

The dominants classes in Nigeria have been working with foreign capital thus occupying a dependent or intermediary position in the economy. It was not an accident therefore that despite over several US\$ billions collected since the discovery of oil production and marketing, the origins and orientations of the local bourgeoisie have determined the rising import bill (of over N1 billion per month) in the early 1980s; the initiation of dependent food policy, the neglect of agriculture and the initiation of fluctuating policies toward foreign capital. The massive expansion of the commercial and distributive sectors at the expense of productive activities ensured consumption becomes geared towards imported goods including food, some of which were exported during the colonial period. The economy thus, invaded by all manner of foreign firms and the comprador bourgeoisie became fragile and underdeveloped. These developments not only deepened, but also consolidated the incorporation of the rentier economy into the vortex of world capitalism, characteristic of neo-colonialism.

The postcolonial state despite its huge rents is subject to the countervailing forces of transnational oil corporations, which dominate the production and marketing processes involved in oil exploitation. They manipulate the direction of state policies, which are usually

detrimental to auto-centric development. This had been made possible by Nigeria's over dependence on the oil sector – the Nigerian state had depended on oil export for over 95% of its revenue, thereby neglecting other sectors, particularly agriculture, which was the mainstay of the economy (Attah, 2002:40).

At independence, Nigeria was still an exporter of primary products. Food was only imported to supplement local production, though emphasis was still on cash crops production – a precipitate of colonial agriculture. Agriculture was predominantly under the control of the peasant farmers. The tragedy of agricultural sector was that the essential institutions and exploitative mechanisms of the colonial period were “Nigerianised” and preserved (Oculi, 1979:33). The inequalities in resources allocation and the unequal relation between the rural and the urban sector were kept intact; the educational system, which traditionally looked down on agriculture and on farmers was not restructured. Despite the fact that the sector in which the farmers operated was then the mainstay of the economy in terms of foreign exchange earnings and food supplies, peasants were neither involved in plan initiation nor implementation because they were seen as unimportant.

Before the 1973 Middle East crisis and increases in oil prices, the contribution of petroleum to total national revenue was significant. In 1958/59 the contribution of oil to GDP was 0.7%. But by the beginning of the Third National Plan of 1975 – 1980, petroleum was contributing about 92% to the GDP. The contradiction of the post-independence economy was that agriculture, which accounted for 80% of the total export in 1960, had declined below 5% at the beginning of 2000. Reflective of this contradiction; Shehu Shagari noted that the fortunes of the economy are closely linked with developments in oil industry and not agriculture (Lubeck, 1986:64). The implication of this observation by a former prominent member of the ruling class is that agriculture, which used to provide employment for about 70% of the population, is no longer important. This is because the sector has become relatively unimportant to the rentier state.

The neglect of agriculture can be explained as the ‘absence’ of a class that is sympathetic to agriculture – a situation created during the colonial period. The class that controls the state is neither agrarian nor sympathetic to agriculture, therefore failed to be agent for the

transformation of agriculture. Also, the powerful, yet unequal amalgam between the comprador bourgeoisie and foreign capital at independence ensured the initiation of a dependent food policy as alternative to investment in agriculture. Today, dependent food policy has compelled importation of food to feed the burgeoning population.

With each passing year, farming became characterised by inadequate supply of farm inputs, inadequate capital, lack of credit, scarcity of farm labour and suitable technology. Thus, farming became progressively unattractive and unproductive. The dependent food policy of the state did not supplement internal production rather replaced it. Consequently, food import took up to 15% of the total budget in 1973, and rose to 25% in 1980s (Andrae and Beckman, 1985:55-6). Much of these imports consisted of basic foodstuffs hitherto produced locally. In 1982 alone, the rice import reached N400 million, fish was N200 million, sugar N200 million and wheat N160 million (Aminu and Williams, 1985:40). The situation had become even more precarious in the light of the “petrol dollar wealth”.

A massive propaganda campaign was launched about food production in response to the crisis in agriculture. This campaign was evident in “Operation Feed the Nation” (OFN) and the subsequent “Green Revolution” (Aminu and Williams, 1985:40). People without the pedigree in agriculture were employed on farms and “demonstration” farms were declared “opened” on televisions. But OFN failed woefully and despite the Green Revolution, the state continued to import food.

Until privatization policies of the late 1980s, the federal and state governments went into farming either individually or in partnership with foreign capital. Not less than 147 farms were established across the country. This policy resulted in massive displacement of rural farmers; leading to confrontation between the state and the peasants. This was also accompanied by the massive involvement of the World Bank in designing and implementing Nigeria’s Green Revolution to balance western corporate position in the petroleum industry. These projects in themselves yielded very limited results and state farm centres did not fare better. Thus, the response was to further liberalise restrictions on imports, recognising that certain fractions in the ruling class would thereby benefit in collusion with the foreign capital.

The problem here is not with the state participation in agriculture but its role in the collapse of agriculture occasioned by its neo-colonialist nature, which has alienated the peasants from their land. There is no doubt that the state is able to import food exclusively because it benefits from oil exports. Today, American and Thailand rice has under-sold the grain and root produced in Nigeria to such an extent that they found ready markets even in rural areas.

The most outstanding feature of Nigeria's underdevelopment is the food crisis, which has attained an almost tragic situation. The mounting death toll from hunger and malnutrition has demonstrated the critical balance between food needs and supplies. Statistics show that about 70% of people die of parasitic or infectious diseases for which hunger provides a veritable terrain (Dada, *etal*, 2010:209) These situations could continue despite the existence of prodigious untapped food production potentials. A society where the bourgeoisie appear to have located the dynamics and capacity for self-production in neo-colonial structures will remain underdeveloped.

The Trajectory of a Neo-Colonial Economy

Since independence, the idea of partnership with the West has guided state policies toward foreign capital. At independence, the emergent ruling class – the petit bourgeoisie acquiesced in the foreign domination of all key sectors of the economy. Foreign firms were attracted to set up industries through the combinations of factors such as cheap labour, government incentives and tariff protection (Attah, 2008:298). Today, relatively few but large and integrated foreign firms otherwise called Multi-national Corporation have ensconced themselves in the economy. This was made possible by the unpreparedness of the Nigerian comprador bourgeoisie 'to repudiate its nature', but content in reproducing the economic system inherited from the colonizers, which ensured dependency on metropolitan countries (Attah, 2008, 300).

The state marked by the absence of bourgeoisie committed to national interests and development ensured the reproduction of foreign domination of Nigerian economic space. The pathology of the local bourgeoisie is its dependency on the West and its contemptuous disregard of the peasants; it lacks a sense of direction and bereft of ideas capable of engendering development. This class is unable to act out an enterprising and productive role similar to that of the bourgeoisie of the

West or the Meijis of Japan, hence the dynamics, pioneers aspect, the characteristics of the inventors and the discoverers of new worlds, which were found in all national bourgeoisies are lamentably absent” (Franz Fanon, 1963:141).

Industries in Nigeria are extensions of metropolitan firms and are characterised by the production of luxury and consumer goods that were formerly imported under colonial rule (Attah, 2005:96). Some of these goods are detergent, creams, perfumes, beverages, alcoholic drinks, foods, cars, etc. The absence of backward and forward linkages in these industries continues to attenuate development in Nigeria. For example, the car assembly in Nigeria is incapable of stimulating the development of the steel industry, which is essential to car industry.

Many industries depend on very high import content of over 90%. The example of Coca Cola is very illustrative here as it does not import its content alone, but also the bottles (Attah, 2005:97). Local production by most pharmaceutical companies involves only the final stages of manufacture, or repackaging imported finished drugs, many of which are below the required minimum standard, thereby leading to untimely death (Attah, 2008:299). Industrialization is characterised by lack of strategic components in the capitalist reproduction process, namely, the capital goods industries. This necessitates dependence on the capitalist centres for capital goods, thus reproducing a neo-colonial relationship. It is in this sense that Fanon (1963:153) describes industrialization in the Third World as “neo-colonialist industrialization”. Industrial investments now depend on the capitalist intensive technology developed to satisfy the needs of metropolitan economies. This technology is imported by expatriate investors and suppliers. Such import in turn generates a demand for technological sophisticated machinery, which could only be met in the metropolitan countries and consequently fail to develop the local capital goods, thus maintaining foreign domination of the economy.

The character of the economy ensured the rural economy is dominated by small peasant production, an indication of non-subjection of production to capitalist production. Pre-capitalist rural relations of production did not disintegrate, but serve as auxiliaries in the process of global capitalist accumulation. The development of industrial sectors in Nigeria does not stimulate innovation in the mode of agricultural production by providing the necessary markets for its products. Thus, the

industrial mode, far from ensuring the displacement of peasant agriculture by a more dynamic mode of production is parasitic upon it and undermines its productive capacity. The economy can then be explained in the comprador class position of the custodians of state power that have been reproducing neo-colonialism. This class position also explains why oil revenue was not used as a means of promoting agriculture and forming a dynamic link with industry to promote development.

The historical relegation of the dominant classes to peripheral sectors of the accumulation process made possible by neo-colonialism compels the state to regulate relations between foreign and domestic capital (Beckman, 1982:49). Indigenization decrees were promulgated to regulate this relationship. However, indigenization only served to rationalise and legitimise foreign participation as well as to redefine spheres of influence and participation between international and indigenous capital. Ake (1983:413) noted that “indigenization hardly constituted a serious attack on dependence”. The spheres of economic activities such as hairdressing reserved for Nigerians were quite insignificant in terms of contribution to national development. The schedule I reserved for Nigerians in the indigenization exercise merely redefined and preserved the *status quo* as there was no fundamental departure from orthodoxy (Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1988:56).

The changing role of foreign capital continued to co-opt weak and nascent local bourgeoisie into its operations. The co-optation of the local bourgeoisie into the network of foreign capital condemned the former to the position of ‘comprador’. The net result of indigenization for the bourgeoisie was therefore a deepening crisis. Nevertheless, through the imperatives of indigenization, fraction of the local bourgeoisie in collaboration with both the state and foreign capital enhanced its position. Also the big commercial capitalists (Henry Stephen, Ibru, Folawiyo, Fanz etc) extended their intermediary roles and property interests with little movement into manufacture. There is also an insignificant shift from commerce to manufacture as exemplified in the activities of Dangote. Although there exist a group of Nigerian entrepreneurs who have established industries with foreign technical partners and state capital, they have not provided serious challenges to foreign capital.

Given Nigerian's position as a peripheral country and the position of indigenous bourgeoisie in the economy, indigenization was not intended to radically transform either internal or external relation. Rather, as in Kenya, it represented a new balance in the relation of indigenous and international capital, with the state as intermediary and mediator. The state could neither extend its interest in the economy nor employ state power to expand the interest of local bourgeoisie in the economy, except for a fraction of the plutocrats who acted as surrogates to international capital. The weakness of the bourgeois class was revealed not only in its continued subordination to foreign capital, but also in its inability to regulate and undertake commercial undertakings indispensable to development. At the start of 1980s, the Nigerian state under the guise of privatization acquiesced to foreign control of some of its investments. For example, the national railway was given to Indian company, the national airline to the Dutch and Nkalagu cement factory to the Swiss (Attah, 2008:301).

The massive corruption that accompanied oil "windfall" along with the arrogance of power led successive governments to adopt policies that are detrimental to national development, but profitable to foreign capital. One of such policies is "privatization". Until 1989, foreign investment in Nigeria could only occur within a joint venture arrangement based on the provisions of the 'Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 1977'. However, the Nigeria Enterprise Promotion Decree 1989", which replaced the "1977 Act" permits 100% foreign ownership of enterprises, including those otherwise reserved for Nigerian citizens or associations. In the face of the general failure to meet the basic human needs of the majority of Nigerians, the "Nigeria Dream" continued to be elusive.

The ideology of mixed economy, which supposed to be corollary of ideological neutrality between capitalism and socialism, now redefined as privatization became a potent weapon for diverting public fund into private coffers with active connivance of foreign capital. Privatization provided the infrastructure, which facilitates further international capitalist exploitation of the Nigerian economy, this time in collusion with the state. The Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) was set up to supervise the plundering of Nigeria and her economic legacies through the directives of the Bretton Woods institutions. The BPE was saddled with the responsibility of selling off state investments and properties,

thereby reducing the economy to what can be described as “cash economy”. Though government and BPE pronouncement was that, the privatization would ensure rapid economic development by cutting government wastages and removing barriers to ‘free market’; it turned out to be the instrument of rapid underdevelopment of all the sectors of the Nigerian economy.

Under Obasanjo’s administration between 1999 and 2007, the state disinvested from almost all the sectors of the economy. Foreign firms from America, Europe, Asia and even South Africa were invited to bid for Nigerian economy at ridiculous fees. The manner, on which the sales of state investments are conducted, was exemplified in the sale of Nigerian government shares in the West Africa Refinery Company Limited (WARCO) Sierra Leone. The government shares in WARCO, which stood at 72% valued at \$1,560,000 were sold to Majesty Oil by Nigeria’s BPE at the price of \$363,300 an amount five times below the market value and also below what another company had offered (Attah, 2008:302). The sale of the refinery was skewed in favour of Majesty Oil by some people in government who fronted for the company.

Reforms and concessions are being used in neo-colonial Nigeria to enrich fractions of the political class and their foreign collaborators at the expense of national development. The concession of the Nigerian Ports Authority, which translated into the sales of Nigerian seaports to foreign firms, resulted in thousands of job loss. Though the government claimed the sale was in the best interest of the nation, the fact is that foreign firms in collusion with government officials and political office holders benefited from the concession exercise at the expense of development. Granting concessions of old seaports instead of these firms building new ones is inimical to development.

Similarly, the privatization of the Nigerian Airways, which ensured her airlines were bought by foreign carriers (Virgin Atlantic), meant that the control and ownership of the airlines eluded the Nigerian government. Thousands of Nigerian Airways workers were retrenched due to the privatization exercise and were not paid their terminal benefits, years after. Contrary to the Nigerian experience, Kenya in privatizing her airline sold 25% stake in the airline to KLM, while the remaining 75% was floated for the public at the Nairobi Stock Exchange

(Attah, 2008:303). The example of Kenya if followed would have made the airline to remain Nigerian.

At the end of 2004, the neo-colonial state under Obasanjo retrenched 1,517 staff of Ajaokuta Steel Company after conceding the control of the country's strategic steel plant to ISPAT, an Indian company who neither had the technical expertise nor the capital to manage the steel company. The company in 2005 further sacked about 100 staffers of the steel company, while employing Indians to fill their positions. The implication of this is that Nigerian unemployment situation is being exacerbated while that of India is being solved.

Conclusion

Many critics of colonialism view Nigeria's independence from colonial powers as only partial freedom as it was not matched with economic liberation. This has given rise to the current phase of colonialism, correctly redefined as neo-colonialism - a new form of imperial rule characterised by the domination of foreign capital. Instead of real independence, Nigeria now has pseudo independence with the trappings of the illusion of freedom. The age of neo-colonialism, which Nigeria had been caught in was made possible by the roles of the local bourgeoisie in collusion with foreign capital. The state that should have repudiated the economic, political and military control of the country also became willing tool in the hands of the West because of its fragility. In fact, the state became the instrument used to legitimatise the dependency, necessary for a neo-colonial state, a situation that structured Nigerian economies into international capitalism.

Nigerian resources, particularly oil, are exploited by transnational corporations for the benefit of metropolitan countries at the expense of development in Nigeria. The means of production are owned by foreign corporations who employ various means to transfer profits out of the country rather than invest them in the local economy, a situation that engenders capital flight. Nigeria therefore reproduces what Gunder Frank (1996) calls the 'development of underdevelopment'. The unequal relations between Nigeria and the developed countries have been structured and programmed during decolonization process. The character of the present underdevelopment is therefore a product of the historical conjuncture of neo-colonialism rooted in the decolonization agenda.

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CONFLICT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL NEWS IN PRINT: HOW DOES THE PRESS IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN TREAT THEM?

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Abstract

Media and journalism in the Gilgit-Baltistan are operating under some of the worst conditions in the world. Government control of media, illiteracy, and lack of access to information as well as financial and social constraints are some of the issues limiting the populations' access to truth and complete information. The main objective of this study is to investigate the local newspapers' coverage on constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan, development news coverage and conflicts coverage especially sectarian conflicts' coverage in local newspapers of Gilgit-Baltistan. The method of content analysis has been adopted to study the questions.

Introduction

The Gilgit-Baltistan of Pakistan is the Northern most region of the territory under the control of Pakistan. It is recently named as Gilgit-Baltistan through an act of the parliament. This area is constitutionally under a Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) and is governed from Islamabad through the Northern Areas Legislative Council. India does not recognize it as part of Pakistan and calls its part of 'Pakistani administered Kashmir' (Aman, 1998, pp.30-46).

The story of the Gilgit-Baltistan is the story of the people who are struggling for their rights since a long time. To declare the Northern Areas as fifth province of the Pakistan has been the long standing demand of the people. Political parties were also demanding that if not possible to make it fifth province under the United Nations Resolution on Kashmir, then government, at least, should give Northern Areas the same constitutional status as being enjoyed by Pakistani Kashmir. On this pretext, the Government of Pakistan People's Party issued Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009 on September 07, 2009 to bring the area at par with Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Earlier, some residents of northern areas filed writ petition in the high court of the Pakistan administered Kashmir under the section 44 of its interim constitution claiming they were the subjects of the Pakistan administrated Kashmir. The high court decided that the Northern Areas are the part of Pakistani Kashmir. However, the Supreme Court said that

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the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue such verdict (Dani, 2003, p.24).

There is no industry in Gilgit-Baltistan except tourism, which suffered badly in the wake of 9/11 incident. The area has very low literacy rate - 14 percent among men and 3.5 percent among women. According to a survey, conducted by Aga Khan Foundation, there were 674 educational institutions in public sector in 1988. According to another survey, there were 522 primary schools, 337 for boys and 185 for girls, in 2002. There were some 38,000 students enrolled in these schools while there were 1,300 teachers in these primary schools. There were 86 middle schools, 57 high schools, 49 for boys and 8 for girls, 26,978 students and only 690 teachers. There are hundreds of villages which don't have even a primary school while the existing schools suffer from severe infrastructural problems.

There is a shortage of teachers in hundreds of schools - about 20 per cent of schools are without teachers. Hundreds of schools do not have furniture and other sources, buildings are in very poor conditions. There are only 7 intermediate colleges, 2 degree colleges and only one university which is recently established with the name of Karakoram International University. It is very strange that there is no medical or engineering college in Northern Areas. As compared to this, there were 2 universities and 75 colleges in the Pakistani-administered Kashmir (Rana et al., pp.7-8).

Geo-strategically, Gilgit-Baltistan has great significance. To its north is China, towards the north-west is situated Tajikistan, in the west lies Afghanistan whereas Pakistan administered Kashmir lies to its east. In the past, Russia and Great Britain competed to gain control of these areas. Now this area is completely under the control of Pakistan although India still keeps an eye on these areas. The United States of America, too, is taking serious interest in the area owing to its designs to monitor and block this route for China.

There are eight major ethnic groups; viz, Baltis, Sheens, Yashkuns, Moghals, Kashmiris, Pathans, Ladakhis and Turkish speaking. The four major Muslim sects include the Shias, Sunni, Ismailies and Nourbakhshies who have been living there since centuries in an environment of tolerance and harmony though over the past two decades there have been frequent causes of sectarian violence.

In the south of Brushhal was the civilization of Dardistan, which absorbed part of Broshal. In the fifth century, Balawaristan, which consisted of Ladakh and Baltistan took over Dardistan. The capital of Dardistan was in Kohistan, while that of Balawaristan was Skardu. In the later centuries, the kingdom of Balawaristan started disintegrating into small states; they also coincided with the entrance of Islam in the region.

During the middle ages, the Northern Areas were divided into small city or valley-states, which were ruled by small chieftains until the beginning of the 19th century. Like elsewhere, they were in constant conflict. The internal conflicts weakened them. In the view of this, the Sikhs of Punjab unsuccessfully tried to occupy the part of Gilgit-Baltistan on several occasion. The middle ages came to an end and the modern era began with the British colonialism in the subcontinent. The modern history of Gilgit-Baltistan is the history of the Sikh and later British struggle to subjugate Gilgit-Baltistan, first through the maharaja of the state of the Jammu and Kashmir and, later directly.

The political agency of Gligit was established in 1877 under the supervision of British agent. It was withdrawn a couple of years later. The princely states of Hunza, Nagar and small principalities of Yasin, Punyal, Ishkoman and Gupis were made to pledge allegiance to the British agent leaving them nominally independent. In 1935, the British acquired the Gilgit wazarat on lease for a 60 years period from the maharaja of Kashmir. However; the British cancelled their lease on the eve of their departure from the subcontinent. Assistant political agent at Chilas administered Diamer district. He had to travel a long distance by sea, road and on horse back as well as on foot before reaching Chilas where the arduous journey ended after months of travel. The British continued to invade and subjugate or annex territories beyond Gilgit-Baltistan. The people and the rulers of the Gilgit-Baltistan had been constantly struggling for freedom from the Dogra and the British rulers in the 19th century. Their struggle was not aimed at only fighting the aggressors but also to keep their Islamic identity.

Geography of Gilgit-Baltistan

The area of Gilgit-Baltistan is spread over 72,496 square kilometers and populated by a little over 1.5 million people (census 1991)¹ indicating population density of over 20 persons per sq kilometer. The Northern Regions are as fascinating as its southern regions. Amidst towering snow-clad peaks with height varying from 1,000 meters to over 8,000 meters, the regions of Gilgit, Hunza and Baltistan are also called as Shangri-la. Nowhere in the world is such great concentration of high mountains, peaks, glaciers and passes except Pakistan.

Five of the eight peaks (over 8,000 meters above sea-level) of the world are in Gilgit-Baltistan. There are several high altitude lakes in Gilgit-Baltistan; Sheosar lake in Deosai plains, Sadpara and Shangirila lakes in Skardu, Borith lake in upper Hunza, and Rama lake near Astore.

In the northwest, it borders Afghanistan's Wakhan Strip; in the northeast, it borders China's Xinjiang. In the southeast, it borders the Indian administered state of Jammu and Kashmir. It borders Pakistan's NWFP in the west. Gilgit-Baltistan comprises six districts in two regions: the two Balti districts of Skardu and Ghanche, and the four Gilgit districts of Diamer, Ghizer, Gilgit and Astore. The main political centers are the towns of Gilgit and Skardu.

In past various political regimes ignored the development of Gilgit-Baltistan. However, when Parveez Musharraf came in to the power the developmental activities started with full speed.

Though the Government of PPP claims to have increased the annual budgetary allocations for Gilgit-Baltistan from Rs.600 million to one billion, the area continues to be in a state of negligence, with three-fourths of the population estimated to be below the poverty line. It provides water for Punjab's agriculture, but there are no adequate irrigation facilities for its own agriculture. There is always an acute shortage of electricity and only China has been helping in the construction of some small power stations. Apart from the Karakoram Highway (1284 km) constructed by the Chinese in return for Pakistan's transfer of some of the territory in Gilgit-Baltistan to Xinjiang, no new road construction has been undertaken due to the difficulty of the

¹ This can be accessed from <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3405.html> retrieved on April 30, 2010.

engineering works involved, particularly for the construction of tunnels. The North Korean Army has offered assistance for the construction of tunnels and in 2001 a North Korean team of military engineers had visited the area for studying the feasibility. The work is yet to be started. In the absence of any development, the principal means of livelihood for the local people were employment in the armed forces and in the tourism industry. However, the tourism industry has been severely affected by 9/11 catastrophe, and subsequently 'war on terror'.

Historical Background of Press in Gilgit-Baltistan

Press in Gilgit-Baltistan has a century old background. Basically, it was started by some Britishers in 1907 that came as agents of British rule in sub-continent. They started a pamphlet-magazine "*Spinker*" which is considered the first print medium in the region. In those days many newspapers and magazines were brought to Gilgit from Kashmir by post while the Kashmir-Gilgit road often remained uncertain on account of extremely variable weather conditions. Owing to those news materials, reached here after a couple of weeks, people of the region fulfilled their curiosity of information by reading these out dated materials (Barcha, 2003, p.11).

With the passage of time, in the development continuum of journalism, the *Karakoram*, a periodical literary magazine was introduced in 1970 by Federal Government Degree College Skardu under the editorship of Ghulam Hussain on yearly basis. With this, the first printing press was also established in the region in 1970 with the name of Hunza Printing Press. Publishing of other periodical magazines started from Gilgit-Baltistan after the popularity of the aforesaid magazine. Up till 1987, only periodical magazines had been published. But in January 1988, a weekly newspaper named *Nawa-i-Gilgit* started its publication under the editorship of Mushtaq Ahmad Advocate. After the publishing of *Nawa-i-Gilgit*, a series of newspapers and magazines started their publications one after another.

Recent Developments in the Field of Press

With the increase in literacy, a great number of of daily and weekly newspapers started publication in English and Urdu from Gilgit-Baltistan and Islamabad. Apart from many obstacles and pressures, these papers are playing their due role. However, no private television channel has yet been launched due to a relatively smaller market. Above all, two radio

stations established in Gilgit and Skardu with the frequency of 1512 kHz are also playing a vital role in creating awareness among the masses on local, national and international affairs.

Following are some of the details of daily and weekly publications from Gilgit-Baltistan area:

- *Daily Muhasib* the first ever weekly newspaper being published from Gilgit city.
- *Daily K2* started publication in May 1996 and being published from Islamabad.
- *Weekly Naqara* printing at Islamabad started publication in Jan, 2007.
- *Weekly Waddi* printing at Islamabad started publication in Sep, 2000.
- *Weekly Siachin* printing at Skardu started publication in Nov 1988.
- *Weekly Mountain Times* printing at Islamabad started publication in May, 2007.
- *Weekly Sada-i-Gilgit* printing at Islamabad started publication in Nov, 2004.
- *Weekly Badi-i-Shmal* printing at Islamabad started publication in June, 1999.
- *Weekly Chatan* printing at Islamabad started publication in June, 2004.
- *Weekly Azan* printing at Islamabad started publication in Sep, 2006.
- *Weekly Bang-i-Sahar* printing at Islamabad started publication in July, 2004.
- *Weekly Gilgit Today* printing at Islamabad started publication in March, 2007.

Research Question

The purpose of this study was to investigate the coverage of local newspapers on major issues of Gilgit-Baltistan, especially developmental news coverage, news coverage on conflicts, and coverage of local newspapers on the constitutional status of the area.

This research addressed the following questions:

- What is the proportion of the developmental news in three local newspapers?
- Do the local newspapers give high proportion of space to sectarian conflicts?

- Do the local newspapers provide higher proportion of space for the development news?
- What is the proportion of conflicts, specially sectarian, political and ethnic in local newspapers?
- Do the local newspapers provide higher proportion of space to the constitutional status of the area and the constitutional rights of the people?

Literature Review

This paper undertakes ‘development journalism’ paradigm as a perspective to evaluate the contents of newspapers from Gilgit-Baltistan. This perspective advocates that the media has the potential to play the role of development facilitator and foster change in the society in an organized fashion (Xu, 2008). This phenomenon is more prevalent in developing and under-developed nations where it is assumed that the government needs discipline more than the democracy.

‘Development journalism’ has since long been practiced in parts of Asia and delivered enviable results (Chen, 1991; Latif, 1998; Maslog, 1985; Shah, 1989; Verghese, 1976; Vilanilam, 1975, 1984; Xu, 2005). It was one of the most celebrated tool of development in 1960s, when media focused on the conditions of developing nations and attempted to uncover the ways to improve them.

Development is a complex phenomenon and development communication is systematic use of communication for national development (Lent, 1979). As Signal & Rogers (2001) mention:

Development is widely participatory process of directed social change in society, intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including greater quality of freedom, and other valued qualities) for the majority of people through their gaining greater control over their environment (p.33).

Many countries justify government control over the media in the name of national security, religious and cultural harmony and the name of systematic use of the media to promote governmental agenda for development. As McDaniel (1986) has pointed out, politicians in developing countries “wish to be seen as champions of development issues” and warned “it might undermine development as a responsibility

of the whole population, picturing it instead as an activity of the influential and politically powerful” (p. 170).

Both the government and privately owned media in developing countries present a higher proportion of development news. However, newspapers have different views about which aspect of development deserves their primary attention and how the news should be presented. Social welfare and national and international economics were most emphasized and official sources were most often quoted in the Indian dailies (Shah, 1990), whereas rural Georgian weekly newspapers devoted less space to development news, emphasized physical facilities development and rarely quoted government sources (Griswold & Swenson, 1992).

Development news should examine development plans, critically evaluate and point out disparities between the original plan and actual implementation (Aggarwala, 1979). Studies on media ownership and proportion of development news coverage showed that conglomerate-controlled newspapers cover more governmental news than development news in comparison to independent newspapers (Vilonia, 1979b).

Second variable of present study focuses the conflict and issues regarding Gilgit-Baltistan. Conflict has definitions in the conflict resolution literature that range from bad thoughts to genocide. Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties. These parties may be individuals, small or large groups, or countries.

Interests can diverge in many ways: over resources, territory, money, energy resources, food and how they should be distributed. Over power, how control and participation in political decision-making are allocated. Over identity, concerning the cultural, social and political communities to which people feel tied. Over status, whether people believe they are treated with respect and dignity and whether their traditions and social position are respected. Over values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology. Incompatibilities can be seen in changes in objective circumstances: a lower standard of living; demographic changes or population movements; technological changes that alter communications, material capacities, weaponry and relative power. Subjective changes can also

generate conflict through, for instance, newly felt social resentments or a rising new nationalist ideology; these subjectively felt changes can arise whether or not objective changes have occurred. The parties' emotional states and mental outlooks influence conflict. Time is a factor as well: observers note that with time, a conflict's subjective content gains importance as its objective basis is obscured. A group or nation's objective circumstances do not themselves cause violent conflicts. Conflicts only arise out of those conditions or changes in them when it is perceived that interests are threatened by some other party (Burton, 1993, pp.54-44).

It has become common to describe conflicts as passing through a series of phases. The potential for conflict exists whenever people have different needs, values, or interests; this is the "latent" conflict stage. The conflict may not become apparent until a "triggering event" leads to the emergence (or beginning) of the obvious conflict. Emergence may be followed quickly by settlement or resolution, or it may be followed by escalation, which can become very destructive¹.

A sectarian conflict usually refers to violent conflict on religious and political lines such as the conflicts between Shias and Sunnies in Pakistan. It may also refer to general philosophical, political or armed conflict between different schools of thought. Non-sectarians espouse that free association and tolerance of different beliefs are the cornerstone to successful / peaceful human interaction. They espouse political and religious pluralism.

Sectarianism is present in all parts of the world. Wherever religious sects compete, religious sectarianism is the net outcome.

These conflicts arise, according to arguments of Bakker (as quoted in Szarka 1998), because the majority or dominant national government wants to establish the same conditions in regions where the majority population belongs to a minority as in other regions of that state. Subsequently, he defines a minority conflict "... as a form of active antagonism between the government of a state and representatives of a minority over the extent of opportunities of minorities to influence the

¹ This can be viewed on www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_stages/?nid=1068 retrieved on September, 2003.

use and organization of the (sub-state) territories they inhabit"¹ (Szarka, Lazlo. 1998).

Hypothesis

Following hypotheses were constructed to study the problem in question:

- H₁: Newspapers from Gilgit-Baltistan are not relatively giving enough coverage to the issues concerning the constitutional status of the area.
- H₂: Developmental coverage is seldom seen in local newspapers of Gilgit-Baltistan.
- H₃: Development news receive more front-page coverage in Daily K-2 and *Weekly Naqara* than *Weekly Azan*.
- H₄: Local newspapers provide high proportion of space to the conflicts especially that of sectarian nature.
- H₅: All the three newspapers giving high proportion of space on conflicts as compared to developmental news coverage.

The Newspapers under Analysis

The present study is a content analysis of local Urdu newspapers from Gilgit Baltistan - the *Weekly Azan* (Gilgit), the *Daily K-2* and the *Weekly Naqara*. Their printed editions are among the highest circulated Urdu daily and weekly newspapers in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Weekly Azan

Weekly Azan started its publication from Islamabad containing four pages in Urdu language from September, 2006 under the editorship of Khushee Muhammad Tariq. Its reporters are present in each district of Gilgit-Baltistan and also in the capital. It is a private enterprise. Its readership is also in Karachi, Islamabad and various other cities of Pakistan where the people of Gilgit-Baltistan dwell. The publication of the newspaper which could appropriately reflect the present political, religious, cultural literary and national aspiration was the long felt need of the people of the area. It catered to the requirements of representation of voices of the people from Gilgit-Baltistan to the ruling class. It has been instrumental in developing the political consciousness of the educated people of the area.

¹ This can be viewed on www.hungarianquarterly.com/no150/130.html retrieved on 1989

The paper is praised for its presentation, effectiveness, accuracy of language by the most learned Urdu writers. Its editorials are well reputed, and are appreciated. This newspaper often loaded the voice for constitutional rights of the people. Advertisement is the main source of the income for the newspaper. Without advertisement, a paper could not continue its publication. Same is true for this paper as well. Advertisement is given to this newspaper by both the government and the private sector. Columnists of these newspapers present views through their journalistic writings.

The main objective of this newspaper is to highlight the constitutional status of the Gilgit-Baltistan and to raise the awareness about the hazards of sectarianism among the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Weekly Naqara

Weekly Naqara, being printed at Islamabad, started publication in 2004 under the editorship of a renowned journalist of the region Raja Hussain Khan Maqpoon. The language of this news paper is Urdu. *Weekly Naqara* is also considered effective newspaper of the region. Slogan of this paper is 'Gilgit -Baltistan ke awam ki awaz' (the voice of people of Gilgit-Baltistan). The newspaper claims to have their main objective to focus the real issues of Gilgit-Baltistan, especially developmental issues and constitutional status of the area. Content of this newspaper is based on local news and publishes only editorial and there is no space for columns and letters to the editor. Government and influential personalities also appear in news stories. Circulation of this paper is also very high as compared to other local newspapers. This newspaper sheds light on the socio- religious problems and also writes about rights for the people of the area. The first page contains very important news related to Gilgit-Baltistan and inner page carries less important news.

Both the government and the private sector give advertisements to this newspaper. This newspaper is playing an important role to create political awareness among the people of the region. *Weekly Naqara* has now been merged into Karakoram Publishing Network. Head office is located in Islamabad and regional offices are in Skardu and Gilgit.

Daily K-2

Daily K-2 also started its publication in May 1996 from Islamabad. This newspaper is considered to be the highest in circulation among the

newspapers of Gilgit Baltistan. The slogan of this paper is 'Jabroo-Istehsal K Khilaff Barsar-e-Paikaar' (fighting against cruelty and injustice). With the passage of time this newspaper earned a respectable status among local readers because the agenda of the paper was set as 'fight against the social evils'.

Daily K-2 is published under the Karakoram Publishing Network. As compared to other local newspapers, circulation of this newspaper is the highest. The main page of *Daily K-2* carries national news and some news items related to the Gilgit-Baltistan and second page of this paper gives full coverage to Gilgit-Baltistan related news. The title of the second page 'Gilgit Baltistan kay Qaryya Qaryya say' (from all the nooks and corners of Gilgit-Baltistan), which focuses only regional news related to various towns and villages of Gilgit-Baltistan. Copies of this newspaper are sent to various cities of Pakistan including Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Karachi and Azad-Kashmir.

Contents of this paper mostly include local news, related to Gilgit-Baltistan. According to senior management official of *Daily K-2* in Islamabad, the newspaper has been receiving threats from sectarian elements. According to him, each religious establishment demand high proportion of coverage to their news items as compared to other. General perception regarding this paper in public is positive. Due to successful 13 years of publication and highest circulation, now *Weekly K-2* has turned into a daily newspaper and it has been publishing from various cities including Islamabad, Karachi and Azad-Kashmir.

Methodology

This study is based on content analysis – 'a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description on the manifest content of communication' (Bereleson, 1952, p.18).

The purpose of this study was to investigate the coverage of local newspapers on major issues of Gilgit-Baltistan, especially developmental news coverage, news coverage on conflicts, and coverage of local newspapers on the constitutional status and constitutional rights of the area.

This research addressed the question such as what is the proportion of the developmental news in three local newspapers. What are the content characteristics of development news? Do the local newspapers provide higher proportion of space to the development news? What is the

proportion of conflicts, specially sectarian, political and ethnic in local newspapers? And finally, do the local newspapers provide higher proportion of space to constitutional status of the area and the constitutional rights of the people?

Sampling and Variables

Guido H. Stempel III (1952) found that increasing 'the sample size beyond 12 does not produce marked differences in the results' (p.33). This study used the criteria suggested by Stempel and the sampling technique used by Vilanilm (1967), with some modifications.

For sampling, the whole year was divided into 52 weeks and 26 weeks were selected using systematic sampling with an alternative interval. All news stories related to variables on front and back pages (except advertisement and supplementary materials) published in each newspaper on the selected weeks were coded and analyzed. The unit of analysis in this study was a news story like; story placement (front page and back page), length of the story, type of the story; i.e., development, conflict or constitutional status.

Operational Definitions

The definition of development news used by John V. Vilanilam (1979a) was adopted as an operational definition for this study. He defined development news as:

News relating to the primary, secondary, and tertiary needs of a developing country. Primary needs are food, clothing, and shelter. Secondary needs are development of agriculture, industry and all economic activity which lead the fulfillment of the primary needs, plus development of education, literacy, health environment, medical research, family planning, employment, labor welfare, social reforms, national integration and rural and urban development. Tertiary needs are development of mass media, transportation, telecommunication, activities (p.34).

Conflict has definitions in the conflict resolution literature that range from bad thoughts to genocide. Conflict is said to exist when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or pursue their interests through actions that damage other parties. Sectarianism is bigotry, discrimination or hatred arising from attaching importance to perceived differences between subdivisions

within a group, such as between different denominations of a religion or the factions of a political movement. Ethnicity is also one of the facets of conflict which refers to the behavior and feeling (about oneself and others) that supposedly emanates from membership of an ethnic group. Ethnic conflict has come to mean cleavages between groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities¹ (Hizkias, Assefa, 2006).

Because sectarian, ethnic and political conflict frequently stir up in Gilgit-Baltistan where the population is divided clearly in different sects, ethnic and political groups with different ideologies and thoughts (as discussed in introduction). The ideological underpinnings of attitudes and behaviors labeled as sectarian are extraordinarily varied. Members of a religious or political group may feel that their own salvation, or success of their particular objectives, requires aggressively seeking converts from other groups; adherents of a given faction may believe that for the achievement of their own political or religious project their internal opponents must be purged.

Findings and Discussion

Space Devoted to Constitutional News Coverage in the Newspapers

Table 1 shows that the *Weekly Azan* published highest proportion of space on constitutional status of the area (21%) followed by the *Daily K-2* (18%) and the *Weekly Naqara* (9%). However, the total space of coverage on constitutional issue in all the three newspapers is only (15%), which supports our hypothesis that the local newspapers in Gilgit-Baltistan are not relatively giving enough coverage to the issue concerning the constitutional status of the area. The proportional ratio of constitutional news coverage in all the three news papers has limited to (15%) with 113 news stories.

Table-1: Space Devoted to Constitutional News Coverage

Coverage on Constitutional News	Azan	K-2	Naqara	All three Newspapers
Number of News Items	46	49	18	113
Size of News (cm ²)	3,278.04	2,369.50	1,673.25	7,320.79
Percentage	21%	18%	9%	15%

¹ This can be viewed on www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee06.htm retrieved on 2006

Space Devoted to Development News

Table 2 highlights that *Weekly Naqara* provides high proportion of space to the development news (43%) followed by *Weekly Azan* (36%) and *Daily K-2* (31%). Total coverage of all the three newspapers in developmental news is 70%, which indicate that our hypothesis is not supported by the data which says that developmental news coverage is seldom seen in local newspapers. Because, all the newspapers are giving high proportion of space to the development news. The proportional ratio of developmental news coverage in all the three news papers has been (70%) with 428 news items.

Table-2: Proportion of Development News in Selected Newspapers

Coverage on Developmental News	Azan	K-2	Naqara	All three Newspapers
Number of News Items	132	141	155	428
Size of News (cm ²)	57,432.20	4,065.50	8,031.56	69,529.26
Percentage	36%	31%	43%	70%

Development News coverage on Front Page of the Newspapers

Table 3 shows that the *Daily K-2* published high proportion of development news (37%) on front page, followed by *Weekly Naqara* (36%) and *Weekly Azan* (27%). *Daily K-2* published 77 news items on front page, *Naqara* published 70 and *Azan* published 57 news items on front page. These findings support our hypothesis which predicted that *Daily K-2* and *Weekly Naqara* giving high proportion of space to the development news on front page then *Weekly Azan*.

Table-3: Front Page Coverage of Development News

Front Page Coverage on Developmental News	Azan	Naqara	K-2	All three Newspapers
Number of News Items	57	70	77	204
Size of News (cm ²)	3,037.30	4,041.79	4,065.50	11,144.59
Percentage	27%	36%	37%	31%

Local Newspapers Coverage of Conflicts

Table 4 indicates that *Daily K-2* gives high proportion of space to conflicts especially that of sectarian nature. *Daily K-2* published total 121 news items of conflicts, out of which 63 (50%) news stories relate to sectarian conflicts, 24(35%) news items to political conflict and 15 (15%) news items to ethnic conflicts. *Weekly Azan* published 137 news items on conflicts, of which 48% on sectarian conflicts, 34% on political

conflicts and 18% on ethnic conflicts. *Weekly Naqara* published 132 news items on conflicts, of which 38% on sectarian, 37% on political and 25% on ethnic. All the three newspapers published 392 stories on conflicts, out of which 173(45%) news stories on sectarian conflicts, 146(35%) on political conflicts and 73 (20%) on ethnic conflicts. Findings support our hypothesis which predicted that the local newspapers giving high proportion of space on the conflicts especially sectarian nature.

Table-4: Coverage of Conflict Comparison with Sectarian Issues

Coverage on / Conflicts News	Azan			K-2			Naqara		
	Sect	Pol	Eth	Sect	Pol	Eth	Sect	Pol	Eth
Number of News	62	50	27	63	43	15	48	53	31
Size of News (cm ²)	3,284	2,329	1,237	3,323	2,298	1,018	3,438	3,381	2,280
Percentage	48%	34%	18%	50%	35%	15%	38%	37%	25%

All Three Newspapers		
Sect	Pol	Eth
173	146	73
1,044	8,007	4,535
45%	35%	20%

Comparison

Table 5 shows that the *Daily K-2* has given 51% space to conflicts and 31% space to the developmental news. *Weekly Azan* has devoted 43% space for conflicts and 36% for developmental news. *Weekly Naqara* has given 48% space to conflicts and 43% to developmental news. All the three newspapers have given high proportion of space which is 47% to conflicts – slightly higher than to development news (38%).

These findings support our hypothesis that all the newspapers have given high proportion of space to conflict news as compared to developmental news coverage. These findings can be justified on the number of stories given on the subjects as well. All three newspapers have published 392 stories on conflicts and 365 stories on developmental news.

Table-5: Comparison of Developmental and Conflict Issues

Coverage on / Conflicts News	Azan		K-2		Naqara		All Three Newspapers	
	Dev	Conf	Dev	Conf	Dev	Conf	Dev	Conf
Number of News	132	139	77	121	156	132	365	392
Size of News (cm ²)	5,743	6,849	4,065	6,638	8,032	9,099	1,784	2,258
Percentage	36%	43%	31%	51%	43%	48%	38%	47%

Conclusion

Based on the results and findings discussed above, the present study supports four out of five hypotheses regarding conflicts, constitutional and developmental news coverage in local newspapers of Gilgit-Baltistan. One hypothesis that developmental news coverage is seldom seen in local newspapers has proven to be false because the local newspapers not only cover such issues rather devote sufficient space.

This study proves that local newspapers give sufficient coverage to the issues of conflicts especially sectarian which is quite sensitive in Gilgit-Baltistan. However, it is required to be essentially studied as how these news items are covering the issue and what kind of discourses do the reporters make in their news stories. It is also found that constitutional issues are not on priorities for the local press, as only 7% space has been devoted by all the three newspapers. The selected three newspapers have given high proportion of space to the developmental issues and activities which is a good sign for the regional developmental activities like education, infrastructural development, health, agriculture & food, environment, transportation, telecommunication and water.

Based on the findings, the present study supports that the local newspapers of Gilgit-Baltistan have given high proportion of space to conflict issues especially sectarian, indicating that the press is aware of the sensitivity of the problem. However, it is considered vital that an analysis of the news item should be made to evaluate as what aspect(s) of the issue are covered significantly. Coverage of local newspapers on development news is quite satisfactory and coverage on constitutional status of the area less than 15% which indicates negligence on part of the local press towards the major issue.

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METAPHOR, LANGUAGE AND REALITY

* *Mazhar Hayat*

Abstract

This paper aims at exploring the position and role of metaphor vis-à-vis language and reality as it has been visualized and interpreted differently by the anthropologists, literary critics and linguists from classical era to the modern age. The classical tradition proclaims metaphor as an added extra to the language of poetry. The Mediaeval and Elizabethan eras upheld the classical notion and emphasized on didactic function of metaphor. The Cartesian and Empirical traditions of the 17th century found metaphor as disruptive of univocal discourse which threatened logical argumentation. It was German philosopher Hegel who first revolutionized the notion of metaphor by dividing the whole language into 'Dead metaphor' and 'Live metaphor'. Inspired by Vico, English Romantics proclaimed metaphor as imagination in action. They asserted that language was an organic whole which was a means of experiencing reality, not imitating it. In twentieth century, Structuralists, Post-structuralists and Cognitivists have upheld and extended romantic notion of language and metaphor. They assert that metaphor is an omniscient principle of language rather than a marginal construct. So Language being essentially metaphorical, fashions our thinking and reality.

Speech is a unique human faculty. It is through speech that we express and communicate our internalized experiences and feelings to the people around us. The function of metaphor in human language has been a much debated issue among philosophers, literary critics and linguists since classical age. Metaphor is a Greek word meaning Temper. Greek etymology is "from meta, implying a change and *pherein* meaning to bear, or carry".¹ In Modern Greek, the word metaphor retains its historical meanings of 'transport'. As a rhetorical device, metaphor is defined as a direct comparison between two or more seemingly unrelated objects. However, for the transference to occur there must exist certain analogies between the objects to be compared. For Richards, a metaphor contains two constituents which are the Tenor and the Vehicle. The Tenor refers to the subject to which attributes are ascribed whereas the Vehicle is the one from which the attributes are borrowed. The corresponding terms for the tenor and the vehicle, among Cognitivists, are the target and the source domain respectively.

The study of metaphor dates back to the Greeks. Aristotle is now considered as "originator of the comparative theory of metaphor, holding that a metaphor is a comparison between the two terms that is made in

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order to explore the nature of one”.² Furthermore Aristotle acknowledges the potential of metaphor to signify what is not named. He also touches upon the ability of metaphor to serve “human urge to articulate what is as yet unarticulated”.³ Classical rhetoricians approved of metaphor as a device that moves the audience. Randal Holme in his *‘Mind, Metaphor and Language Teaching’* states that “In the western rhetorical tradition, metaphor was also seen as able to help a speaker to remember the order of their subject-matter”.⁴ The attributes that classical tradition has assigned to metaphor establish it as a literary device. Quite significantly, Aristotle classifies the arts of language into three categories which are logic, rhetoric and the poetic. The logic and rhetoric promote wisdom and clarity and so are carried through prose and the real speech patterns. Poetry provides for unusual expression which is achieved mainly through metaphor. The notion of metaphor as distinguished from the real speech is persistent in Aristotle’s writings. For him, metaphor is a kind of ‘added extra to language’. “For in a metaphor alone there is perspicuity, novelty and sweetness”.⁵ Aristotle’s view of metaphor affirms that metaphor being lively contains decorative and educative value. Unlike Plato whose philosophy resides in his doctrine of essences, Aristotle revels in the material world and opts for its detailed investigation to discover truth. In the *Poetics*, he states that all arts are imitations. For him, “In particular, the art of poetry exists because people are imitative creatures who enjoy such imitation”.⁶ It also enjoins that art and reality are separate entities and the mode of expression cannot alter reality. Art is only a presentational mode of discovering truth. Subsequent classical writers like Cicero, Horace and Longinus substantiated Aristotelian notion of metaphor as a decorative device which enhances sensational and emotional effect of the style. Cicero conceives of decorum as a principle of life transferred to the domain of art. For him, “A metaphor is a short form of simile, contracted into one word; this word is put in a position not belonging to it as if it were its own place, and if it is recognizable it gives pleasure”.⁷ Horace in the *‘Art of Poetry’* declares that the ultimate aim of literature is to be sweet and useful. Best writings are meant for teaching and delight. “The poets must understand their audience: the learned reader may wish to be instructed while others may simply read to be amused”.⁸ Longinus in his *‘On the Sublime’* advocates for the need of decorum and sublimity of style to intensify sensation and acknowledge

figures of speech as the most important source to achieve the desired artistic effect.

The Medieval and Elizabethan societies extended the classical view of metaphor. Dante, the most renowned literary critic and writer of medieval age, utilized multiple levels of interpretation of meanings in '*The Divine Comedy*'. Throughout the medieval era, the church figures followed a tradition of symbolic (metaphorical) reading of Bible and interpreted many of the Biblical stories as allegories of Christ's actions. Dante was the first writer to employ the principles of symbolic interpretation to his secular work. Medieval age is not famous for the growth and progression of literary pursuits yet it helped formalize Greek approach towards metaphor. Medieval society being wholly Christian affirmed theological significance of metaphor. Medieval poets did not use figures of speech to realize their personal experiences; they used metaphors to relate to the collective experience. Medieval Christian society believed in a fundamental metaphor of the world as a book written by the Lord. For them, world was teemed with metaphors, structured by God to communicate meanings and wisdom of the creation. In Medieval era, classical rhetoricians were applauded as representatives of a sublime wisdom. As Perry Miller puts it, "It was agreed on all sides that rhetoric was derived from God, that Aristotle and Quintilian, like the great prophets of Judea, had been essentially scribes merely setting down a revelation from on high".⁹

Elizabethan and Metaphysical figures of speech reflect a continuation of classical and medieval notion of metaphor and reality. Sir Philip Sidney, a representative critic and scholar of Renaissance era, upholds Aristotelian view of art as an imitation. In his '*An Apology for Poetry*', he declares poetry as "a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth" whose chief aim is "to teach and delight".¹⁰ He prefers poetry to history, law and philosophy for its representation of truth. Sidney's approval of Classical notion of imitation and poetry reaffirms decorative and educative value of metaphor. It also affirms that truth resides in material world and the poet only discovers it. Elizabethan writers (poets) secularized medieval Christian ethics and promoted collectivism. Their use of metaphor is wholly didactic. They manifested truths and values which carried social approval. For Elizabethans, art which was an imitation, did not mean a mindless copy of the material world rather it

was an improvement upon nature. George Puttenham takes the poet for the gardener whose art helps nature. For him, “he (poet) furthers her (nature’s) conclusions and many times makes her effects more absolute and strange”.¹¹ So, the function of the metaphor, in Renaissance poetry was to substantiate shared reality, not to question it. In order to promote the sense of shared reality, Elizabethan poet did not require to invent metaphors which could impose his subjective responses to the world on the reader. His metaphors required the reader to respond to the poetic experience of the reality in order to complete it. His metaphor did not aim, in words of T. E. Hulme, “at handing over sensations bodily in order to make the reader continuously see a physical thing”.¹² The researcher also deems it essential to acknowledge the influence of Elizabethan philosopher Peter Ramus in extending logical support to the role of metaphor. *Ramus* restructured Aristotelian rhetoric. He simplified five parts of rhetoric into two categories: Logic and Rhetoric. *Ramist* reconstructing of rhetoric provided logical base to the metaphors which were hitherto considered as only decorative devices. The Elizabethan and Metaphysical poets now made conscious efforts to relate metaphorical inventions and comparisons in poetry to logic. Commenting on the logical basis of the metaphorical comparisons in Marlowe’s ‘Hero and Leander I’ in which women are compared with musical strings, vessels of brass and richest mine etc, Miss Tuve says “a woman is a musical string, a brass vessel, rich mine, base mould, in quick succession, and she is all of them with reference to but one characteristic which all share – of no worth unused”.¹³ So while maintaining the central assumptions of Aristotelian notion of metaphors, Renaissance era extended logical support to the metaphoric form in addition to its decorative and educative value.

In seventeenth century, western philosophy came under the influence of Cartesian principle of deductive method. The deductive theory which was based upon the principle of cause and effect validated any argument if it was deduced from the one before in chronological sequence. This deductive method discarded metaphorical expression as illogical. Metaphors assign attributes to the objects which are unconventional and unrelated to them. Elaborating Cartesian reservations regarding metaphor Randal Holme states “it (metaphor) raises the possibility that words can suddenly acquire new meanings, calling into

question an argument which is founded on meanings that were thought to be fixed".¹⁴ Similarly, the 18th century Empirical tradition in England did not approve the role of metaphors in language. Empirical tradition verifies human argument and wisdom in the light of natural happenings in the outer physical world. Empiricism supported mimetic theory of language. The language was the replica of the external world and had no structure of its own. This hypothesis asserts that "Words are symbols for things in the world, each word having its own referent – the object, concept or idea that represents and/or symbolize a word".¹⁵ For Empiricists, metaphor disrupts the possibility of unidirectional discourse which conforms to the natural world. Dr. Johnson's biased notion of metaphor is reflected in his comments on the wit of the metaphysical poets. Commenting on the metaphorical language of the metaphysical poetry, he says, "The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons and allusions".¹⁶

The notion of metaphor was first revolutionized by the German philosopher Hegel in 19th century. He proclaimed metaphor as inevitable. He categorized the whole language into two types of metaphors: dead metaphor and live metaphor. Dead metaphor referred to the words whose meanings were Fixed and Live metaphor referred to the words which could disrupt univocal discourse. In words of Cooper, "A dead metaphor has its meanings secured by the passage of history".¹⁷ The metaphors, which lost their strangeness; came to be recognized as part of normal conversation, are called lexicalized metaphors.

Romantic age is known for its radical departure from Aristotelian notion of metaphors. Romantics rejected classical notion of division of arts of language into different categories. They uphold Platonic view of organic unity of art. Romantics also repudiate the theory that metaphor is an added extra and admit metaphor as central to human discourse. They also discard the classical assumption about the function of metaphor as a decorative device. For Romantics, the function of metaphor is the expression of imagination. The major exponents of romantic notion of metaphor and language are Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley. Before analyzing the contribution of these romantic writers and theorists towards the notion of metaphor, it seems pertinent to acknowledge the influence of 18th century Italian jurist and rhetorician Vico on romantics

regarding the role of metaphors in forming human mind. Vico proclaimed in his *'New Science'* that the primitive societies evolved wisdom through metaphors, fables and myths which enjoy powerful influence on modern analytical modes of thought. Vico conceived of language as shaping reality. He says, "We live in a world of words, made for us by our language, where minds are formed by the character of language, not language by the minds of those who speak it".¹⁸ It was this Vico's view of language and society which provided the basis for the modern principle of what we call 'cultural relativism' and discursive reality. His notion of language and society finds its excellent illustration in the *'Savage Mind'* of French anthropologist Levi-Strauss.

To return to the romantics, Wordsworth was the first to affirm his faith in the organic unity of language. Expressing his commitment with the language of rustic people, Wordsworth in his 'Preface to the Lyrical Ballad' asserts that "such a language arising out of repeated experience and regular feelings is a more permanent and a far more philosophical language than that which is frequently substituted for it by poets".¹⁹ Wordsworth rejects dignified and variegated poetic diction. He establishes autonomy of the reader. While there is no special language for poetry, so there is nothing like special figures of speech. Wordsworth's chief interest in poetry is to locate the primary laws of human nature by focusing on the moments of genuine excitement in the daily life of his rustic individuals who live in the company of Mother Nature and have hourly communication with the natural objects around them. Describing the state of genuine excitement in his rustic characters arising out of his interaction with nature, Wordsworth says:

...observation of affinities
In objects where no brotherhood exists
to passive minds.

(The Prelude, 1850, II, 384-6)

The English writer and critic who is acknowledged as the pioneer of modern notion of metaphor is S. T. Coleridge. It is with Coleridge that interest renewed in the work of Vico. He revolutionized the notion of mind. For Coleridge, mind is not the passive receiver of reality imposed from it from the external world. It is "an active, self-forming, self-realizing system".²⁰ At the centre of Coleridge's theory of metaphor is his notion of imagination. It is through imagination that we perceive

'Similitude in dissimilitude'. Our imagination imposes order on the external world which is unpatterned. It creates unity in diversity. And finally the harmony generated through imagination is linguistically realized through imagery (metaphor). Elaborating the inner unifying process of imagination, Coleridge says: "The poet brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which I would exclusively appropriate the name of imagination".²¹ For Coleridge, metaphor is 'imagination in action'. Highlighting the interplay between mind and metaphor, he goes on to say:

Images, however, beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs of original genius only as far as they are modified by a predominant passion; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity.²²

Rejecting Aristotelian view of metaphor, Coleridge claims that language is that weapon of mind which conquers the world beyond sensuous perception. "The power of poetry is, by a single word perhaps, to instill that energy into the mind which compels the imagination to produce the picture".²³ Furthermore, for Coleridge, language is not only a representation of the external reality but also of reality as it is perceived by the poet. So language and reality are interrelated.

Shelley's chief contribution towards the notion of metaphor lies in his emphasis on the connective ability of the faculty of imagination which creates similitude out of dissimilitude. If Reason discerns differences, Imagination perceives harmony between different objects. Distinguishing between Reason and Imagination, Shelley says, "Reason respects the differences and imagination the similitudes of things". He further adds that poetry may be defined to be "the expression of the imagination".²⁴

Twentieth century theories of metaphor and language are highly indebted to the Romantic notion of metaphor. Modern philosophers, anthropologists, literary critics and linguists have repudiated the

Victorian sense of shared reality and have come to believe in relativism and variety of experience. For them, truth is subjective and varies with the change in frame of reference. This belief in relativism and variety of experience not only validates the central role of metaphor in human language but also strengthens the common ground between the poetic and the ordinary language. Contributing to the notion of metaphor, twentieth century linguists have mainly focused on the similarities between the poetic language and the real speech. Chief among those who explore common grounds between the poetic diction and the ordinary language are Mukarovsky, Henry Lee Smith and Mrs. Nowothy. They claim that the oral language is basic to all literary compositions because both the poet and the hearer have internalized the same principles of their native language. The poet being a native speaker cannot violate the systems of his language. For them, metaphor is a linguistic device which utilizes the language by stretching it beyond its literal usage. Elaborating the literary use of the real speech, Mrs. Nowothy states:

A verbal structure is literary if it presents its topic at more than one level of presentation at the same time - or, alternatively, if one and the same utterance has more than one function in the structure of meaning in which it occurs.²⁵

So metaphorical use of language is, in reality, greater utilization of the potentialities of real speech. To add to it, twentieth century anthropologists have established close relationship between language and culture. They assert that our sense of reality is mainly built through the linguistic choices we make to interpret our experiences. Twentieth century anthropologists like B.L. Whorf, Sapir, Emily Durkheim and Franz Boas are agreed that language is guide to cultural and social reality. The relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary which is the outcome of social agreement.

In terms of literary criticism, one of the major literary contributions of 20th century critics is I. A. Richards' view of metaphor. He views metaphor as "an omniscient principle of language rather a marginal construct that threatened the integrity of logical argument".²⁶ Richards discards Cartesian and empirical tradition that language is a univocal discourse and that metaphor disrupts logical argumentation. The emphasis on context and frame of reference establishes the view that

reality is discursive. Richards' classification of metaphor into 'Tenor' and 'Vehicle' later on extended by Black came to be known as "interactional theory of metaphor".²⁷ According to interactional theory, metaphor acquires more varied and multi-dimensional meanings as it is created out of tension between the tenor and the vehicle. So metaphor is not only essential for the perception of reality; rather it expands reality by extending the scope of language. Evaluating the role of metaphor in language, Philip Wheelwright finds metaphor at the center of language and reinforces the transference of meanings. In 'Metaphor and Reality', he says:

In this broadest possible sense of the word 'language' I mean to designate any element in human experience which is not merely contemplated for its own sake alone, but is employed to mean, to intend, to stand proxy for something beyond itself.²⁸

Post-structuralist theory of language and reality is the latest argument in favour of metaphor. Derrida, the founder of Post-structuralist school of thought contributed towards the notion of metaphor by analyzing the role of metaphor as a mechanism of meaning-construction in language. Post-structuralists argue that meanings do not depend on reference to the world. If the objects, to which language refers, already existed in the outside world, then words would have similar equivalents from one language to another. They reject structuralists' view of stable relationship between the signifier and the signified and assert that language is a much less stable affair. Highlighting instability of meanings, Eagleton explains:

Nothing is ever fully present in signs. It is an illusion for me to believe that I can ever be fully present to you in what I say or write, because to use signs at all entails my meaning being always somehow dispersed, divided, and never quite at one with itself. Not only my meaning, instead, but I myself: since language is something I am made out of, rather than a convenient tool I use, the whole idea that I am a stable, unified entity must also be a fiction.²⁹

Language through its analogies (metaphors) controls our social relations, our thinking and our understanding of the world and ourselves. Establishing metaphor as central to discourse, Derrida says, "foundation

is a metaphor, concept is a metaphor, theory is a metaphor and there is no metaphor for them".³⁰


Despite the fact that overwhelming concern of the philosophers, anthropologists and the linguists in 20th century was to establish metaphor as central to language, the formalists continued to treat metaphor as a suspect topic. The mistrust of the formalists about the disruptive role of metaphor was so pervasive that it even influenced those who took interest in metaphor as a means of experiencing reality. Even Black emphasized that "Metaphor was central to human self-expression but that it was nonetheless a departure from normal language use".³¹ Formalistic and empirical approach has been manifested most vehemently in Tarski's theory of Truth-condition. According to the concept of truth-condition, a statement is validated if and only if it is in accordance with the world it refers to. A metaphorical expression is always a departure from literal meanings of the language and does not qualify the parameters of truth-condition. "Metaphorical meaning is a violation of a term's truth-conditions and metaphor suggests a language of semantic flux where a statement cannot be validated by the world to which it refers".³² However truth-conditional analysis frequently fails to rationalize the gap between the sentence meaning and the utterance meaning as it surfaces in practical conversation. Contextual knowledge always plays central role in abridging the gap between the sentence meaning and utterance meaning. Furthermore, formalists assume that the listener understands the meanings of the statement because he applies the same rules to interpret it which were applied by the speaker to produce the statement. For formalists, these rules of language do not permit incomprehensible sentences which metaphorical expressions are likely to create. Chomsky's theory of 'competence' and 'performance' is one of those linguistic concepts which have helped reduce the gap between literal utterances and metaphorical expressions. Chomsky's competence refers to "the knowledge possessed by the native users of a language" and performance refers to "the actual use of language in concrete situations".³³ In this way, Chomsky moves metaphor into the region of performance where meanings are determined by the context. But, he does not subscribe the rules which determine the usage of language. However, the linguist Grice claims to have formulated the rules that govern the use of language. He claims that interlocutors cooperate with each other to

make their conversation meaningful. Grice describes his view of cooperation between the interlocutors as ‘Maxims of Cooperation’. Elaborating Grice’s theory, George Yule states:

It is important to recognize maxims as unstated assumptions we have in conversation. We assume that people are normally going to provide an appropriate amount of information; we assume that they are telling the truth, being relevant and trying to be as clear as they can.³⁴

This view of unstated assumptions affirms the notion that language is a contextual phenomenon and hence is no longer a univocal discourse. Since metaphor apparently threatens the maxims of truthfulness, the maxim of relevance helps locate the cooperative intention behind the metaphorical expression. In words of Sadock, “We seek a figurative, cooperative intent behind the utterance”.³⁵ The maxim of relevance does not only help the meaningful communication to take place but also governs our mind to bring the utterance in accord with the unstated assumptions. Before we make an utterance, we ensure that it conforms to the principle of relevance. “In forming or interpreting an utterance, we first try to make the utterance concur with the assumption that we hold about it”.³⁶

As metaphor is an integral part of language, it is the only source of conceptualizing abstractions. For Cognitivists, we cannot really think which is void or formless. As the role of conceptual metaphors regarding abstractions is based on the view that natural and social universe is an organic whole grasped through binarities; this phenomenon is best illustrated in Bickerton’s bidimensional tree modal:



(Adapted from Bickerton, 1980, p. 53)³⁷

Bickerton's view in *'Prolegomena to a Linguistic Theory of Metaphor'* (1980) is among the latest arguments which acknowledge multiplicity of meanings in discourse. His view of tripartite nature of meanings is based on the relationship between speaker, language and hearer. This notion also furthers the scope of metaphor as the basic foundation of language.

Elaborating pervasive role of metaphor in language, it is affirmed that metaphors structure our use of language in everyday life. Reddy has contributed significantly in evaluating the role of metaphors in structuring the use of real speech patterns. In his analysis of 'Communication', Reddy showed how it is conceived in various ways. "Communication is often conceived as a 'conduct'. We discuss communication as 'opening or using a channel as in 'getting through, coming across, putting across or transfer as in 'language transfer'".³⁸ Lakoff and Johnson extended the analysis of conceptual metaphors by exploring a number of metaphors which help contextualize abstract experiences of our daily life. For instance, time is talked about in terms of space. Business is talked about as "warfare". "Conceptual metaphors represent how we grasp and structure our reality. They establish the principles that guide our metaphor-making in language or in some other medium".³⁹ We also use synaesthetic metaphors to describe the opposite. Synaesthetic metaphors are those metaphors which take into account sense experiences of one type to conceptualize the opposite. Post-modern philosopher Derrida referred to a number of sense experiences which cannot be conceptualized without synaesthetic metaphor. For instance, sense of smell cannot be visualized unless it is described as bitter, sweet, oppressive or sharp. Metaphors fashion our attitude towards society, politics and economics. We talk and think through metaphors and hence they affect our angle of seeing at issues of life and the process of decision-making. Lakoff (1992) in his 'Metaphor and War' describes how the rhetoric of metaphors in Western politics manipulated the issue of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Saddam Hussain was projected as demon. This metaphor facilitated western politicians to influence public opinion in favour of military action against Iraq.

As it is established that we talk and think through metaphors, so to return to Hegelian notion, it infers that whole language consists of dead and live metaphors. It further enjoins that bulk of our real speech pattern

was once metaphorical extension which was gradually lexicalized as it lost its strangeness due to its repeated use. The question whether a metaphor is live or dead is determined mainly by the response of the listener/reader. Response is automatised in case of dead metaphor whereas live metaphor achieves deautomatisation. Analyzing the nature of the metaphorical expression “I smell a red herring” meaning “distraction from the real topic”, Goatly says that “the metaphor is opaque because it refers to a long forgotten practice, that of using rotten fish to distract bloodhounds from a scent”.⁴⁰ So metaphor is the product of a central thought process which is generated through the language that is strewn with metaphors.

To conclude, after the thorough investigation of various philosophical, literary and linguistic theories of metaphor, from classical to the modern age, it is affirmed that metaphor is no longer an added extra to the domain of poetry. It is central to human discourse which is an organic whole. Language being essentially metaphorical does not verify the happenings in the outer material world, rather it fashions our view of reality and society.

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DESCARTES' IDEA OF HUMAN NATURE: A BASIS FOR THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMITATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract

The question of what constitutes human nature is a recurrent one. This question becomes more important and demands urgent attention in the context of the debate and comparison between man and brutes. To the evolutionists, man may not after all be different from other animals since both have the same ancestry. On the other hand, the creationists vehemently disagree with this sameness and equality of man with other animals. To them man is the most perfect being, the apex of creation and therefore possesses a nature different and superior to other animals in most if not in all cases. Such is the camp Descartes belongs to. In recent times, with the unprecedented breakthroughs in Information Technology, there is an attempt of equating man with other animals and machines in terms of intelligence and knowledge. However, how tenable and justifiable is this equality? In the light of this, the paper, based on Descartes' theory of human nature, examines the epistemological status of artificial intelligence. The paper establishes that since animals and machines lack the mind, which Descartes refers to as consciousness, and its essential attributes, by consequence, they have great limitations epistemologically.

Introduction

From creation or if you like evolution, man has remained a being at the apex of all creatures or products of evolution. Whether he is seen as a spiritual being or a mere uncompromised matter, he has remained a mystery to every contemplating mind. Man is such a complex being that he has always been a mystery and an insoluble problem. Thus, the French philosopher, Gabriel Marcel (1955) describes him as a problematic being and Jean Paul Sartre (1956:43) describes him as a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not, a being who puts his own very being into questions. Therefore, from ancient times to the contemporary, efforts have been made and researches carried out to see what constitutes human nature. This paper is an attempt in this direction.

It is important to study human nature, for such knowledge will furnish us with certain truths about ourselves and these truths will consequently effect a causal change in us. It will help us to pick out certain human problems that are of fundamental importance and to offer guidance on how to solve them. This liberating power of self-knowledge

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was acknowledged by Socrates in his popular dictum, 'man know thyself'. This power of self-knowledge was later corroborated by Plato as well as Spinoza.

In the study of human nature, various epochs and traditions have been identified. In the ancient religious traditions, it is believed that some gods influence human affairs and other forms of life after death (Leslie, 1980:2). Such ideas were handed down from generation to generation by the authorities of tradition. Such efforts in this tradition contain no attempt to prove, or give evidence for, the doctrines so asserted. The concern of the traditional authorities is much more with conviction and conversion than with epistemology. One theme that is common to all the writings in the ancient religious tradition is the hope for some kind of liberation from the suffering, pain, toil, disease and mortality of ordinary human life (ibid: 4).

In the Greek and Medieval periods, reasoned argument about human nature was carried out by such philosophers like Plato, Lucretius, Aristotle, Aquinas etc. Here, attempts were made to give rational argument for the assertions made. This is what distinguished this period from the ancient religious tradition. However, in the modern period, the search for a scientific theory of human nature was made. This is the tradition or the period in which Rene Descartes featured.

Descartes' Theory of Human Nature: A Restatement

As a mathematician, experimental scientist and philosopher, Descartes was a central figure in the scientific revolution. The application of science to the study of man was made possible by his philosophical dualism of body and soul. According to Descartes, the body could be understood as the subject of a deterministic, mechanical explanation, while the distinctively human attribution of thought, rationality and freedom could be located in the incorporeal soul, which is beyond the reach of science (Leslie, 1980:81). It should be noted that before Descartes, Plato and St. Augustine maintained a dualistic conception of man. Plato conceives man as composed of two substances, a spiritual substance, the soul, and a material substance the body (Akintona, 2002:99). He sees the soul as the essential part of man superior to his body since the soul acts on the body and not vice versa. In the same vein, St. Augustine defines man as 'a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body' (Omogbe, 2001:1). Like Plato, Augustine also

sees the soul as the essential part of man. The soul is a spiritual substance superior to and above the body, which it acts upon and not vice versa. Influenced by this existence philosophy, Descartes develops his dualistic thesis known as *Interactionism*. To him, the attributes of the mind are different from the attributes of the body. The mind is non-local and non-spatial unlike the body which is an entity extended in space. How did Descartes arrive at his concept of the mind? He did this through his methodic doubt. In the words of Descartes:

I am. I exist-that is certain but for how long do I exist?
For as long as I think; for it might perhaps happen, if I
totally ceased thinking that I would at the same time
completely cease to be. I am now admitting nothing
except what is necessarily true. I am therefore, to speak
precisely, only a thinking being, that is to say a mind, an
understanding or a reason of being, which are terms
whose meaning was previously unknown to me?
(Descartes, 1960:26)

Descartes goes further to distinguish between the mind and the body. He writes in the sixth meditation:

I am a thinking being, I readily conclude that my essence
consists solely in being a body, which thinks (or a
substance whose whole essence or nature is only
thinking). And although perhaps, or rather certainly, I
have a body with which I am very closely united,
nevertheless, since on the other hand I have a distinct
idea of myself in so far as an extended being which does
not think, it is certain that this 'I' (that is to say my soul,
by virtue of which I am what I am) is entirely (and truly)
distinct from the body, and that it can exist without it.
(Descartes, 1960:26)

On the distinct nature of the mind and body Descartes writes, 'I further take notice here that there is a great difference between the mind and the body in that the body, from its nature is completely indivisible'. Descartes dualism forced him to make an absolute distinction between those who possessed incorporeal souls and that, which lacked them. This made him draw the line between men and all other animals. This distinction is based on the fact that he ties all mental attributes to the soul. Having done this, Descartes treats all other animals as mere bodily machines lacking rationality. Descartes carries this distinction between

men and other animals further when he argues that human beings alone are capable of a rational use of language or words. According to him, animals could never use words or other constructed signs as *we do* to declare our thought to others. Animals or machines can be made to utter words, but not that they should be so made as to arrange words variously in response to the meaning of what is said in their presence, as even the dullest men can do (Leslie, 1980:84).

Furthermore, comparing man with other animals, Descartes identifies consciousness (mind) which is a unique characteristic of man, as determining factor to man's response to the environment. Knowledge is a product of the activity of the mind. And it belongs to the mind to think, doubt, understand, affirm, deny, will, refuse, imagine etc. The mind, which is the ego, is the seat of knowledge and understanding. Without it, knowledge is difficult (Descartes, 1995:466). A mindless body is lacking in knowledge and understanding. To Descartes, animals are lacking in this unique aspect of man-the mind. Descartes believes that no matter how dull or stupid men are, they can arrange various words and form a sentence to make their thoughts understood. To a very large extent, we can accept this, for in experience, we do sometimes see even lunatics and infidels make intelligible statements. Descartes argues that no other animal, however perfect or well bred could do this. He goes further to show that this inability does not stem from their lacking the "organs" for magpies and parrots can and do utter words like us, yet they cannot talk like us, that is, with any sign of being aware of what they say. Descartes argues that animals are completely lacking in reason. However, for this position, a critic may want to know how a trained dog for instance, detects the presence of an enemy in the house no matter how pretentious and disguised the enemy might be, if animals wholly and completely lack reason. In response to our critic, we may then argue that it is not the case that animals can equal men in reason but that in comparative terms, animals possess a very small degree of reason to men.

Be that as it may, based on the possession of mind by men, an essential part that is lacking even in the most perfect species of animals, Descartes notes a fundamental difference between men and animals. He writes:

... It is incredible that a monkey or parrot who was one of the most perfect members of his species should not be comparable in this regard to one of the stupidest children or at least to a child with a diseased brain, if their souls were not wholly different in nature from ours. And we must not confuse words with natural movements, the expressions of emotions, which can be imitated by machines as well as by animals...it is another very remarkable thing that although several brutes exhibit more skill than we in some of their actions, they show none at all in many other circumstances. So their excelling us is no proof that they have a mind, for in that case they would have a better one than any of us and would excel us all round. It rather shows that they have none, and that it is nature that acts in them according to the arrangements of their organs... (Leslie, 1980:85)

Descartes, writing on what happens to the soul after the disintegration of the body argues that although the soul inhabits the body, it is not united with it in death. For whereas animals have no hope after this life, men have hope hereafter. He writes:

Whereas, when we realize how much they really differ from us, we understand much better the arguments proving that our soul is of a nature entirely independent of the body, and is not liable to die with it, and since we can discern no other causes that should destroy it, we are naturally led to decide that it is immortal (Ibid).

The Epistemological Limitation of Artificial Intelligence

Before we discuss the implications of Descartes' theory of human nature for the epistemological status of Artificial Intelligence, we consider it germane to make some clarifications on Descartes submissions vis-à-vis human nature and animal nature. It appears Descartes is using the terms animals, brutes and machines interchangeably as though they are synonymous. This is understandable. It is not the case that Descartes is not aware of the difference that exists between animals and machines. However, within the context of the fact that animals and machines lack consciousness or the mind realm, which is a unique characteristic of man which makes possible the high degree of reason in man, rational use of words to communicate thoughts, self-awareness of man's environment among other things, to this extent

Descartes classifies animals and machines together. Therefore this classification is not a false one, but a classification in context.

Again, it is not the case that Descartes is not aware that man is after all an animal, though a higher animal. However, his attempt to make a clear and distinct separation between human nature and animal nature is premised on the primacy, which he gives consciousness (an attribute of the mind), which is a unique possession of man. It is on this basis that he argues that lower animals are epistemologically limited. This suffices to him since he ties knowledge or higher degrees of knowledge to consciousness and other psychic or mental attributes. This submission is a fallout of the fundamental difference between human nature and artificial intelligence which is further crystallized by Lynne Rudder Baker in his famous article "Why Computers Can't Act". Baker formulates his argument in a deductive syllogistic form. He says, "My argument that machines cannot act is extremely simple. It goes like this:

P1: In order to be an agent, an entity must be able to formulate intentions.

P2: In order to formulate intentions, an entity must have an irreducible first-person perspective.

P3: Machines lack an irreducible first-person perspective.

C: Therefore, machines are not agents (Baker, 1981:157).

Since the argument is valid, the truth value of the premises need be determined. The first premise is simply a matter of definition. To perform action is to be able to formulate intention and agents are beings capable of formulating intentions. However, the second and the third premises need elaboration. The first-person perspective necessary for agency is the one that enters into self consciousness which emerges from group activity understood from the social context in which it manifests itself. According to Baker, "the ability to conceive of oneself in the first-person is the ability to conceive of one's thoughts as one's own... the ability to make irreducible first-person reference is clearly necessary for the ability to have second order consciousness. Therefore, an entity which can think of propositions at all enjoys self consciousness if and only if it can make irreducible first-person reference" (Baker, 1981). But the machines lack the first-person perspective. Baker's evidence for this conclusion is largely linguistic. "Computers cannot make the same kind of reference to themselves that self conscious beings make, and this

difference points to a fundamental difference between humans and computers namely, that humans but not computers have an irreducible first-person perspective” (for a detailed analysis of this argument, see Baker’s article, “Why Computers Can’t Act”). Be that as it may, Baker adds that “the conclusion does not claim that the human species is unique in enjoying a first-person perspective, certain experiments of chimpanzees suggest that they may be trained to recognize themselves in the first-person way (Gallup, 1977:329-338). However, non-human higher animals are not agents in anything like we are. Applying Malcolm’s distinction between thinking and having thought in the sense of entertaining proposition (see Malcolm’s “Thoughtless Brutes” in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* vol. 46, 1973, pp. 5-20), Baker states that “dogs, as well as chimpanzees do things intentionally in the sense that, dogs can think, but neither dogs nor the trained chimpanzees can entertain propositions at all and hence cannot formulate the thought required for full fledged agency. Thus, they are limited in knowledge.

Our argument is that there is a fundamental difference between man’s nature and animal/machine’s nature, and that this difference is what accounts for what man or computer machine can know. That whatever the computer machine *knows* or can *know* is a product of man’s programming ingenuity. To this, a critic may argue that how are we not sure that man himself is a product of a programmer. In fact, is man, according to Daniel Dennett, not a ‘brain in a vat’ being operated and manipulated by a powerful but evil scientist? With a rare showcase of imaginary ability, Dennett shows how his imaginary evil scientist can possibly deceive man into believing that he (man) is a real being with real abilities. Be that as it may, we are invited to answer our critic thus: that if indeed man is a product of an invisible but higher programmer, then man is a programmed ‘machine’ of a different nature with special and higher abilities than the limited computer machine. He is a special ‘machine’ with inbuilt freewill to choose to do or not to do certain courses of actions. He is a special ‘machine’ with an incredible ability for decision making. Engineers measure information flow in bits per second, or let us speak of the bandwidth of the channels through which the information flows. Television requires a greater bandwidth than radio, and higher definition television has a still greater bandwidth. High-

definition television *smello-feelo* television would have a still greater bandwidth, and interactive *smello-feelo* television would have an astronomical bandwidth, because it constantly branches into thousands of slightly different trajectories through the (imaginary) world. Throw a skeptic a dubious coin, and in a second or two of hefting, scratching, ringing, tasting and just plain looking at how the coin glints on its surface, the skeptic will consume more bits of information than a Cray supercomputer can organize in a year. Making a real but counterfeit coin is child's play, making a simulated coin out of nothing but organized nerve stimulations is beyond human technology now and probably forever. Come what may, man's propensity to command knowledge is unlimited when compared to the computer machine and that we are not brains in vats, after all.

In this section, efforts will be further made to examine the epistemological status of Artificial Intelligence in the light of what Descartes said about the nature of man on one hand and the nature of animals/machines on the other hand. If epistemology is derived from the Greek words; *episteme* and *logos* meaning an enquiry into knowledge; and if the question of epistemology is the question of what we can know, how we can know and the limitations of human knowledge, it means that the question of epistemology is premised on rationality for without reason knowledge or knowing may be difficult if not impossible. Even the empiricists who consider sense-experience as the ultimate source of knowledge still accept that reason plays a significant role in the organization of the data of sense experience. (Fadahunsi, 2004:20-29)

Rationality presupposes consciousness; consciousness and rationality play important role in Descartes' epistemology. According to Descartes, reason and the possession of mind (consciousness) determine the epistemological status of any being. However, since it is man alone who possesses reason and self-consciousness, it is man alone who can 'know' in the strict sense of knowing or knowledge. Therefore the epistemological limitation of animals/machines in Descartes' theory of human nature is a result of non-possession of reason, self-consciousness and the power of rational use of language by animals.

At this juncture, it is important to ask, what is Artificial Intelligence? According to Michie, it is the development of a systematic theory of intelligence process (1999:7). Minsky defines it as "the science

of making machines do things that would require intelligence, if done by man". Corroborating this claim, Cowan and David equally conceive Artificial Intelligence as an attempt to embody in a machine a repertoire of intelligent behaviour comparable with human behaviour in similar context (1998:113). On his part Dele Balogun, (2005:37) sees artificial intelligence as representing a sort of intelligence which emanates from computerized machines and are capable of performing intelligent actions like that of human beings.

As early as 1960, some researches were pursued on the simulation of networks. Certain features of neural networks in organisms were represented in computational programs. In the 1970s, programs to deal with ordinary human language were developed. These programs are meant to translate texts from one language to another. In the 1980s, efforts were devoted to the development of expert systems which aim at writing a program that duplicates the decisions of human expert in a particular field, for instance, a "knowledge engineer" interviews an expert and tries to formalize the explicit or implicit procedures he or she uses. A series of if- then rules and inferences are formulated, and these are reviewed and revised by other experts. (Barbour, 1989: 91:169). Amongst the breakthroughs recorded by Artificial Intelligence (AI) in this aspect is the development of a program called MYCIN, which was written to diagnose bacterial infections and prescribe appropriate antibiotics.

Although these systems work well in narrow technical domains, the systems are however blind to large contexts, and have difficulty deciding where the boundary of the domain lies. The systems are only useful in rule-governed situations where occasional errors can be tolerated, but not in complex situations where human lives are at stake (Bronzino & Movelli, 1989).

Despite some of these recorded limitations of AI, some AI researchers like Allen Newell and Herbert Simon defend the formalist thesis that there is no difference between human intelligence and machine intelligence. The Formalist thesis states that all intelligence(natural and artificial) consists in the manipulation of abstract symbols; that a world of discrete facts can be represented by a corresponding set of well-defined symbols and that the relationship among symbols are abstract, formal and rule governed; symbols can

therefore be processed by differing system with identical results. Allen and Herbert argue that the brain and the computer are two examples of devices that generate intelligent behaviour by manipulating symbols. According to them, a machine is intelligent if, in performing tasks, it exhibits behaviour that we would call intelligent' if performed by human beings. (Newell and Simon, 1983).

The keyword here is intelligence. However, learning, thinking or reflecting is a product of rationality and consciousness or self-awareness. The act of intelligence is an act of learning, thinking and reflecting. Another way to put it is to say that it takes a being that learns, thinks or reflects to be intelligent. Intelligence therefore, is the ability to learn, understand, reflect and think in a logical way about things. The question now is: how intelligent are the so-called intelligent machines? Can machine exercise rationality? Can machine think in the strict sense of the word "think"? Can machine reflect or ruminate over many options before making a choice or decision? The kind of 'thinking' done by the machine is made possible by the programmer who develops the complex system and reduces the complex problem to rigorous chains but step by step automatic Yes/No logic appropriate to the computer. It is only man who can approach the solution to a problem theoretically through the power of abstraction and imagination. The computer machine is not capable of this type of thinking or reasoning; it simply does not think what it does.

Here, by way of analogy, for instance, if I have an artificial machine made house-help and tells it to clear the table by packing the things on the table inside the freezer in my refrigerator immediately it is 12 noon if I do not come back from work. Assuming I left my one-year-old baby on the table before leaving for work, once it is 12noon, my machine-made house help will unpack the table including the little baby (which is alive) and dump all of them inside the freezer in the refrigerator. But if a human house-help is giving the same command under the same circumstance, the human house-help will unpack the table but not the little baby (who is alive) because the human house-help would 'think' and know that the freezer is not meant for the little baby (at least when the baby is still alive) and as a matter of fact, I do not mean that the baby also should be unpacked with every other thing on the table. Although, a critic may argue that a machine house-help can do the same if given

enough data on how to recognize a human being and thus avoid dumping it into the freezer together with every other thing on the table. However, we argue that a machine house-help can only do that if *instructed*, but a human house-help need not be *instructed* in this respect before he knows what to do. This is because of his ability to think before acting. Here in lies the uniqueness of man.

When you feed data into a computer it will analyze them exactly the way it is programmed, if the data are false or even absurdly false, it will still churn out the analysis and produce false and absurdly false conclusions. In contrast, a human being may be given instruction on what to do or say, but upon discovering the absurdity or illogicality of that instruction based on self-reflection, and logical thinking, he may decide to set aside the instruction and do that which is right, reasonable and logical. This is because he is thinking of what he is doing. The machine in this sense of 'think' simply does not think at all, because thinking in this sense is the product of rationality, consciousness and self-awareness.

In line with the above argument, J. Searle is of the view that 'machine never felt nor suffered, thought nor dreamed, but never failed to give sign. The machine can plough, harvest and imitate, but not feel pleasure or self-pity. No matter how complex a machine may be, it is no more conscious than a clock" (Searle, 1996; 100). The intelligence of the machine (if it has intelligence at all) is very low when compared to that of the human person. Human thinking is much deeper than that of any intelligent machine. Georgi Smolyan has this to say:

Thinking, reason, intellect, creation, reflection, higher levels of psychics activity, are all the products of human activity-biologically and above all socially determined. The logical problem solving abilities of computers, however, great are the results of scientific and technological development of the specialized engineering activity of man. Man's thinking is only a narrow section, a faint gleam of man's inner world (Smolyan, 1986:150).

On the epistemological status of machines, Dele Balogun (2005:39) argues that intelligent machines cannot learn, think or reflect on their own; they cannot criticize or know anything outside the purpose for which they have been designed or programmed. This explains why the

expert systems (which are written programs that duplicate the decisions of human experts in a particular field) cannot know anything beyond the human knowledge that is already stored in them. In other words, the expert systems have no desire or urge to know more. At best they can only reproduce whatever form of knowledge that is stored in their database and that is why for now their knowledge is very limited.

Conclusion

In conclusion, from the above explication, we have seen the epistemological status of animals/machines under the name 'Artificial Intelligence' from the perspective of Descartes' theory of human nature. For Descartes, there is fundamental difference between human nature and animal nature and this is what accounts for what each nature can know epistemologically. The implication of this is that animals/machines are epistemologically limited. The reason for this is that Descartes attributes to man alone the possession of mind (consciousness) and the ability for ratiocinative activities which is a fundamental prerequisite for knowledge strictly speaking. According to Descartes, intelligence responsible for thinking, reflecting, learning and acquisition of knowledge, is a product of rationality and consciousness. Therefore, since animals/machine are lacking in this, they cannot be said to 'know' in the strict sense of the word knowledge.

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JINNAH AND THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE 1906-1924

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Abstract

The establishment of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906 was a turning point in the history of the freedom movement in India. However, Jinnah, later on Quaid-i-Azam, did not join the AIML until 1913 and remained a loyal Congress man. The present article is aimed at studying the circumstances behind Jinnah's joining of the AIML as well as clarifying certain confusions connected with his membership of the INC. An attempt has also been made to analyze the earlier political career of Jinnah in connection with Hindu-Muslim unity and to safeguard the interests of the Indian Muslims.

Nearly 3000 delegates from all parts of India assembled at Dhaka and founded the All India Muslim League (AIML) on 30 December 1906.¹ In this organizational meeting included conservatives like Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, Mushtaq Hussain (1841-1917), the Nawab of Dhaka, Khawaja Sir Slimullah (1884-1915) and Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Nawab Mehdi Ali (1837-1907). A.K Fazlul-Haq (1873-1962), Maulana Mohammad Ali Johar (1879-1931) and Syed Wazir Hasan (1874-1947) represented the younger generation. Nationalists like Syed Hassan Imam (1871-1933), Mazhar-ul-Haq (1866-1936) and Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) also attended the meeting. The most significant absence was that of Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), distinguished Bombay barrister. It is reported that Jinnah was openly hostile to the formation of the AIML. Louis' Marey Backer has mentioned four important reasons for this attitude of Jinnah towards the foundation of the AIML. To her, Jinnah had come from commercially advanced family in a Muslim majority area, a back ground which largely freed him both from the feudal ties and from the minority psychology. Secondly, Jinnah obtained most of his education in a secular atmosphere. Thirdly, in his early life he also acquired western habits and dress. Fourthly, from his student days Jinnah was fond of political philosophy of liberalism. This personal background, significantly different from those of most of his coreligionists', indicates the reasons for his absence from the Dhaka meeting of 30 December

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1906². Besides these reasons, it may be suggested that there were obviously some other reasons for his not joining the AIML until 1913.

In 1904 Jinnah had Joined the Indian National Congress (INC)³ under the influence of liberal Hindu leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1927), Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), Surendranath Banerjee (1848-1925) and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta (1845-1915). By 1905 he was an active member of the INC and its influential leader at least in the Bombay political circles and was chosen to represent the INC delegation to England to plead for Indian self- government.⁴ This, indicates that Jinnah did not join the INC in 1906 as generally admitted by most of his biographers. His criticism on the composition of Simla deputation,⁵ and his opposition to the Muslim demand for separate electorates made him unqualified for Dhaka meeting of 1906.⁶ Even he opposed the reservation of seats for the Muslims.⁷ During Hindu agitation against partition of Bengal in 1905 his silence kept him away from mainstream of Muslim politics and he remained loyal to the INC creed.⁸ He did not join the AIML because he was not in agreement with the pro-British policy and programme launched by the Aligarh leaders. Another reason is that Jinnah could not identify himself with an association which was exclusively Muslim because his aim was to keep the Indian national movement free from religious and communal bias. Jinnah's close association with Surendranath Benerjee, who was known to Indian Muslims through his anti-partition of Bengal stance, is enough to show that he was a loyal Congress man and was proud that he belonged to Congress⁹, and not interested to join any Muslim political organization whose aims and objectives were contrary to political programme of the Congress.

Though a loyal Congressman, he was not yet unconcerned with Muslim interests. For instance, his speeches delivered in the legislative council on the special Marriage Amendment Bill in February 1912 and support to Gokhale's Elementary Education Bill in March 1912 showed his interest in Muslim mass welfare. His efforts regarding the Musalman Wakf Validating Bill in Imperial Legislative Council won him the gratitude of the entire Muslim community. The AIML paid a tribute to him in a resolution passed on 23 March 1913.¹⁰ At that time he used the platform of the INC to safeguard the interests of his co-religionists. At the same time he was convinced that Hindu-Muslim unity was the

condition of India's freedom. He continued to hold this belief till Lucknow session of the AMIL held in 1937. Before 1937 he was busy to prepare the grounds to achieve the Hindu-Muslim unity. He actively participated in the deliberations of the first Hindu-Muslim unity conference which started on 31 December 1910 at Raja Hotel Allahabad. At that time Jinnah was playing an important role to the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity and had attracted the attention of both the Hindu and Muslim intelligentsia. Proclaiming his creditable share to the cause Gokhale spoke of him as having "That freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity"¹¹ This unity conference held under the presidency of Sir William Wedderburn (1838-1918), Jinnah served as a cross-bencher to secure an "entente cordiale" between the two communities. But the conference had ended without any tangible results.¹²

The Lucknow pact, signed both by the INC and the AIML, was first and only complete agreement ever reached by these parties on a future constitution of India. The pact was a personal triumph for Jinnah. As the chief negotiator of the pact between the parties Jinnah realized his personal ambition to become a Muslim Gokhale and an "apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity". At Lucknow also for the first time, Jinnah was elected president of the AIML session. He was now playing a triple role as a leader of the AIML, a leader of INC, and a member of the Imperial Legislative Council, a three-fold honor, unique in the annals of Indian political leadership.¹³

Jinnah's election to Imperial Council under the Act of 1909 and in the same days his cooperation to organize the Bombay Presidency Muslim League brought him closer to the AIML.¹⁴ However he formally enrolled as a member of the AJML in 1913.¹⁵ He joined the AIML without any persuasion. It has been reported that Syed Wazir Hasan and Muhammad Ali Johar were responsible to bring him into the AIML. In fact Jinnah was in London to give evidence before public service commission, headed by Islington, as he had appeared before the commission at its Bombay session on 11 March 1913.¹⁶ During his stay at London some major developments left deep impact on Jinnah's mind as it was reflected in his unrecorded speech delivered in Bombay on 20 December 1913 in the meeting of Anjuman-i-Ziaul Islam arranged in his honor. From the speech one can infer some reasons of his joining the

AIML. For instance, the Secretary of State for India's attitude towards the Muslim League representatives and his refusal to see them, tussle between Syed Amir Alt and Syed Wazir Hasan, Turko-Balkan War, Cawnpore Mosque case and the treatment of some sections of the Muslim press by the government in demanding securities and forfeiting them under the Press Act were the main causes.¹⁷

It is not fortuitous that Jinnah joined the AIML in London while earlier in 1912 he had attended the council meeting of the AIML where aims and objectives of the AIML were modified similar to his own ideas.¹⁸ If this change in the constitution of the AIML was a main reason of his joining the AIML as mentioned by almost all the biographers of Jinnah then he should have joined the AIML in India before going to England. There was no reason to postpone the matter. In fact Jinnah was a man who never ignored the objective realities of a given situation. He thought several times before he took a political decision. He was fully aware of the fact that the decisions of politician leave deep imprint on their future career. Besides this, his experience as a member of INC, rational approach and acute observation of the political developments in India enabled him to perceive the role he could assume in Indian politics. By temperament he remained in the center stage of any organization of which he was a member. Whenever he was pushed aside from the centre-stage, as he was done by Gandhi in the Home Rule League (1920) and in the INC (1920), he left that party for good.¹⁹ The Aga Khan and Syed Amir Ali tendered their resignations from the presidency of the AIML and London branch of the AIML respectively.²⁰ At that time the AIML was in search of a leader and Jinnah desired to lead a party. Consequently, Jinnah decided to join the AIML and signed the League pledge on 10 October 1913.²¹

It is interesting that Jinnah took seven years to join the AIML (1913) and left the INC within same span of time (1920). Several reasons have been mentioned for Jinnah's rupture with the INC. Hence, one thing is clear that he did not leave the INC on the question of Gandhian non-corporation programme as the AIML had adopted the more strict resolution in support of non-corporation, but he did not leave the AIML. In-fact in the presence of Gandhi there was no room for Jinnah in the INC. In the INC Jinnah was one of its main leaders, but in the AIML he could, as leader, hope to rise to the highest position. Gandhi was the key

figure in the drama of Jinnah's rift with INC leading ultimately to his exist from INC.²²

M.A.Jinnah and the AIML were not unfamiliar with the affairs of the Muslims abroad. In this regard, the Calcutta session of the AIML was remarkable. The AIML deputation led by Jinnah proceeded to England to present the point of view of the Indian Muslims over the dismemberment of Turkish territories, position of the Khilafat and Muslim Holy places. A ten point memorandum dated 27 August 1919 was sent to the British Prime Minister along with Jinnah's letter of 4 September 1919.²³ Jinnah while delivering speech before the AIML session held at Calcutta on 7 September 1920 strongly criticized the British Government.²⁴ However, he refused to associate himself with the non-cooperation movement. He was against the strategy and methods to promote the Khilafat cause. On the other hand, through Khilafat movement, Gandhi had succeeded in killing the spirit of the Lucknow pact that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations represented politically by AIML and the INC respectively.²⁵ Through Khilafat issue Gandhi had acquired a commanding position over national politics and Jinnah was left alone practically. The INC grew more powerful and transformed itself from elite organization to a mass political party. The Ullema had formed their own political party i.e. Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind on 24 November 1919 at Delhi.²⁶

During the Khilafat movement the All-India Khilafat Committee became a soul spokesman of Indian Muslims. The AIML was pushed aside and had ceased to exist for all practical purposes. It was alive on the papers only. Most of its leaders were swept away by the Khilafat movement. Under these circumstances, some Leaguers suggested that the AIML should be disbanded as its existence was no longer nationally useful.²⁷ When the AIML was in a moribund condition, Jinnah took steps to revive the AIML with the help of Punjabi faction of the AIML. Consequently, the AIML session, held at Lahore, on 24-25 May, 1924 had passed an important resolution which later on became a unanimous demand of the Indian Muslims. Here it is to be remembered that the demand presented by Shafi and Iqbal before the Simon Commission, resolution of the All-India Muslim Conference (f. 1929) of Delhi session and Jinnah's 14 points were mainly drawn from this resolution of Lahore session of AIML. Thus the AIML was resuscitated in 1924 at Lahore and

Jinnah was thankful to Punjabi faction of the AIML and also received many accolades from the Muslim leadership of India for achieving this feat.

References

1. There were also 1000 officials and observers. The meeting held at the palace of Nawab Sir Salimullah who had arranged accommodations and food for all the delegates from his own resources, Nadeem Shafiq Malik, ed. *The All India Muslim League 1906-1947*, Lahore, 1997, pp. 17, 25.
2. Mary Louise Becker, "The All India Muslim League; 1906-1947, A Study of Leadership in the Evolution of a Nation," unpublished *PhD thesis*, Radcliff College Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957, pp. 102-103.
3. Most of the biographers of Jinnah held the view that Jinnah started his political career in 1906 from the platform of the Indian National Congress. Dr. Riaz Ahmad held the view that jinnah started his political career earlier in 1897. See Dr. Riaz Ahmad, *Complete Works of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Vol-I (1893-1912)*, Islamabad, 1996, p.xivii. These documents produced by Dr. Riaz Ahmad reveal that Jinnah had attended the meetings of *Anjuman-i-Islam*, Bombay and *Bohra community*, Bombay in 1897. But it must be noted that these meetings were not of a political nature. Ibid., pp.4-5 Jinnah attended the first meeting of the INC on 18th July 1904. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
4. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
5. Dr. Muhammad Saleem Ahinad, 'Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: A Study in Pragmatism' *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi, Vol. XL, April 1992, pp. 99-100.
6. M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah, A Political Study*, Lahore, 1962, p. 37.
7. Dr. RiazAhmad, *Complete Works*, pp. 80-81.
8. I.H. Qureshi, 'The Founder of Pakistan' Quoted in *Pakistan: 50 Years of Independence*, ed. By Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, New Delhi, 1997, p.50. See also M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, pp. 22-23.
9. Ibid., p.46.

10. Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947*. Vol.1, 1906-1924, Karachi, 1969, p. 279.
11. M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, p. 51.
12. For detailed accounts See Dr. Matiur Rahman, 'The First Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference' *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Lahore, Vol.vii, No.I, January 1970, pp. 1-10 Lovett held the view that the unity conference was never held. See Verney Lovett, *A History of Indian National Movement*, London, 1921, pp. 87-88. This statement is incorrect since no other authentic source testifies that such conference was never held.
13. Muhammad Saleem Ahamd, *The All India Muslim League; From the late-19th Century to 1919*, Bahawalpur, 1988, pp. 151-175, Also see Lovett, *Indian National Movement*, p. 99.
14. Dr. Muhammad Saleem Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam: Jinnah*, p. 102.
15. Dr. Muhammad Saleem Ahmad held a view that Jinnah had joined the AIML earlier in 1910. This assumption is not confirmed by any authentic source. Jinnah died in 1948 and Noman had got published his *Muslim India* in 1942 but Jinnah did not negate his membership of the AIML in 1913. Shamsul Hasan, an office secretary of the AIML 1914-1947, also confirmed the date mentioned in membership form available in the AIML record. Many works on Jinnah had been published during the lifetime of Jinnah's contemporaries and office bearers of AIML but they never confirmed Jinnah's membership of the AIML prior to 1913. For Dr. Saleem Ahmad's viewpoint See, *Quaid-i-Azam: Jinnah*, pp. 102-103.
16. M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, p. 48.
17. *All India Muslim League Papers* (hereafter MLP) Vol.119
18. Waheed Uzzaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality*, Islamabad, 1985, p.6. See also Matiur Rahman, *From Consultation to Confrontation*, London, 1970, pp.273-275.
19. Sharif-al-Majahid, 'Quaid-i-Azam and Decision Making', unpublished paper, p. 2.
20. K.K. Aziz, ed; *The Aga Khan III*, vol-I, 1902-1927. London, 1998, pp. 463-467.
21. *MLP*, Vol. 225.

22. Muhammad Saleem Ahmad, 'The Emergence of Jinnah's Leadership of the Muslims in South Asia 1906-1920', *Asian Profile*, Vol. 6, No. I, February 1978, pp.73-76. Also See *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1920*, Lucknow 1920, pp. 6-7.
23. Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol-III, 1990, pp. 200-203.
24. Jinnah dubbed the Rowlatt Acts and the Punjab atrocities as “attacks on our liberty” and the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and Khilafat as "attack on our faith". Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 541-543.
25. According to Professor Balraj Madhok, The Congress by making this pact (Lucknow pact 1916) recognized that the Muslims as a community were different from the rest of the Indians and thus by implications prepared the grounds for two nation theory. Quoted in Professor Muhammad Munawar 'Khilafat Movement: a Pathway to Pakistan' *Iqbal Review*, October-December 1986, p. 88.
26. For Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind see Perveen Rozina, "History of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, 1919-1947", unpublished, *M.Phil. Thesis*, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1986.
27. For details see Abdul Razzaq Shahid, “The All India Muslim League 1919-1937, An Analytical Study”, unpublished, *Ph.D. Thesis*, Department of History, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, 2006, pp. 85-88.

DIVERSITY AND VARIATION IN PAKISTANI ENGLISH

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Abstract

The present research has used 2.1 million words corpus of written Pakistani English to explore the trends of spellings in Pakistani English and to identify its conformity with British and American traditions of spellings. The spelling differences between British and American varieties of English communicate the social and cultural make up of the two varieties which has aroused a great confusion about English spellings to follow in Pakistan. Apparently there are no specific norms, and both the American and British spelling variants have been used by the Pakistani writers, but it is the time to decide whether or not there is any need for standardized spelling in Pakistani English. Statistical analysis, one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) has been performed to assess the significance of difference between American and British spellings of different root families to address the issue of spelling in Pakistani English. Most of the American and British spellings have shown significant differences at $p < 0.05$ value. Keeping in view these differences, the research has emphasized to accept both varieties of spelling and that there is no need of standardization of the spelling of Pakistani English.

Background

Spelling and vocabulary are central to any study of standardization of a variety of language. Usually Post-colonial varieties of English tend to retain the British spellings but the ever-increasing influence and efforts to simplify spelling of American English have attracted different responses. Pakistani English is a typical manifestation of such trends. In orthography, spelling is the most striking feature to recognize or label a variety of English.

There is a general impression about Pakistani English that it has a tendency to use formal technical vocabulary. This is also due to the fact that Pakistani English, like other varieties of South Asian English, is acquired in formal educational settings through ‘the study of text books and literary classics’. (Kachru, 1986, p.43, Hickey, 2004, p.547)

Some of the function words like ‘Amid’, ‘Among’, ‘Till’ and ‘While’ have some archaic and formal forms as well e.g. ‘Amidst’,

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‘Amongst’, ‘Until’ and ‘Whilst’. (Quirk et al 1985, Biber and Quirk, 1999, Sedlatschek, 2009, p.115)

English orthography is highly standardized. The standardization of the written language is easy to demonstrate with reference to orthography. Milroy and Milroy (199, p.67) are of the view that spelling is the most uniform level of language use; and contrasts in this respect with variability of its counterpart in speech – pronunciation ... Twentieth century English spellings are almost absolutely invariant.

Spelling is that bit of linguistic practice where issues of authority, control, conformity can be most sharply focused. Spelling is the domain for excellence – no matter how tiny it may seem – where the politics of conformity can be selected (Kress, 2000, p. X). According to Kress (2000, p. 1) orthography is knowing how to write words correctly. ‘Writing correctly’ is exactly what is implied by the term used for spelling in many languages like German and Greek. Spellings can be defined as writing of words of a language according to the norms or conventions of that language. (Sebba, 2007, p. 34)

Spelling is an issue among the linguistic community and also outside the world of linguistics. It is a general concern of English language learners’ community in the ‘outer’ or ‘expanding circles’. There is a general concern that ‘spelling standards’ should be upheld and not allowed to skip. According to McArthur (1992), “The most abrasive differences between present day American and British documents are their spellings” (p.970). Millward (1989) contends that proper spelling has become so culturally important that, ‘Thou shalt not spell incorrectly’ has almost attained the status of an “Eleventh Commandment”. People respond strongly to what they perceive to be incorrect spelling (p.270).

There is some acceptable variation in spellings within both American and British national systems, as reflected in their respective authoritative dictionaries. The widespread exchange of written materials among English speakers around the world, especially electronically, introduces different spellings and over time can become more acceptable in other locations.

It is also important to realise that in terms of standard usage, the spelling differences are minor but noticeable, but sometimes annoying and alienating (Crystal 1995). English is a living language and like all

living organisms it keeps on changing. It has almost attained the status of a world language. It is being used by people all over the world. About 2 billion people around the world speak English. Although they use the same language i.e. English, but if we closely analyse, there are many differences between the different varieties of English used in different societies. The differences are phonological, orthographic, syntactic as well as semantic and pragmatic.

Sebba (2007, p. 34) describes that one important feature of language is to communicate meanings which are culture, society, group or community specific. These meanings could not be conveyed by following the norms and codification standards of other cultures. This is also true about spellings. If complete standardization of spellings takes place, there would be invariant spelling, unable to convey social meaning, and on the other hand, if non-standard and freely varying spellings are being used they cannot convey the social meanings. It is largely context dependent that the writer makes one selection. In present day English there are two main varieties of English regarding spelling differences, i.e. American English and British English.

The differences in these two spelling systems are purposeful and families of words that illustrate spelling practices draw attention to differences between the American and British Spelling Systems. Americans tried and are still trying to simplify English and “Spellings, according to Kövecses (2000, p.166), is where this phenomenon can be observed the most”.

The renowned linguistic scholar Noah Webster and the other Americans consciously tried to change the spellings. The chief motives behind these changes are to:

- i. make English a phonographic language which has sound and spellings harmony
 - ii. simplify and ease
 - iii. make a conscious effort to differ and be distinct from the Britishers.
- Spellings can be categorized from highly regulated and focused on standard to the least regulated and focused on anti standard depending upon the regime, text types, institutional order and readership.

Methodology

Pakistani English is a newly developing variety. It is in the process of endo-normative stabilization. In the educational set up of the country,

it is the British spellings which are strictly followed. Teachers, textbook writers and examiners all focus on the British spellings and all other deviations are discouraged.

The data for Pakistani English has been taken from PWE, a corpus of Pakistani Written English. The size of the corpus is 2 million words. The data in this corpus is taken from formal domains and basically from edited and published sources. The writers are all educated people. To study the frequency of these variant spellings in the British and American Englishes, Brown family corpora have been used. The British data has been taken from the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English (FLOB) corpora (henceforth LF) and the American data has been taken from Brown and Frown corpora (henceforth BF).

There are three strands of this research. At the first step, a list of words having different spellings in the American and the British Englishes has been selected and the frequency of the variant spellings in Pakistani English has been studied. In the second step, some of the function words having variant forms have been selected and their frequency in the British, American and Pakistani Englishes have been studied to find the level of difference among the three varieties. In the third step some of the verbs having different past participle forms have been selected for study.

Results and Discussion

The frequency of the variant spellings in the British and American Englishes in Pakistani Written English has been given in Table 1 below:

Table-1: Total Frequency of American vs British Spellings in PWE

Variety	Frequency
American	4358
British	7246

Table 1 shows that the American spellings of the words appeared 4358 times and the British spellings appeared 7246 times. So the ratio is 1:1.66. This shows that Pakistani variety is not specifically following the British variety. Table 2 given below explains the significant differences of the frequency of Br and Am English spellings in PWE.

Table-2:

Family	Am	Br	Probability *
a-e	21	46	$P < 0.05$
ae-e	1	1	$P > 0.05$
dg-dge	316	57	$P < 0.05$
e-ae	8	10	$P < 0.05$
ei-i	6	12	$P < 0.05$
eo-aeo	2	7	$P < 0.05$
er-or	53	26	$P < 0.05$
er-re	429	657	$P < 0.05$
eu-oeu	3	6	$P < 0.05$
f-ph	6	7	$P > 0.05$
g-gue	6	177	$P < 0.05$
i-igh	11	965	$P < 0.05$
ie-iae	26	1	$P < 0.05$
io-iou	82	262	$P < 0.05$
i-y	3	6	$P < 0.05$
k-c	9	20	$P < 0.05$
l-l	177	220	$P < 0.05$
m-mme	318	759	$P < 0.05$
oe-oeo	3	13	$P < 0.05$
o-ou	92	377	$P < 0.05$
or-ore	3	3	$P > 0.05$
or-our	336	1414	$P < 0.05$
ow-ough	3	16	$P < 0.05$
se-ce	88	876	$P < 0.05$
u-iu	1	5	$P < 0.05$
u-ou	1	12	$P < 0.05$
Zs	2354	1291	$P < 0.05$
Total	4358	7246	$P < 0.05$

* $P < 0.05$ showed significant difference between American and British spelling whereas, $P > 0.05$ showed non-significant difference between American and British spellings.

Statistical analysis, one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to analyze the significance of difference between American and British spellings of different family. There is significant difference ($P < 0.05$) between American and British spellings of most of the families. Non-significant difference ($P > 0.05$) between American and British spellings in only three families i.e. ae-e, f-ph and or-ore.

To explain it visually, it is further shown in Fig 1 below:




Figure-1

Table 3 below gives different 3 Variant Spellings of Function Words in PWE.

Table-3: Function Words with Different Spellings

Adjective	PWE	BF	LF
Amid	26 ^a	31 ^a	27 ^a
Amidst	18 ^c	5 ^a	13 ^b
Among	830 ^b	820 ^b	562 ^a
Amongst	176 ^c	5 ^a	96 ^b
While	1803 ^b	1353 ^a	1335 ^a
Whilst	14 ^a	0	120 ^b
Till	328 ^c	84 ^a	111 ^b
Until	300 ^a	841 ^b	943 ^c
Toward	80 ^b	744 ^c	25 ^a
Towards	893 ^c	81 ^a	610 ^b
Afterward	2 ^b	37 ^c	1 ^a
Afterwards	43 ^b	20 ^a	131 ^c

Different letter in superscript represented significant ($P < 0.05$) difference among PWE, BF and LF.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to investigate the significance of difference among PWE, BE, and LF. The significantly ($P < 0.05$) different values are marked with different superscript letters whereas, same superscript letters represent non-significant differences among PWE, BE and LF.

In British English both forms exist to varying degrees but the American English seems to prefer the modern forms and avoid the

archaic formal forms. These spelling related differences are considered to be marked indicators of formal style.

The results revealed that there is no significant difference in ‘Amid’ which has been used 31 times in BF and 27 times in LF and 26 times in PWE; ‘Amidst’ showed significant difference in its frequency which has been used 18 times in Pakistani English, 13 times in LF and only 5 times in BF. The data revealed that there is no difference of ‘Among’ in PWE and BF whereas ‘Amongst’ revealed a significant difference in its three varieties. Table 3 shows that except in a few words, all of the words give a significant difference in English spellings.

Table 3 is shown visually in Fig 2 for clarity.




Figure-2

Verbs with Variant Spellings

Some of the verbs like burn, dream, wed, leap, smell, inquire and learn have orthographically variant past participle forms. The statistics collected from the three corpora reveal that in the case of the verb ‘burn’, ‘burned’ is a unambiguous American preference. Out of the 37 examples, 33 use ‘ed’ spellings in American corpora. The British and Pakistani corpora make roughly equal use of both ‘ed’ and ‘t’ spelling variants. In the case of verb ‘dream’, ‘dreamed’ is a clear cut preference both in British and American corpora whereas Pakistani data has also 5 occurrences of the form ‘dreamt’. The verbs in ‘wed’, ‘leap’, ‘smell’, ‘enquire’ have only rare occurrences in all the three corpora. In the case of the verb ‘learn’ the ‘ed’ form is a clearcut American and British choice whereas the Pakistani data shows a preference for the ‘t’ variant of spellings. It is given in Table 4 below to show the significance value.

Table-4: Verbs with Different Spelling in 3 Corpora

Verb	PWE	BF	LF
Burned	17 ^a	33 ^c	22 ^b
Burnt	20 ^c	4 ^a	15 ^b
Dreamed	8 ^a	20 ^b	9 ^a
Dreamt	5 ^b	2 ^a	1 ^a
Inquired	1 ^a	1 ^a	0
Enquired	2 ^a	0	3 ^a
Leaped	1 ^a	3 ^b	1 ^a
Leapt	1 ^a	1 ^a	1 ^a
Learned	38 ^a	119 ^c	73 ^b
Learnt	58 ^b	0	32 ^a
Smelled	0	5 ^b	1 ^a
Smelt	2 ^a	5 ^b	1 ^a
Wed	1 ^a	2 ^a	1 ^a
Wedded	2 ^a	2 ^a	3 ^a

Different letter in superscript represented significant ($P < 0.05$) difference among PWE, BF and LF.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to investigate the significance of difference among PWE, BE, and LF. The significantly ($P < 0.05$) different values are marked with different superscript letters whereas, same superscript letters represent non-significant differences among PWE, BE and LF. The most of the verbs showed non-significant ($P > 0.05$) difference among PWE, BF and LF.

The orthographic conventions followed in Pakistani English data reject the common belief in the country that we are following the British spelling norms. The results reveal that we are torn between the orthographic norms and have not decided yet, which spelling system is to follow.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Although Pakistani English has linkage with the British variety, the results have shown that in the area of spellings it seems to have followed the American trend as well. Out of 317 items selected, only 17 items have no appearance in American spellings where as there are 4 items in which have no appearance in PWE. The research has revealed that systematic differences exist among the varieties. In some of the spelling families like 's' and 'z', it is because of the Internet and the default Microsoft word settings that people are over using the 'z' family of spellings. The four spelling families 'dg-dge', 'er-or', 'ie-iae', and 's-z'

in Pakistani data show that the American influence is more prominent. There are no fixed rules as to which spelling system should be used. Apparently there are no specific norms and both the American and British spelling variants are used by the Pakistanis. The differences in the spellings of some of the function words can also be attributed to the 'colonial lag', as these archaic forms were used in the colonial British English and are still being used in Pakistani English but are not frequently used in the present day British English.

The data have found highly significant differences between British and American spellings, therefore it is strongly suggested that Pakistani Written English spelling may be accepted in education and government sectors as they are to eradicate the spelling confusion. It is further recommended that British and American English may be considered as a source of modern technology despite the differences, and that it should not hinder our written English spellings.

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LANGUAGES AND DOMAINS: NIGERIAN SITUATIONS

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Abstract

This paper views Nigeria as a multilingual country with diverse languages and cultures to the extent that the total number of languages spoken right now in Nigeria has risen to about 500 (See Adebite 2010). This linguistic diversity in the country has occasioned the development and spread of the concepts of Bilingualism, Multilingualism, Diglossia and Language Choice. As a result of this diversity, it is noticed that the phenomenon of Language Choice has become inevitable on the language use habit of Nigerians as every domain of language use has its own language features. This is because both the indigenous (major and minor) and foreign languages have distinct domains of usage. However, despite the multilingual nature of the languages in the country, English Language is the domineering language in almost all the domains and specifically used for all government functions. This is mainly due to historical factor and multi-ethnic and cultural nature of the country.

Introduction

The determination of the number of languages spoken in Nigeria, is still under the cloud; there is a lot of speculations and guessing about it. There have been various suggestions ranging from 368 to 450 (e.g. Osaji 1979, Bamgbose 1971; Brann 1990). Others put the number at about 400 (Adebija 1991a 1989). The most recent speculation puts the number between 450 and 500 (Omodiagbe 1992 and Adebite 2010). Undoubtedly, there are many languages in Nigeria that exist side by side which include foreign and indigenous. These languages are assigned different roles or functions depending on the domains and occasions. Therefore, language use situation in Nigeria is different from what obtains in other bilingual and monolingual countries like Canada where there are two languages, French and English; and Japan where a single language is used for all activities.

There is the government policy concerning domains of language use in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979), and the National Policy on Education (1977, 1985, 2004). It is obvious that government understands the importance of clear allocation of roles to languages (both indigenous and foreign languages). The government also recognizes that in Nigeria, language is a means of promoting social interaction and national cohesion; and preservation of cultures; hence

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every child is mandated to learn the language of the immediate environment. Furthermore, in the national interest, it is expedient that every child is required to learn one of the three Nigerian languages: Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Hence it is stated that:

For smooth interaction with our neighbours, it is desirable for every Nigerian to speak French. Accordingly, French shall be the second official language in Nigeria and it shall be compulsory in primary and Junior Secondary Schools but as a non-vocational Elective at the Senior School (cf. NPE, Revised, 2004)

However, despite the government and individual efforts to plan and allocate distinct roles to each of these languages in well-stated domains, the phenomena of borrowing, interference, code-switching, code-mixing, domestication or nativisation of foreign languages, particularly, the English language are still a hindrance. These phenomena are product of language contact; co-existence of both foreign and indigenous in the Nigerian multilingual environment. Speakers of English or other foreign languages (Arabic, French) and indigenous languages tend to switch from one to the other because of the existence of these languages in their linguistic repertoires.

Multilingualism relates to speaking or using several languages; so it is possible for individuals or a society to be multilingual. The Nigerian society is multilingual considering the number of languages existing in the country and the nature of her multilingualism represents a case of linguistic and cultural diversity *par excellence*. It is more complex and intricate than multilingual European countries like Belgium, Switzerland, or Sweden; and other countries like South Africa, Singapore, India, Pakistan; where there are handful number of languages. It has been realized that, the more the number of diverse languages and cultures, the more intricate and the more complex language planning decisions are likely to be.

In a similar vein, Akindele and Adegbite (1999) submit that due to existence of various ethnic groups in Nigeria with over 400 languages, Nigeria is therefore a multilingual and multicultural speech community where diverse languages and cultures compete. It is also a speech community with not only the indigenous languages but also foreign

languages which compete with the indigenous languages and cultures. English language is used to perform official and national functions, while the various indigenous languages are used for interaction in their respective domains.

It is also observed that contacts between indigenous languages and cultures have greater potential for enhancing harmonious inter-language and inter-cultural communication. Such contracts also result in increase in the level of multilingualism and multiculturalism. For instance, Ebira and Ogori-Magongo people are put in the same political administrative constituency, this increased the level of contact among them. Trading at Obehira, Okene, Ogboroke, Ogori and Magongo markets has created constant links between Ebira speaking and Oko-osanyin speaking people, resulting in inter-marriages. Consequently, many Ebira people have settled in the Oshobane, area of Ogori after such marriages. (Adegbija 1992a).

Joshua (1991) reported cases of increased multilingualism in Sagamu area of Ogun State, where trading brought the Hausa to settle there. Many of them have inter-married with the Yoruba and live harmoniously with their hosts. Similarly, some of these Hausa, through constant relationships with the Yoruba and business transactions have acquired the Yoruba language while the Yorubas also have achieved some level of competence in Hausa. This situation cannot be denied in 'Sabo' (places where the Hausa settle in major towns or cities in Nigeria). Also, Adegbija (2004) citing an example of some Fulani cattle rearers who have settled in Osara in Kogi State. Along with their slaughtering of cows for the community, a highly valued service, many of them learned Ebira, the local language. Such contacts increase intellectual diffusion and broaden the culture, the outlook and attitudinal tolerance of the people with different languages and cultures. In such a context; individual and societal multilingualism are common phenomena that smoothen and lubricate channels of intercultural contacts and communication.

Functional Classification of Language in Nigeria

The different domains of the use of the various languages in Nigeria are classified into three categories as follows:

- (a) Indigenous or native language: Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo have been constitutionally recognized as 'major'.

- (b) Exogenous or non-indigenous: In this category, we have English, French Arabic and other languages like German and Russia which have a rather restricted functional scope.
- (c) Pidgin languages: This is represented by Nigerian Pidgin English, with a dual status of being at once indigenous and now exogenous.

The indigenous languages vary greatly in functional, structural, and spatial characteristics. It has been noted that the celebrity of Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba is as a result of their numerical strength in terms of their number of speakers (Harm 1991). These languages are followed by Fulfulde, Ibibio, Efik, Kanuri Tiv, Nupe, Ijo, Edo, Igala, etc. It is discovered that over 500,000 people speak each of these languages. (Akinaso 1991, Jibril 1990).

The three major languages in Nigeria perform official functions side by side with the English language. They are used in some cases for the conduct of business in the civil service, law, commerce and education and in all other official domains. For instance, English, Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba are allowed for conduct of legislative functions in the States' Houses of Assembly in Nigeria. They also play a prominent role in education in recent years. It is officially stated in the National Policy on Education NPE that the mother tongue should be used as the medium of instruction in the first two years of primary school.

English has been more noticeable in use in Nigeria. It serves various functions as well as official language as the second language. It remains the language of bureaucracy of government, of education, of commerce, of science and technology, of interethnic cooperation and contacts, etc. French is in every sense of the word a foreign language in Nigeria and its impact on the country is rather limited to a few schools such as universities where it is learnt as a school subject and used in diplomatic contacts, especially with Nigerian immediate neighbours in Chad, Niger, Benin, Togo and Cameroon and with other foreign embassies. It was made second official language during the Sani Abacha era but has a limited number of speakers. Arabic is mainly a predominant language of Islamic religion and aids Koranic schools in Nigeria today. It is also learnt as a school subject in some universities, such as the University of Ibadan, Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto, as well as Bayero University, Kano.

The third category of languages in Nigeria is Nigerian Pidgin; a hybrid Nigerian language. There have several idea and view about its origin whether it is indigenous or exogenous. Omodiagbe (1992) comments that 'Pidgin is an offshoot of the pure 'English of the early missionaries and colonial administrators'. It is the product of necessity and pragmatism, as well as maliability and acceptability of the English language.

Oladejo (1991) contrary to Omodiagbe's submission, describes Nigerian Pidgin as 'the only truly neutral indigenous Nigerian language'. Whatever its status, it is a lingua franca in informal domains, especially among the non-western educated masses. It is also a principal language of commerce which has been creolized in Sapele and Warri and other areas of Delta state. It is used in literary or creative writing, in mass media, in inter-ethnic communication among lower classes in some educational institutions. In urban centres like Warri, Benin City, Sapele, Port Harcourt, Onitsha and Calabar, it is spoken by over 70% of the adult population, and in these places almost all the children of school age speak pidgin fluently. It functions as a language of wider communication in public institutions, public service and welfare centres, post offices, police stations, Army barracks and Magistrate centres. In market places and commercial centres, it is equally widely spoken (Agheyisi 1984; Adegbija 1992b).

'Multiglossia' and Domains of Language Use Nigeria

'Multiglossia' is a term used as an extension of Ferguson's (1959) 'diglossia' (Adegbija 2004) to describe language use situation in a multilingual environment like Nigeria. It should be stated that Fishman (1967) is more appropriate to explain language use situation in Nigeria, where there are languages rather varieties or a variety of a language. Language potency and prestige in Nigeria are directly related to language functions. For instance, the English language is used in formal situations, in the media, in education, etc as a result of its prestige. The functions assigned to a language or languages enhance the prestige of such a languages like Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, and English. Various languages in Nigeria have distinct and functional manifestation at several hierarchical levels of usage, that is, each of the languages has domains of use different from the others. They are assigned roles based on their prestige and status.

In Nigerian situation, multilingualism is directly linked to 'diglossia'. This determines the roles and functions of a language, that is the role a language performs within a multilingual speech community like Nigeria. Some languages may be more functionally silent in a particular context than others. A language could be used to perform certain functions based on the perception of its users, its suitability for certain occasions, participants, the intention of the communicative encounter, interpersonal goals relating to identity, solidarity, exclusion and commitment of oneself (Adegbija 1987; Searle 1969; Austin 1969).

At the societal level, language functions appear to be more fixed. The functions of languages especially in multilingual contexts, such as Nigeria include roles relating to official use of language, being used as national language, media language of wider communication, international communication purposes, school subjects, judiciary functions, roles relating to national identity, solidarity and for cohesiveness of the citizens.

The Determining Factors of Language Domains in Nigeria

It has been discovered that in Nigeria, the following factors determine the language domains:

a. Prestige and Status

Generally speaking, a language is considered prestigious if given prestigious functions and is considered low if it is not given any function at all or allocated low status functions. In actual sense, through status planning, the status of a low language can be considerably enhanced, for example, in Nigeria education is taken to be a high- prestige domain of language functionality. And those languages that are used as mediums of instruction in Nigeria are given high or prestigious status; this is the case with English, Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa.

b. Level of Development

Development is used here synonymously with modernization and standardization. The most basic measure of language development is graphization. Other measures include availability of dictionaries and linguistic descriptions, lexical expansion, metalanguage or register. In Nigerian multilingual society, the functions allocated to a language seem to be directly proportional to the extent of their development. For instance, Hausa, Igbo, Edo, Yoruba and Efik are offered as school

subjects at the West African Examination Council and National Examination Council, because they have already developed.

c. *Historical and Political Profile*

According to Adebija (2004), to a large extent, the historical and political past tradition tends to attract greater functions to a language or languages. National functions are assigned to Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, representing the languages of the three major political power blocs in Nigeria. Equally, the international functions of English in the world is enhanced by the political power-broken dynamism of the combined force of the native speakers of the language; hence English language is allocated official functions in Nigeria.

d. *Institutional Policies*

Institutional policies of government ministries, organs or agencies, cultural and religious organizations, language development centres, universities and the other educational institutions and the media within the country contribute remarkably to the determination of language functions. Generally, languages that receive the institutional blessings tend to prosper functionally while those that do not tend to functionally wane or wither. In Nigeria, the three elevated native languages, Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa have the backing of the institutional policies of the government. And right now, some minority indigenous languages like Efik, Edo, Urhobo are also being given some institutional policy backing in their various regions.

e. *Numerical Strength*

The number of speakers of a language tends to contribute its prestige and status and it affects its allotted functions. The national function allocated to Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba is traceable to the number of their speakers. Languages with a small-population of speakers in Nigeria are functionally underrated, oppressed and belittled (Jibril 1990). Certainly, the most noticeable aspect of language use situation in Nigeria is the hierarchical distribution of functions among the different languages in the country.

The indigenous languages in Nigeria are the languages of ethnic solidarity and local day-to-day interactions. A few of them are used in broadcasting (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, Efik, Edo). They are also predominant in religious worship of various kinds. It is significant to note that as far as functions of languages in the Nigerian multilingual

context is concerned, speakers modify their speech codes appropriately to fit changes of interlocutors, social setting, discourse topic, and conversational mood. The domains for the use of each of the languages in Nigerian soil include the institution of government, the media, commerce, schools, religion and the home.

The Institution of Government

In Nigeria, English is prominently used at the three tiers of government: Federal, State, and Local. But it is even more so at the national level where it is constitutionally co-official with the three major Nigerian languages: Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba in the legislative houses. In practice, owing to linguistic heterogeneity, English is the predominant language of nationism, nation building and governmental functions. Proceedings in law courts, especially the Supreme Court and the High Court of Justice are also predominantly conducted in the English language. Lawyers argue their cases and judges deliver their judgments largely in English.

In Sharia courts, Arabic plays a significant role since it is considered more related to Islamic justice than English, pidgin or any of the indigenous languages. Commenting on this and on the general functions of Arabic in Nigeria Akinnaso and Ogunbiyi submit:

This relationship between Arabic and Islamic underscores the predominantly religious role of Arabic in Nigerian today, especially its use in Islamic worship and Qur'anic pedagogy. Beyond this religious role, however, Arabic has performed other important roles as 1. a language documenting the pre-colonial history of what is now northern Nigeria; 2. a medium of international contract and diplomacy especially with the Arab world, 3. a medium of popular graffiti; 4. a donor language to a number of Nigerian languages, especially Hausa and Yoruba; and 5. a language of political administration in the defunct Kanem-Bornu and pre-colonial Hausaland which formed the nucleus of much of the present northern states of Nigeria. (Akinnaso and Ogunbiyi (199:1)

As far the written mode is concerned, English can be said to be the predominant language at all levels of government. Consequently, government publications, newsletters, gazettes, policy document such as the National Policy on Education, the Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria and newsletters of ministries are normally published in English. Consequently, however, we have isolated cases in which records are kept in the indigenous languages.

The Media

The media is the life-blood of effective information dissemination in any nation, especially multilingual ones like Nigeria. Crucial national information dissemination in Nigeria occurs first in English, even though less than 30% of Nigerians are competent in it. But it is at the moment, the only effective language for reaching the entire country. In reality, English officially serves as the paramount chief among the languages of nationism in Nigeria; hence, national broadcasts, are usually given in English language. Though the different geo-political zones broadcast in both English and zonal languages to ensure a wider coverage.

Indisputably, English is predominant in the print media. Most of the national dailies are published in English: *The Guardians*, *The Punch*, *This day*, *The Nigerian Tribune*, *The Sun*, etc. There are other regional newspapers that are produced in the languages of the various geo-political zones in Nigeria. Examples of these local newspapers are, ALAROYE KOWE, (See Salawu 2006).

Commerce

Nigerian pidgin is functionally unrivalled in ethnic commercial contacts, especially in the southern states of Nigeria. This is partly because it is the language that could be most easily picked up by the masses since its history and origin are rooted in this domain. It has been perpetuated dominantly in this domain at the societal and individual levels. Thus, in many Nigerian markets, especially in the southern parts, pidgin is the predominant language of inter-ethnic transaction.

Through inter-ethnic communication tends to occur in Nigerian pidgin, but other indigenous languages are also used depending on whether or not the interlocutors share the same language. In this connection, it is important to emphasize the significant role played by the languages in most of the states as lingual francas in inter-ethnic communication, especially in the domain of trade. So, English occupies the backseat in the commercial domain, except in big businesses such as chambers of commerce and multinational commercial contacts like banking and highly commercial activities.

Religion

There are three major religions in Nigeria: Christianity, Islam and African traditional religion. Islam has Arabic for prayers and reading of the Quran. And the indigenous languages are used in traditional religion. The language of Christianity vary depending on the denomination, educational status and language background of the majority of the congregation, the geographical location of the church, and, sometimes, the language background of the pastor. However, the indigenous languages are used in the traditional churches such as the Anglican and Methodist churches as well as African churches, while English is strictly used in the Pentecostal Churches such as Living Faith Mission, New Covenant Church, etc. and occasionally translated into the indigenous language of the area.

Generally, in the religious domain in Nigeria, language could function as potent weapon for cementing a spiritual bond, for identifying the faithful; for enlisting members and for a spiritual course. In performing these functions, any of the three languages (exoglossic, endoglossic, or endoexoglossic) in the country could be employed, the final choice largely depends on the sociolinguistic composition of the majority of the congregation and the geographical location of the place of worship.

The Home Domain

A particular language could not be said to be dominant in Nigerian homes, particularly in the Southwestern Nigeria. Home is supposed to be a relaxed environment where there would be freedom to express oneself in the indigenous language, but reverse is the case in Nigeria. Both literate and non-literate force their children to speak English and discard the indigenous languages as the languages of the uncivilized people.

Some homes in Nigeria, where husband and wife come from different language backgrounds, are bilingual in English and in an indigenous language, English tends to be predominant. However, when they are bilingual in two indigenous languages, each parent sometimes speaks his or her language to the children. The mother's language or the language of the immediate environment tends to become dominant in the children principally because most children have greater interaction and intimacy with their mothers than with their fathers.

Language Use according to the Audience

Despite the prevalence of English language as the language of wider communication in Nigeria, it would be foolhardy for a young person to speak in English in a normal jocular circumstance with an elderly person. It is considered a form of disrespect, rudeness and misconstrued value. Speaking the mother tongue serves as a polite technique. Therefore, in circumstances like this, a larger percentage of the Nigerian populace would prefer using their mother tongue. Schmeid (1985) and Sure (1991) opine that “the greater the age and the higher the cultural and social status attained by an addresser, the greater the need, a speaker feels to employ politeness strategies. “In this circumstance, what counts as politeness strategies in interpersonal interactions in most Nigerian communities is better expressed by the very fact of speaking the mother tongue”.

Phatic Solidarity and Boundaries Markers

Language choice is used to suggest either familiarity or solidarity or as a mark of divergence. This is exemplified in a situation in which a student converses with his/her lecturer in their shared mother tongue despite the fact they are expected to relate in English because of the kind of lecturer-student relationship. Also, in an elder-junior relationship, the junior would rather greet the elderly in the mother tongue in place of English so as not to be considered rude. The English language has no room for elaborate greeting system which are found in many indigenous languages. Language choice here may also be used to dissociate oneself from the ethnicity or group of speakers of a language.

Language choice, with regards to the family, occurs when in a multilingual family, the mother tongue is reverted to (in a case where the language of the environment is different from the language spoken at home). Although the language spoken in the larger society is thought to be more prestigious, still the members of the family prefer to use their own language. This is to show familiarity, intimacy and closeness. However, when they are with other members of the community, they converse in the more prestigious language.

Language choice varies according to the different domains of use; this implies that language varies according to situations as well as the relationship that exists between the various interlocutors. It suggests that interlocutors switch from one language to another, which is what Blom

and Gumperz (1972) and Gumperz (1982) identified as metaphorical code switching. Metaphorical code switching is most likely to be motivated by the topic or according to the issues being discussed.

Conclusion

Linguistic diversity in Nigeria has occasioned the development of the concepts of bilingualism and multilingualism. Some people in the country speak at least one language in addition to their mother tongues; some speak as many as four. Wolf (2000:316) cites a UNESCO document prepared for the Intergovernmental Conference on Language Policies in Africa in which it is noted that in Nigeria case, the situation is such that:

... the number of languages spoken by each of the subjects of the speech communities studied range from two to five as follows: 60 per cent of the subjects spoke two languages; 30 per cent three; and 10 per cent over four languages.

With regards to Nigeria, it has been noticed that language choice permeates the nation vis-à-vis the people's everyday life. Nigerians, have, because of their colonial background, had to add the English language to their linguistic inventory, or else a majority of the citizenry would be excluded from day-to-day official matters. The English language is the domineering language which has firmly entrenched its roots into Nigerian life, and coupled with the diversity already in place before the introduction of the English language, it is obvious that language choice will be inevitable and ever-present in the country.

It is true that Nigeria is a multilingual society with diverse cultures and languages. The language use situation in Nigeria is clear despite the number of languages in the country. Each domain of language is known for its unique language use features, although there could be deviations in some situations. Various languages: the major indigenous languages, foreign languages and minority languages have distinct use domains. It has been observed that due to the co-existence of these languages, some linguistic phenomena are unavoidable. Nigeria seems to be giant in every sphere of life including the complexity of her languages which can not be over-emphasized.

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JAPAN AND THE WTO'S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

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Abstract

This article argues that since the creation of the WTO, Japan has been a more active participant in dispute settlement mechanism than it was in the GATT system. It has used the WTO dispute settlement process to tackle what it considers to be the other's abuses of international trade rules. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has served as a catalyst in greatly strengthening Japan's ability to better secure its interests, especially in confronting US unilateralism. Generally, though not always, Japan's participation in the dispute settlement system has accrued fairly positive results for itself and despite some unsuccessful cases, it has reaped important successes, especially with regard to antidumping issues. The article concludes that the multilateral legal rules have provided opportunities to Japan to promote its interests by invoking dispute settlement processes and though historically preferring a system relying on negotiation and compromise, it has come to support a more legalistic WTO dispute settlement system to resolve WTO-related disputes.

Japan participated in successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, under the framework of GATT, including the Tokyo Round of the 1970s. However, Japan has been relatively passive in its use of GATT's admittedly weak dispute settlement mechanism and other GATT-consistent forms of protection such as the antidumping measures.¹ It was also due to GATT's dysfunctional dispute settlement procedure that many trade conflicts involving Japan continued to be resolved bilaterally.²

While discussing various cases involving Japan in the WTO this article argues that the January 1, 1995 establishment of the WTO and its new and improved dispute settlement mechanism has contributed in bringing about an important change in Japan's external trade relations. It is argued in this context that it has significantly strengthened Japan's potential to oppose discriminatory trade protection by its trade partners.³ The automobile dispute of 1995 can be cited in this changing scenario, where Japan refused to open its market under the US pressure and the US decided to settle the case according to the Japanese priorities. Similarly, there are other antidumping and TRIMs-related cases, where Japan has been able to secure its interests successfully in the new framework of the WTO.

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The WTO's Dispute Settlement System and Japan

The establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system is one of the most significant changes adopted as a part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The system has worked to the benefit of the member states, providing a means to enforce their respective rights and contributing to greater compliance by WTO members. Japan attaches importance to using multilateral dispute settlement procedures of the WTO to address unfair trade policies and measures.⁴ In the four years after the establishment of WTO in 1995, more than 150 cases were brought to the WTO and according to one report by METI, this fact demonstrates the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement procedures, and also shows how effectively the mechanism works.⁵

The creation of the WTO led to significant legal and institutional changes that increased the credibility and legitimacy of the dispute settlement system. Thus, it is argued that the WTO dispute settlement affords a number of benefits to the member states including Japan. Japan has achieved successes within the current rules; and the manner in which panels and the Appellate Body render findings in the area of antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures, means Japan and other members benefit from clarification and improvement.

Overall, in comparison to the dispute settlement options available under the WTO's predecessor, the GATT, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been found to be more reliable. It also defuses opportunities to block panel results, and is more comprehensive, in that it covers all the WTO agreements while the GATT system covered only goods. The element of 'automaticity' to the dispute resolution system is reflected in both the time-bound and negative consensus properties evident in the procedural rules of the DSU.

In the case of Japan, it is argued that, though historically preferring a system relying on negotiation and compromise, it has come to support a more legalistic WTO dispute settlement system to resolve WTO-related disputes.⁶ Japan's interest in the dispute resolution procedures can be traced especially to its concern with handling trade problems with the US in the post-Cold War era especially since Japan and the US had been embroiled successively in high profile and contentious trade disputes over most of postwar era.⁷

According to a widespread view in the Japanese foreign policy establishment, Section 301 of the US Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 (updated in 1998), had allowed the US to be both judge and jury in trade disputes with Japan in the 1980s, and the measures had to be countered.⁸ In this context, Japan, and also the EU, hoped that a strengthened WTO dispute settlement system would reduce US tendencies toward unilateral actions under Section 301 of the US 1974 Trade Act.⁹

However, while Japan has requested more consultations than under the GATT, its post-1995 requests appear small by comparison to the US and the EU.¹⁰ It is argued that this difference 'may reflect a conscious decision by the Japanese authorities to pursue dispute settlement especially in cases in which its major export interests are in jeopardy' and 'to resist in cases in which its domestic firms are charged with ostensible restrictive behavior'.¹¹

Overall, since the creation of the WTO, Japan has been a more active participant in dispute settlement mechanism than it was in the GATT system. It has used the WTO dispute settlement process to tackle what it considers to be the other's abuses of international trade rules. In this context, Japan has generally received satisfactory results in the cases where it was a complaining party. Moreover, the existence of the DSU rules made it somewhat easier for Japan to argue that the US could not proceed with unilateral action. For example, in the case concerning photographic film, against the US, Japan became able to extract an outcome in its favor.

In this case regarding consumer photographic film and paper¹², the US put to challenge various Japanese laws, regulations, and requirements concerning imports of photographic film and paper. This translated into a Section 301 action on behalf of Eastman Kodak against the Fuji Photo Film Company. As the consultations remained unsuccessful, the US requested the establishment of a panel that was set up formally in October 1996. In this case, what the US put up claims that certain laws, regulations, and requirements put in force by the Japanese government, with respect to the distribution and sale of imported consumer photographic film and paper, violated the existing WTO legal provisions, and thereby harmed the US interests. However, the panel remained unconvinced and dismissed all of the US objections. The US did not

move to appeal the ruling. The panel report was adopted by the WTO in April 1998, demonstrating Japan's success.

The Massachusetts case¹³ was initiated because, in June 1996, the US state of Massachusetts passed a law barring the State from entering into contracts with any company that does business with Burma (Myanmar). Japan, however, claimed that this law was in violation of certain articles of the 1994 Government Procurement Agreement.¹⁴ As the joint consultations, by Japan and the EU, with the US remained without any substantial development, Japan and the EU jointly requested the establishment of a panel in September 1998. However, in the meantime, a US District Court held that this law was unconstitutional and was thus invalid. The State of Massachusetts' motion for a stay pending appeal was rejected.¹⁵ As this law has been declared invalid, Japan requested, along with the EU, to suspend the panel proceeding in February 1999.

Japan has asked the WTO to adjudicate several trade disagreements with the US and also other trading partners. In 1995, an important case on the issue of market access of auto exports was initiated by Japan against the US.¹⁶ The case dealt with punitive duties on Japanese auto exports to the US. Japan filed its first complaint in the WTO in May 1995, which however, did not lead to the establishment of a panel.

In this case Japan alleged that the imposition of import duties on automobiles from Japan under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 were in violation of the GATT. The dispute was settled in July 1995 when Japan and the US came to an agreement mainly favorable to the Japanese side. The automotive complaint against Indonesia (a TRIMs case), regarding discriminatory tax and tariff regimes in the Indonesian automobile sector, was also settled as Japan prevailed against Indonesia and Indonesia had to change its auto regime.

Japan also prevailed against Canada in the automotive sector. Its complaint against Canada involved the latter's import measures that especially favored the big three US automobile manufacturers (Autopact) by allowing these to import automobiles with zero percent tariff.¹⁷ It had also been included in the Canadian deal that new members would not be added to the Autopact. In July 1998, Japan requested consultations with Canada followed by a similar request by the EU. Japan then requested

the establishment of a panel in November 1998, and a joint panel of Japan and the EU was established in February 1999.

Japan claimed that the Canadian duty exemptions violated specific legal provisions of the WTO. After deliberations, the panel report of February 2000 upheld almost all Japanese claims. Although Canada went on to appeal the ruling on March 2, 2000, the appellate body upheld the rulings, especially with respect to violation of the GATT articles. Thus practically Japan won its case against Canada.

Japan has also contested the US regarding various dumping complaints in the WTO. In one case, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (March 2000),¹⁸ Japan, (and also the EU), successfully challenged the US Antidumping Act of 1916 after a US steel company used it to sue several importers of Japanese steel. On 26 September 2000, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted its recommendations and rulings in the case. At the DSB meeting on 23 October 2000, the US informed the DSB of its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in connection with this matter.

On 19 May 2003, legislation repealing the 1916 Act and terminating all pending cases was introduced in the US Senate. Other bills repealing the 1916 Act were introduced in the US House of Representatives on 4 March 2003 and in the Senate on 23 May 2003. Moreover, the US administration has conveyed its intention to continue to work with its Congress to enact legislation, and that it will continue to confer with the EC and Japan, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter.

In the case of Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan¹⁹, Japan moved formally to challenge antidumping measures against some of its steel products in the US and requested a panel on February 24, 2000. By February 2001, the panel report made clear that Japan had prevailed in much of its legal case against the US. When the US appealed the panel's rulings, the appellate body similarly found that the US actions had violated certain provisions of the antidumping agreement, as argued by Japan, although not to the extent claimed by Japan.

In another case regarding steel safeguards²⁰, Japan and seven other complainants (the EC, South Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, Brazil consolidated into one case), filed the original complaint

against the US in March 2002. The case was filed in reaction to the US president's imposed 'safeguard' tariffs of up to 30 percent on several types of imported steel on March 5, 2002. The US said objective was to restructure and help its ailing steel industry and it regarded its action as consistent with the WTO safeguard agreement, which allows countries to restrict imports temporarily if these threaten 'serious injury' to a specific domestic industry.

The Section 201 duties, imposed in March 2002 were reduced by 20 percent in March 2003, and further, imports from many developing countries and a number of steel products were excluded from the duties. However, Japan claimed the US move violated the WTO rules on the condition that there had not been a surge of steel imports into the US, a precondition for invoking the WTO safeguard rules.

The WTO panel issued its decision on July 11, 2002. It rejected the US arguments that the tariffs of between 8 and 30 percent, on selected types of steel imports, were needed because of increased steel imports that were hurting its domestic steel producers, thus deciding that US steel tariffs were without justification. The panel also rejected the US higher duty exclusions for free trade agreement (FTA) partners, Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan, even when the US included imports from those countries to demonstrate an increase in imports.

However, the US opted to appeal the WTO panel's final ruling against it and in the meantime kept in place the steel tariffs, originally introduced for three years. The steel dispute intensified as the EC drew up a list of potential US products to be hit with retaliatory measures if Washington failed to conform to the WTO ruling. In any event, Japan along with other complainants remained successful at the panel stage and later in the Appellate Body's decision. In this context, on December 4, 2003, the US President demolished controversial steel tariffs, mainly to avert the threat of retaliation from the EU and Japan, etc.

On 28 May 2008, Japan as a complainant requested consultations with the European Communities and its member states with respect to their tariff treatment of certain information technology products.²¹ Japan claimed that the tariff treatment the European Communities and its member States accorded to certain information technology products did not respect their commitments to provide duty-free treatment for these products under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and

asserted that a number of EC customs classification legal instruments appeared to be inconsistent with the EC's and its member States' obligations under Article II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and their Schedules, and therefore nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Japan under the GATT 1994. However, in this case no panel had been established nor settlement notified.²²

According to the request for consultations from Japan as a complainant on 24 November 2004, the US violated its WTO obligations with respect to certain measures relating to zeroing and sunset reviews.²³ On 4 February 2005, Japan requested the establishment of a panel. The Panel upheld Japan's claim relating to the use of zeroing when used by the USDOC by finding that it is inconsistent with Article 2.42 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It also agreed with Japan that the US zeroing methodology is a "norm" capable of being challenged in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The Panel rejected Japan's claims that zeroing was prohibited in proceedings other than original investigations, i.e. periodic reviews, new shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews.

However, both the parties notified their respective decisions to appeal certain issues of law covered in the panel report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the United States' zeroing procedures constitute a measure which can be challenged, as such, and therefore dismissed the United States' claim that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. It, however, reversed the Panel's finding that the United States does not act inconsistently with Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994. At its meeting on 23 January 2007, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body.

Afterwards the United States stated that it intended to comply with its WTO obligations and that it would need a reasonable period of time to do so, Japan requested that the reasonable period of time be determined through binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. Despite the Director-General's appointment of Mr. Florentino Feliciano to act as arbitrator, on 4 May 2007, the United States and Japan informed the DSB that they had mutually agreed that the reasonable period of time for the United States to implement the DSB

recommendations and rulings would be 11 months, expiring on 24 December 2007. However, on 10 January 2008, on the grounds that the United States had failed to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings, Japan requested the DSB authorization to suspend concessions pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU. The United States objected to the level of suspension and accordingly requested the matter to be referred to arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU and on 18 April 2008, the DSB agreed to refer to the original panel, if possible, the question whether the United States had complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings.²⁴

On the negative side, there have been some adverse rulings involving Japan in the WTO dispute settlement system. In the alcohol taxes case²⁵, the US along with the EU and Canada, successfully challenged a discriminatory Japanese tax initiative that placed high taxes on some western-style spirits, while applying low taxes to a traditional Japanese spirit (shochu). The Appellate Body Report and Panel Report were adopted on December 24, 1996, while not deciding in favor of Japan. However, under a December 1997 deal, Japan agreed to eliminate tariffs on white spirits and to accelerate elimination of tariffs on brown spirits.

Japan could not win a case, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products²⁶, brought by the US, and eliminated on 31 December 1999 the varietal testing requirements and the relevant experimental guide described in the Panel Report (WT/DS76/R). The US had alleged that Japan's quarantine measures for imports of agricultural products, including apples, cherries, peaches, walnuts, etc., were inconsistent with certain Articles of the sanitary and phytosanitary agreement, Articles XI of the GATT, and Article IV of the Agreement on Agriculture. After failure of consultations under the WTO, in April 1997, the panel, established in October 1997, issued report supporting the US claim and recommended Japan to change the measures. Japan, however, filed an appeal in November 1998.

In February 1999, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's findings. At its meeting on 19 March 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate Body report (WT/DS76/AB/R) and the panel report (WT/DS76/R) as modified by the Appellate Body report. Thus, Japan agreed to eliminate various testing requirements for quarantine purposes

and lifted various restrictions on the imports of certain varieties of fruit, including apples and cherries. On 30 August 2001, Japan and the US communicated to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, that they have reached a mutually satisfactory solution regarding the matters raised by the US in 'Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products' (WT/DS76) with respect to conditions for lifting import prohibitions on the fruits and nuts at issue in the dispute (covered products).

Japan also remained unsuccessful in the WTO case over apple quarantine.²⁷ On March 1, 2002, the US requested WTO dispute settlement consultations with Japan on its fire blight restrictions on imported US apples. Consultations remained unsuccessful and on May 7, 2002, the US requested that the WTO establish a panel to consider the Japanese restrictions. The US alleged that Japan's fire blight restrictions were inconsistent with various provisions of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and also without sufficient scientific evidence. Japan imposed severe restrictions on imported US apples, allegedly to protect Japanese plants from fire blight, a plant disease that affects certain types of plants, including pear and apple trees, but does not affect humans.

Japan claimed that its restrictions on imports of US apples were necessary to prevent introduction of fire blight into Japan. Japan, which had no fire blight-related plant disease, required US exporters to provide evidence that the trees from which apples were picked for export to Japan had been free of the disease for several years. Japan also required US apple farmers to keep trees producing fruit for export at least 500 meters away from other apple trees.

The WTO panel concluded, in a substantial report issued on 15 July 2003 that Japan's quarantine measures for fire blight disease were inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The WTO panel found, among other things that, on the basis of the information available, there is not sufficient scientific evidence that apple fruit are likely to serve as a pathway for the entry, establishment or spread of fire blight within Japan. The WTO settlement panel concluded that the Japanese measures were excessive and without scientific foundation. Japan, however on 28 August 2003, filed an appeal against the WTO panel's conclusion.

On 14 March 2006, a complaint was filed by Korea requesting consultations with Japan concerning countervailing duties imposed by Japan on certain Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs) from Korea.²⁸ Korea considered that the foregoing determinations were inconsistent with Japan's obligations under the GATT 1994 and under the SCM Agreement. On 18 May 2006, Korea requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 19 June 2006, the DSB established a panel. The Panel in its report while rejecting some of the Korea's claims upheld some of the claims in light of its findings.

On 30 August 2007, Japan notified its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the Panel report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The Appellate Body report was circulated to Members on 28 November 2007 and on 17 December 2007; the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report. At the DSB meeting of 15 January 2008, Japan announced its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations and was prepared to consult with Korea to reach an agreement on the reasonable period of time. On 25 February 2008, Korea requested that the reasonable period of time be determined through binding arbitration and both Korea and Japan requested Mr. David Unterhalter to act as arbitrator. The arbitrator determined that the reasonable period of time for Japan to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB would be eight months and two weeks from the date of the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body reports.

Japan has also settled some challenges in the consultation stage, and an important case brought by the US/EU concerning sound recordings under the TRIPs Agreement was resolved without litigation. Japan changed its law to grant full copyright protection for sound recordings, thus bringing its copyright law into compliance with the WTO TRIPs Agreement.²⁹

In another case in which Japan was a respondent,³⁰ Korea requested consultations with Japan on 1 December 2004 concerning Japan's import quotas on dried laver and seasoned laver. According to the request for consultations, Korea believed that Japan's extremely restrictive import quotas on dried laver and seasoned laver are inconsistent with, *inter alia*,

Articles X.3 and XI of the GATT 1994; Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; and Article 1.2 and 1.6 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. On 4 February 2005, Korea requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 21 March 2005, the DSB established the panel. However, on 23 January 2006, Korea and Japan informed the DSB of a mutually agreed solution under Article 3.6 of the DSU.

Japan has also made some proposals to improve the DSU, e.g., it has proposed that the DSU should be amended so that a complaining country may be allowed to take countermeasures only after a separate panel finds the member concerned has not complied with the recommendations or rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body.³¹

Conclusion

Japan has achieved successes within the current rules, and thus, it supports the WTO dispute settlement system. Although, Japan was relatively passive in its use of the GATT's relatively weak dispute settlement mechanism, its interests in the WTO framework have been considerably enhanced, especially after important successes in high profile cases with the US and other countries. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has served as a catalyst in greatly strengthening Japan's ability to better secure its interests, especially in confronting US unilateralism. In the context of the WTO's dispute settlement system, Japan, and also the EU, remain optimistic because the system tends to reduce the US inclinations toward unilateral actions.

Overall, Japan can be observed as a more active WTO member in the dispute settlement system. As a party to various disputes, it has remained quite actively involved in various important cases under the WTO dispute settlement system. Generally, though not always, its participation in the dispute settlement system has accrued fairly positive results for itself. The multilateral legal rules have provided opportunities to promote its interests and by invoking dispute settlement processes, Japan has legitimately tried to thwart external pressures and to protect its domestic interests to the extent possible.

Thus, Japan attaches importance to using the multilateral dispute settlement procedures of the WTO to address unfair trade policies and measures by its other trading partners. Despite some unsuccessful cases, Japan has reaped important successes, especially with regard to

antidumping issues. It also brings to light another high priority of Japan: to strengthen rules and disciplines related to antidumping, especially in its disputes with the US.

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THE STRUGGLE OF DEOBANDI ULAMA FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ISLAMIC LAWS IN PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT

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Abstract

The struggle of Deobandi scholars for enforceability of Islam is an important aspect of history of Pakistan. After independence, it was expected that in the new state, every department will have the color of Islam. Its political, economic and civic matters will be reflective of Islamic teachings. In this regard, the Deobandi scholars struggled hard for the enforceability of Islam in the country. In this paper, the efforts of Deobandi ulama and scholars for supremacy of Islamic laws have been highlighted.

On the 10th of August 1947, first meeting of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was held. Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, elected from East Bengal, was also one of its members. Muslim League leadership chose a Hindu as a chair person of this historical meeting instead of choosing any leader from Muslim League. Consequently, a Hindu leader, Mr. Mandal was chosen as a Chairman of first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Afterwards, when leadership came into the hands of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the next constitutional meeting was started with the recitation of a verse from *Surah Al Imran* (3: 26) by Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani¹.

For the newborn state first and foremost thing was to frame a constitution. However the matters of state were being run according to the Government of India Act 1935. The Government of Pakistan formed a sub-committee to frame the basic principles of Islamic law. Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani consulted Allama Syed Manazir Ahsan Gilani and Dr. Hamid Ullah to develop a framework for an Islamic constitution and to set its basic rules.

Constitutional Assembly should have formed a constitution with full zeal but unfortunately it was not done. Instead, a power struggle started, especially after the death of Quaid-e-Azam. In this situation, Muslim scholars got worried as they wanted to develop an Islamic Constitution in the country. Eventually, a conference at Decca was held in February, 1949 wherein the Muslim scholars plainly informed the government that

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if Pakistan was not having an Islamic constitution, the goals and the objectives that were set for this country would not be materialized. Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani categorically said that we worked hard and struggled for a separate country and for the well being of Islam and Muslims and stated “we would not abandon our demand that the future constitution of Pakistan should be based on Islamic Ideology wherein Muslims in individual or collective capacity, can shape their lives in Islamic orientations².” In the conference, Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani not only challenged Pakistani government but he also presented some proposals for the new born country.³

In February, 1949 when Decca Conference was going on, ulama decided to accelerate the struggle in the Constituent Assembly for Islamic provisions of the constitution. Allama Usmani urged the Prime Minister of Pakistan to declare “the Quran and Sunnah as basic of principles of the constitution and no law or constitution would be formalized which is not in accordance with Islamic point of view.” He quoted the Quaid-e-Azam’s letter which he wrote to Mr. Gandhi in 1944:

The Quran is a complete code of life. It provides for all matters, religious or social, civil or criminal, military penal, economic or commercial. It regulates every act, speech and movement, from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from salvation of the soul to the health of body, from the rights of all to those of each individual, from punishment here to that in the life to come. Therefore, when I say that the Muslims are a nation, I have in mind all the physical and metaphysical standards and values⁴.

On 12 March 1949, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed the Objectives Resolution. The resolution, proposed by the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, proclaimed that the future constitution of Pakistan would be modeled on the ideology and democratic spirit of Islam⁵. The Objectives Resolution defined the basic principles of the new state and provided that:

Pakistan would be a state wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed; wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out

in the Holy Quran and Sunnah; [and] wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to progress and practice their religions and develop their cultures.⁶

The ulama considered it an important move before the framing of constitution and thought it appropriate to present a comprehensive outline of basic Islamic principles of governance to the Constituent Assembly, since they were of the view that the members of parliament could not perform this task because of their lack of expertise in this area. On the proposal of Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan established a *Taleemat-e-Islamia Board*. Deobandi scholars, Allama Syed Suleman Nadvi and Mufti Muhammad Shafi were also members of this board. The Board formed the details of Islamic law with the cooperation of other members. However, the government neglected its recommendations and did not show any keenness on the recommendations of the Board.

The first attempt to establish Islamic Shariah in Pakistan was made by adopting the Objectives Resolution on March 12th, 1949. However, the basic problem in the enforcement of Islam was that the followers of different schools of thought did not trust each other and were not united to follow a single combined school of thought. Finally, in 1950, Syed Suleman Nadvi and Maulana Ehtasham-ul-Haq Thanvi collected 31 scholars from different schools of thought for this purpose, and after a lot of discussion and hard work, they put forth 22 points collectively⁷. The 4-day meeting was presided over by Allama Syed Suleman Nadvi. These 22 Points were presented to Governor General Ghulam Muhammad⁸. These points proved the sincerity of these scholars. Even today these 22 points can be used as a basis for establishing Shariah in the country. These 22 points were unanimously agreed by ulama of all schools of thought in a meeting from 21st to 24th January 1951.

Role of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

The Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam was formed when some of its members broke from the Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind in 1945 after that organization backed the Indian National Congress against the Muslim League's demand for a separate Pakistan. Its first president was Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. Unfortunately after the establishment of Pakistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given to an Ahmadi. Deobandi scholars

and ulama tried to make government know the ticklishness of situation but rulers did not take any notice of situation.

In the year 1953, a vigorous Anti-Qadiani movement started. The objective of the movement was to ensure the removal of all Ahmadis from government service, have them declared non-Muslims, stop them from raising mosques for the community and ban them from preaching or propagating their faith. A vociferous campaign by this movement in 1953 led to widespread rioting all over the Punjab. Several persons were killed and scores injured in the riots which were quickly quelled by the Pakistan army. The anti-Qadiani movement-supported by all mainstream Islamic parties in the country-continued to generate opposition to the Ahmadis through public rallies and court cases.

The objectives of 1953 Anti-Qadiani Movement, however, could not be realized and by the end of this movement political situation was much changed in the county. Many respectable ulama went into seclusion and they restricted their activities to publishing and preaching. To their followers, this situation was very alarming. Moulana Mufti Mehmood convened a convention in Multan in 1956 and in this convention they reviewed the political situation of the country. Moulana Ahmed Ali Lahori was chosen as president of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam while Moulana Mufti Mehmood was chosen as Vice President. Dr. Ahmed Hussain Kamal has observed in this regard as:

Within ten years, the situation was changed and persons that stood as heirs of Moulana Usmani were lost in their personal affairs and some preferred to remain silent. New generation of Pakistanis had no clear cut direction except to be either looking at all the ills of American Capitalism or the Communism. In this situation there was no other solution than that the people of Islamic orientations should step forward to take Pakistani nation out of the ill politics so that Islam can be provided strength. So to fill the gap, Moulana Ahmed Ali Lahori, Moulana Mufti Mehmood and Moulana Ghous Hazarvi and other ulama came forward in the political arena⁹.

Finally in 1974, under severe pressure from the ulama, Pakistan's first elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, introduced a constitutional amendment - known as the Second Amendment - which declared the Qadianies as non-Muslims.

Since its inception, ideologically, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam is regarded as non-compromising, rigid, insisting on strict enforcement of traditional Islamic law. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam helped establish thousands of madrasahs in Pakistan, and is reported to have affiliations with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan.

The Constitution of 1956

Pakistan remained without a constitution from 1947 to 1956. After the efforts of nine years, Pakistan was successful in framing the constitution which was implemented on March 23, 1956. Article 24 provided that the state should endeavor to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries. The same article enjoined Pakistan to foster friendly relations among all nations. There was no provision to make Islam as the state religion of Pakistan. Article 21 provided that no person should be compelled to pay any special tax, the proceeds of which were to be spent on the propagation of any religion other than his own. The Head of State was to be a Muslim not younger than 40 years of age.

Islam was given a significance in the 1956 Constitution, in two ways. First, through Article 197 the president was obliged to set up an organization for Islamic research and instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis; and under article 198 the President was to appoint a commission of experts to make recommendations' as to the measures for bringing existing laws in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. The Commission was to submit its report to the President within five years of its appointment. This report was to be placed before the National Assembly, and the Assembly after considering the report was to enact laws in respect thereof¹⁰.

The Constitution of 1956 had something to offer to both sides; it gave grounds to the orthodox traditionalist that his cause might be advanced, while there was nothing in the Islamic clauses to cause a liberal democrat to feel that Pakistan was incapable of becoming the kind of a state he wishes to see. The constitution did little to settle the fundamental issue of the desirable role of Islam in a modern state. Nor did its adoption serve to bridge what Keith Callard called "the wide gulf between the Ulama of the orthodox schools and the intelligentsia"¹¹. Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam critically analyzed the constitution and proposed some amendments so that constitution can be made completely Islamic¹².

Deobandi Scholars and Muslim Family Laws

Islamic personal law is the base of any Islamic polity, but in Pakistan differences of schools of thought were the major hurdle in it. So to settle these disputes, the Government of Pakistan formed a commission to explore the possibilities of setting the family laws, according to the teachings of Holy Quran and Sunnah. Moulana Ehtasham-ul-Haq Thanvi was also a member of this commission but unfortunately, rest of its members were not ulama and considered westernized. They presented a report which was widely opposed by Moulana Ehtasham-ul-Haq Thanvi, who in fact wrote a detailed note on it.¹³ These recommendations were however translated through Muslim Family Laws Ordinance on March 2, 1961.

Under the Ordinance, unmitigated polygamy was abolished, consent of the current wife was made mandatory for a second marriage and restrictions were placed on the practice of instant divorce where men pronounced it irrevocably by pronouncing *talaq* thrice in one go. The Arbitration Councils set up under the law in the urban and rural areas were to deal with cases of (a) grant of sanction to a person to contract a second marriage during the subsistence of a marriage; (b) reconciliation of a dispute between a husband and a wife; and (c) grant maintenance to the wife and children. All Muslim marriages were to be compulsorily registered with registrars to be appointed by union councils, one in each ward.

Ayub Khan's liberal interpretation of the Islamic principles antagonized Ulama who opposed his Family Law Ordinance to regulate Islamic personal law in a modern Islamic society. His attempts to popularize the family planning program were declared un-Islamic by the ulama who quoted verses from the Holy Quran to plead that the use of contraceptives was prohibited in Islam. Moulana Ehtasham-ul-Haq Thanvi convened a meeting Jamia Ashrafia, Neela Gunband, Lahore, in which Shia, Sunni, Deobandi, Braveli, Ahl-e-Hadees and all other Schools of thought collectively participated and declared that the Muslim Family Laws were against the religion. Same was reiterated subsequently in another meeting convened under the President-ship of Moulana Ahmed Ali Lahori.

In the year 1962 president Ayub Khan gave a new constitution to the county and under it elections were held. Moulana Ghulam Ghous

Hazarvi from Hazara was elected as a member of Provincial Assembly and Mufti Mehmood from Dera Ismail Khan was elected as member of National assembly. Moulana Ghous Hazarvi presented a speech against Family Laws in Provincial Assembly and forcefully said that provincial assembly must recommend abrogation of the Family Laws. During Ayub Khan's talks with the political leaders on 10th March, 1969, in Rawalpindi, leader of Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan, Mufti Mehmood, objected to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and demanded that the 22 Points agreed by Ulama in 1951 should be implemented in order to make Pakistan an Islamic state.

Round Table Conference of 1969 and Ulama's Demands for Islamization

Last days of Ayub's Government saw a political turmoil. Finally, Ayub Khan called a conference of all political parties of Pakistan for having recourse to a joint mode of action. In March 1969, Round Table Conference was held in Rawalpindi, wherein most of the political leadership of the country participated. The consensus decision was to have a parliamentary system of government. Moulana Mufti Mehmood stressed on the Ulama's 22 Points. However, he did not gather much support from the other opposition parties on this issue.

In these circumstances Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam decided to participate in the 1970 elections. For the struggle of having an Islamic system Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam, invited other political parties and religious parties for collective struggle. Jamiat performed well in the elections and on the 1st May 1972, Mufti Mehmood became the Chief Minister of NWFP (now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).¹⁴

Moulana Mufti Mehmood took several Islamic measures after taking his oath as the Chief Minister. Drinking was banned immediately. He also imposed complete ban on interest, gambling, wearing English dress in the government offices and dowry. Moreover, the Quranic education was made a condition for admissions in educational institutions and Urdu was declared as the national language at all official levels.

The 1973 constitution of Pakistan also provides for the protection, propagation and enforcement of Islamic Ideology. It also affirms to propagate and implement the basic teachings of Islam. Role of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam in this context was significant. For the first time, Moulana Mufti Mehmood got included the definition of a Muslim in the

constitution and Islam was declared as the state religion of Pakistan¹⁵. It was also declared that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions¹⁶.

Though, the Constitution of 1973 comprehensively defined “Muslim”, but the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed called themselves as the Muslims. A movement against the Qadianis started in 1974. A new organization, “Majlis-e-Amal Protection of Khatam-e-Nabuwat” formed with the representation of all major political parties, and Allama Syed Muhammad Yousaf Banuri, a renowned student of famous Deobandi scholar of Hadith Allama Anwar Shah Kashmiri was the elected president of this committee. In this regard, meetings and processions were held all over the country. This issue was presented before the Parliament. On 30th June 1974 opposition presented a bill in National Assembly to declare Qadianis as non Muslims. A total of 45 other members of the opposition were also there with Moulana Mufti Mehmood who presented the bill. At last on 7th Sep 1974, the parliament passed an amendment in the constitution and declared Qadianis as non Muslim minority. The Second Amendment in the 1973 Constitution declared for the first time the Ahmadiyya Community or the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement (Lahoris) as non-Muslims¹⁷.

PNA Movement of 1977

As the schedule of 1977 General Elections was announced, all the major opposition political parties, including the religious ones got united under the banner of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Moulana Mufti Mehmood was chosen as the President of the Alliance. However, the clean sweep in the elections by PPP was a great surprise to everyone and the PNA could not swallow the results and accused Bhutto of systematic rigging in the general elections and boycotted the provincial assembly contest thus making the whole exercise doubtful¹⁸.

Consequently, a mass movement started against the government. Excessive violence of the government upon the people gave a new trend to the movement and in this way the protest against the rigged general elections became movement of Nizam-e-Mustafa. This movement was also led by Islamic scholar Moulana Mufti Mehmood. Although this movement could not succeed to get their goals, it paved the way of General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law¹⁹.

In 1980 a Constitutional amendment by General Zia ul Haq's regime introduced a new hierarchy of Islamic courts. This hierarchy consisted of a Federal Shariat Court (at the level of High Court, the highest judicial forum in a Province) and a Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench (at the level of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the highest judicial forum in the Country) as its sole appellate forum. The Federal Shariat Court was given the power to declare any law repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. In case of such a declaration, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench, the said law would cease to exist on the date mentioned in the decision declaring it so. The known Deobandi scholar Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, the son of the late Moulana Mufti Muhammad Shafi (the former Grand Mufti of Pakistan) served as Judge of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan from 1982 to May 2002²⁰.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 redefined the ideological orientations of Deobandi ulama. The fear of USSR to attack Pakistan led Pakistan to jump into Afghan Jihad. Government radically supported the Afghan Jihad through the provision of volunteers in the form of mujahideen, most of them hailing from Deobandi school of thought. These Deobandi Madrasahs were seen as "supply lines for jihad" in the Soviet Afghan war. Both the U.S. and Arab states joined to help the Afghans wage a jihad against the Communists and also to contain Irani influence. However, after the Soviet Union pulled out of the conflict in the late 1980s the mujahideen fought each other in the subsequent Afghan Civil War. Following 11 September, the international community has seen these madrasahs as schools of militancy and terrorism.

The Deoband ulama have been the center of controversy since 9/11 attack on New York Towers. It was thought that attacks were planned by Taliban who were students of madrasahs run by ulama professing Deoband ideology. Since then, the Deobandi Madrasahs especially from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are in focus and have come under fire especially from the West.

Conclusion

Pakistan was carved out of the sub-continent of India to serve as a laboratory for Islam and to promote the separate and distinct identity of the Muslims. The Deobandi ulama strove hard to make Pakistan an

Islamic polity since its emergence on the world map. No doubt, Islamic parties did play some role in creating the urge amongst Muslim masses for Islam, and the Ulama-e-Deoband have launched a sustained campaign for establishing the Islamic system in the country. But these endeavors were never completely successful. In 80s, the General Zia's Hudood Ordinance did not bring unity in the nation. Later in 90s, Shariat Bill brought forward by JUI and Moulana Sami-ul-Haq, the man behind it, was not a success. Politically, during Musharraf era, religious elements under the banner of MMA won partial victory and became the balancing force. Despite that the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, be it Sami-ul-Haq's or Fazl-ur-Rehman's, could not become rising star on national horizon or to form federal government as a result of winning the elections.

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8. Government of Pakistan, *Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Pakistan. National Assembly*, Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1972, p. 154.
 9. Ahmed Hussain Kamal Dr., *Tareekh-i-Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam*, Lahore: Makki Dar ul Kutab, 1997, p.74.
 10. An explanation at the end of Article 198 read: "In the application of the article to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression Quran and Sunnah shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by the sect." In effect of this explanation is officially recognized by all the sects in Pakistan.
 11. Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958, p. 228.
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 14. Kamal, *Tareekh-i-Jamiat*, p. 194.
 15. For the first time, the Constitution of Pakistan determined the definition of a Muslim which states: 'Muslim' means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, and does not believe in, or recognise as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad.
 16. For further details, see: Martian Lau, *Islam and Constitutional Development in Pakistan*; Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*; Golam Wahed Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*.
 17. Part IX of the Constitution: Islamic Provisions

18. Jaffer, Syed, *Bhutto Rigged the Elections: Third Forged Letter Against him*. Available online <http://www.scribd.com/doc/45955561/Bhutto-Rigged-the-Elections-Forged-Evidence-Exposed-by-Syed-Jaffer> (Accessed on April 8, 2011 at 11.00 am).
19. However, it has been argued that the Nizam e Mustafa movement, which comprised almost all factions of religious forces, went in wrong directions and General Zia had taken the due advantage of it. The army staged third coup d'état in Pakistan's history when General Zia ul Haq overthrew the government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and took over as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) on July 5, 1977. The federal and provincial governments were dismissed; political parties were banned; national and provincial assemblies and the Senate were dissolved; the constitution was put in abeyance; civil courts continued to function as usual but fundamental rights were suspended.
20. He played a key part in the move toward interest free banking and the establishment of Islamic financial institutions in Pakistan. He is considered to be an authority on this subject. Important decisions delivered by the bench include on *rajam*, making of photographs, shuffa, retirement of government servants, Zakat and Ushr, Qisas and Diyyat, and Riba.

BOOK REVIEWS

Muslims in Global Politics: Identities, Interests, and Human Rights by Mahmood Monshipouri. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, pp. 328.

The global world order that has emerged after September 11, 2001, has for many reaffirmed the clash of civilizations thesis. The war on terrorism is seen as a war between Islam and the West, with an indispensable view of Muslim identity that intermingle it with Islamic terrorism. The question of how the West should respond to this threat has come to dominate global politics. In Western discourse, this terrorism is often framed as resistance to Western values and norms. Hence, prescriptions for dealing with the challenge of global jihadists have included not only military responses but also a campaign for "winning the hearts and minds of Muslims" that usually takes the form of initiatives to introduce "Western" secular and liberal democratic values and human rights norms to Muslim populations (p. viii). Meanwhile, the global jihadist framework is a mirror image of Western perceptions of threat and destruction, and calls for defensive action by Muslims united as a community of faith that condones violence.

In his latest book, *Muslims in Global Politics*, Mahmoud Monshipouri offers an alternative to the project of global jihadists. He convincingly depicts this movement as only one among many competing to win the Muslim hearts and minds. He sees a crowded field of contention over how to reconstruct Muslim identities and reformulate their interests. These competing movements differ in their reactions to globalization and their position on the preservation of Islamic identity. He recognizes, however, that the current socio-cultural context, which has been shaped by decades of Islamist activism coupled with domestic repression and Western hegemonic practices, is more conducive to the expansion of the global jihadists' agenda.

Monshipouri's prescription for preventing the spread of the transnational community of Islamist militants and for enhancing the enjoyment of human rights is inclusionary politics. This would encompass the integration of Islamic reformists into the political process within Muslim majority countries and of Muslim minorities into the Western societies they are living in, as well as Western engagement with Islamic reformers who have already illustrated their receptiveness to universal values, such as democracy and human rights.

The author develops this policy-relevant advice through a study that clearly demonstrates his argument that "Muslim identities are multiple, fluid, and contentious" (p. 260). Drawing on constructivist insights from international relations, his analysis takes into account the dialectical relationship between material and ideational transformations within the international system and domestic environments that continually shape and are in turn shaped by the growing number of claimants to distinct identities.

In chapter 1, he discusses the international and domestic factors that set the stage for Islamic revivalism, and how processes of both modernization and globalization have strengthened the authoritative status of Islamists of various stripes in shaping identities at the individual, national, and transnational levels and transformed existing formulations of Islamic national and state identities into new and hybrid forms.

Chapter 2 introduces a typology of four competing schools of thought--Islamic conservatives, neoconservatives, reformists, and secularists--focusing especially on their perceptions of globalization, in particular the universalization of human rights discourse and their strategies of action. The author argues that while the conservatives and neoconservatives resist global norms which they perceive as instruments of Western hegemony and secularists adopt them as the correct model, reformists look for ways of reconciling and

accommodating human rights norms within Islamic principles. He illustrates throughout the book the increasing interconnectedness of the assertion of Islamic identities and struggle for the protection of human rights alongside mounting criticism of the universal human rights regime in the post-Cold War period. Monshipouri strongly endorses calls for intercultural dialogue to negotiate a set of non-ethnocentric universal rights.

Especially commendable is chapter 3 on gender identity, which is the issue at the heart of the debate between Islamic and universal human rights. He investigates the unique role of Islamist women who have to struggle not only against state repression but also against conservative Islamism and patriarchy. He demonstrates the empowerment of women's movements and the increasing trend of cooperation between secular and Islamist women at the national and transnational levels as a clear example of the diffusion of global norms and social networks among Muslims.

In the case studies that follow, Monshipouri explores the question of how to reconcile conflicting identities that have emerged within the context of the rising influence of Islamism and Western-led globalization.

Chapters 4 to 9 provide an elaborate account of the current status of the competing claims on Islamic national and state identities in six Muslim majority countries (Egypt, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia) by tracing the history of the contestation between the state, secularists, and Islamist movements with conservative, radical, and reformist visions. In his analysis of Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia, author underlines the trend toward Islamic reformism. He strongly praises the reformists for their adoption of the universal values discourse based on human rights. This is especially true of his treatment of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which he identifies as a successful example of Islamist

transformation. He argues that in sharp contrast to the Turkish case, the Iranian reformist movement failed to sustain political liberalization and rapprochement with the West because they have neglected economic development.

In chapter-10, the author examines the relationship between Muslim minorities living in Europe and the states they are living in. He illustrates the growing influence of transnational Islamic identity as these immigrants feel alienated by societies and discriminated against by state policies. By situating Islamist movements within the larger field of contention over identity, the author contributes to the debate on the relationship between universal and particularistic views of human rights in general and between Islam and international human rights specifically.

The book is rich in detail and references and will serve as a great resource for scholars, advanced students, and public policymakers interested in the topic. Yet two interrelated limitations of the study stand out: the terminology he utilizes and the recommendations he offers. In addition to his four category typology, Monshipouri frequently adds qualifiers, such as modernist, moderate, radical, and mainstream, when referring to different movements without providing his criteria for differentiating them. These terms, though frequently used in academia, are still being debated. The reviewer expected acknowledgement of the fact that naming has political consequences.

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Samul Beckett, Wordmaster Waiting for Godot Text with Critical Commentary by Prof. Ira Hasan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 187.

Prof. Ira Hasan, an acclaimed educationist and literary critic, has authored this commentary on Samuel Beckett's (1906-89) famous play *Waiting for Godot* 'with the mature Pakistani student in mind, providing access to latest criticism and developments on the theme of the play' along with 'an easy to follow explanation of the text'. It is a new kind of play categorized as absurd drama wherein its author has achieved 'a theoretical impossibility --- in which nothing happens, twice' notwithstanding its 'second act being a reprise of the first'. (Vivian Mercier)

The play was actually written in French (*En Attendant Godot*: 1949) later translated into English by its author with subtitle --- a tragicomedy in two acts (1954). It came to be considered as an example of what critic Martin Esslin later called "heater of the Absurd" which discards traditional plot, characters, and action to encumber its audience with 'a disorienting experience'. Characters indulge in apparently meaningless dialogue or activities and as a result the audience perceives what it is like to live in a universe that doesn't 'make sense'. *Waiting for Godot* is a classic example of this form of drama that can 'generate considerable suspense and dramatic tension in spite of being a play in which literally *nothing* happens, a play designed to show that nothing *can* ever happen in human life'. Despite its peculiarly facile surface, it is one of the most important dramatic works of the preceding century revolutionizing the theatre as it did and opening it to 'possibilities that playwrights and audiences had never before imagined'. The author of the present book presses the argument thus: 'After *Godot*, plots could be minimal, settings unlocalized, characters contradictory, exposition done away with, dialogue

unpredictable, one actor could talk for several minutes, another remain absolutely silent – the possibilities were suddenly inexhaustible.

Religious interpretations hold ‘Vladimir and Estragon as humanity waiting for the elusive return of a saviour’. Political interpretations stipulate ‘the relationship between Pozzo and Lucky as that of a capitalist to his labour’. Albeit its existentialist undertones, the play seems to be ‘primarily about hope’ --- the two protagonists pitifully awaiting hope to arrive. At times in the play it (hope) is constructed as a form of ‘salvation’ in the personae of Pozzo and Lucky, or even as ‘death’. How to pass the time in a situation which offers no hope, may also be deemed to be a subject of the play.

One would readily agree with the author that “Great texts in literature share a universality of application beyond time, creed, colour or place. Though expressed by two individuals, Vladimir and Estragon’s concerns are universal --- and the response to such texts remains always new because they are capable of absorbing new ideas. Texts like *Waiting for Godot* are ageless.”

Prof. Ira Hasan’s *Commentary on Godot* comprises six chapters dealing with some useful but relevant information on its author Samuel Beckett, structure of the play, an indepth critical evaluation of its contents and model questions and their answers followed by a select bibliography. Written in a scholarly but lucid style, the book is a compendium of authentic academic as well as critical information on Beckett’s supreme classic *Waiting for Godot*.

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Jisay Raat Lay Uri Hawa by Muhammad Iqbal Diwan. Karachi: Scheherzade, 2010, pp. 399.

The seminal difference between an autobiography and a memoir, as the expert academics say, is that the former is chronological and sequential in character and follows a certain timeline while the later is a random set of recollections, significant episodes which does not necessarily follow a necessary timeline.

Jisay Raat Lay Uri Hawa by Muhammad Iqbal Diwan is fascinating and unputdownable memoir of a sitting bureaucrat. From the outset a reader gets the impression that despite having mastery over the Urdu language and beautiful craftsmanship the writer is not as forthcoming and candid in the narration of events and the complete story and description of certain weird events and the disclosure of their characters and their bizarre feats are being withheld for the future. The main character of the book is Mr. Adnan, a bureaucrat, who is the linchpin of all the events of the book. One may safely assume that it is the *nom de plume* of the author.

The book under review is divided into five parts. Most of the book is the portrayal of certain characters (with their real identity hidden) and sharing of the author's experiences with these personas, to an extent, in a fictional context. The first part of the book deals with certain characters like Tajamul Hussain Khan and Admiral Sahib. These are not only a vivid description of demeanors and misdemeanors of serving and retired government servants but a forceful satire on their role in a developing country like ours. In the second part the writer describes the childhood memoirs of the central character of the book Mr. Adnan, his early education and some characters which influenced his upbringing and school education. This part also sheds some light on the Indian state of Gujarat and its famous personalities who played a pivotal role in the realms of politics, religion and business in the

subcontinent. The brief history of stick dance in the Gujarat and Rajasthan regions of India is fascinating and grips the readers. The third part of the book is almost devoted to the ominous and eerie working and characters of Karachi underworld. This part is not only interesting but instructively eye opener to the common readers. It shows how a surreptitious world exists and operates with impunity in a way it wants. The fourth part of the book is a collection of some rambling episodes which show machinations and espionage of secret services such as RAW and MOSSAD and the assassination of Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the events which precipitated this tragedy. The fifth part of the book captioned “Aunty M” is an excellent study of Sufism which revolves around a female mystic and her real or presumed supernatural powers. But the beauty of this part is succinct delineation of the spirit, philosophy and practice of Islamic mysticism. Historical anecdotes and appropriate citations from the Sufi texts increase the worth of this part and make it illuminating and incisive.

The abundant merits of the book make it worth reading. The literary style, lucidity and flow of language make it impressive. Mr. Diwan in writing of this book has fully made use of his command over Urdu language. Such an appropriate use of diction is hard to find in the writings of many contemporary Urdu writers. Mr. Diwan appears to be a voracious reader of not only Urdu prose but also of Urdu poetry, classical and modern both.

The book does not just offer the pleasure of prose reading but a variety of quality verses also. The appropriate selection of verses at the relevant places accentuates the language as well as its effect. These verses make the reading of the text a pleasurable experience. Interestingly, the writer not only makes use of verses from poetry of known poets from the subcontinent but also quotes many songs from Indian and Pakistani films. The language creates an impact of poetic

prose and the reader finds himself carried away because of the beauty of the text's language and diction.

What makes this book an interesting text to read is the fact that it is not just the tale of one character but is fused with the narratives of lot of characters – each having its own tale to tell. Whether these characters are from the bureaucracy and the government circles of Pakistan like *Tajjamal Hussain Khan*, *Roe Peetiyo Baloch* or *Admiral Sahib* or from the Karachi underworld like *Tahir Babu* or from the mystical realms like *Aunty M*, all are dealt with in detail. He seems in love with all the characters he talks about in his text and develops them in way that not a single necessary detail remains untouched. Each new character turns up with a new tale, more interesting than the previous one.

The writer has a keen and sensitive eye to what is worth mentioning and what should remain untold. Writer's focus on the minute details is absolute and his description of such details seems inevitable in the texture of the narrative. While reading this book one can't help but be reminded of Qudrat-ullah-Shahab's *Shahab Nama*. Mr. Iqbal Diwan also seems to be treading on the same path; a bureaucrat turned writer turned Sufi, highlighting the enigmatic socio-political milieu of Pakistan in a Sufi framework, coloured with many fictional and real tales of the elite as well as of common people.

Despite merits, the book is not free from its share of pitfalls and loopholes. Typographical mistakes are not uncommon. On couple of occasions historical details and facts are not described accurately. For example Shaikh-ul-Hind Mahmud Hassan is written as Mahmud-ul-Hassan (P. 52, 345). The known Muslim polemicist Dr. Zakir Naik has been mentioned as belonging to Gujarat rather than Mumbai (P. 105). Mario Puzo rather than Harold Robbins has been described as the author of the book *Dreams Die First* (P. 175). Similarly Pnina Werbner's wonderful study *Pilgrims of Love* is written as 'The Pilgrim

of Love' (P. 360). One expects that the next edition of the book would be free from such galling errors, both factual and typographical.

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Contributions

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